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ABSTRACT 
This research aims at developing and extending the theoretical and empirical 
literature on the extent of government sector involvement in the economy. It is 
primarily concerned to analyse the causes of the generally increasing size of the 
government sector in developed market economies.  
Despite the importance of this topic in the field of political economy, the literature 
review suggests that there is no single core theory of the size of government in the 
economy, only various fragmented theoretical explanations. In an attempt to 
bridge this analytical gap in the existing knowledge, this research offers a simple 
integrative theoretical framework. Within that framework, this research gathers 
and empirically tests the most relevant theories in this field. To that end, it makes 
use of data for developed market economies in the period from 1970 to 2008. The 
obtained results indicate that national income, a country‟s degree of 
modernisation, trade and financial openness, relative prices of government and 
private goods and government sector employment play an important role in 
explaining the size of government in developed market economies.  
In addition, this research contributes to the existing empirical literature by 
examining the evolution of long, historical time-series of government 
expenditures for the four developed market economies for which this data is 
available (the US, the UK, Italy and Sweden). Contrary to conventional wisdom, 
statistical examination of the data suggests that the major change in the underlying 
growth rate of government expenditures occurred around the turn of the 20
th
 
century.  
By contributing to a better understanding of the long-run determinants of the size 
of government in the economy, this research offers a basis for relevant policy 
proposals and also informs debate on the appropriate size and role of the public 
sector in a mixed economy.  
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PREFACE 
The debate about the optimal size of the public sector is one of the oldest and 
most enduring in the field of public sector economics. The polemics about 
governments that have allegedly grown “too big” imply that the optimal size of 
the government is well known and understood. Conversely, according to both the 
theoretical and empirical literature, the issue of whether or not a large government 
sector hinders economic performance is still unresolved. The existing literature 
suggests that it is surprisingly difficult to identify an unambiguous connection 
between economic performance, generally measured by growth rates, and the 
extent of government involvement in mixed developed economies, generally 
measured by government expenditures shares in GDP. Not only is the question of 
the optimal size of government complex in a strict economic sense, but it also 
entails an ideological and political overtone.  
Much the current disaffection with the alleged large government size stems from 
concerns about the long-term sustainability of public finances. Proponents of 
limited governments complain that government has grown so big that is has 
become a pervasive fact of everyday life. They are worried that the financing of 
such a “leviathan” is becoming an unbearable burden placed on the backs of 
citizens; thus advocating an inevitable retrenchment of the government sector. On 
the other side are those who claim that the increasing complexity and insecurity of 
modern economic and social life inevitably calls for the increase in the scope of 
governmental activities. Much of the population perceives government activities 
as important prerequisites for a high, or at least decent, quality of life. The 
publicly supported efforts made by governments to mitigate the negative 
consequences of the on-going global financial crisis suggest that the government 
sector is still seen as a beneficial force that plays an active role in the economy. 
Some commentators assert that the recent global financial crisis is a reminder that 
deregulated markets are not up to coping with the challenges of increasingly 
complex societies.   
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Although the literature on the optimal size of government clearly represents an 
important topic, our thesis is primarily concerned with analysis of the causes, 
rather than consequences, of the generally increasing size of the government 
sector. Just as challenging for economists as the question of what the optimal size 
of government is, has been the question of what the main determinants of 
government size are. This thesis aims at contributing to this specific area of 
research by providing some new insights into the core driving forces of 
government size. A serious discussion about the optimal extent of government 
involvement in the economy ought to be based on a thorough analysis of the core 
determinants of government size. In this light, our inquiry into the causes of 
government size is of general importance, since it informs debate on an 
appropriate size of the government sector in a mixed economy.  
But, how do we measure the size of government? There is no single measure of 
the true government size that would account for all aspects of government 
activities, particularly regulatory or non-budget activities. Nonetheless, we can 
still gain insights into the changes that have taken place in the size of government 
by examining government expenditures. In fact, the most widely used measure of 
the relative size of government is the proportion of government expenditures in 
GDP, and this approach has been followed in this thesis. Although this indicator 
reveals that there are marked differences among nations, government 
expenditures, on average, typically account for nearly 50 percent of GDP in the 
OECD countries. For good or ill, it seems that modern societies today allocate and 
redistribute a significant portion of economic resources through the government 
sector and that, generally, this portion has been increasing throughout the 20th 
century. A question then arises as to the point in time when the relative size of 
government started to grow at an unprecedented pace? Did it occur, as 
conventionally assumed, together with the on-set of World War I, the Great 
Depression, World War II, or, perhaps, somewhat earlier than that? What has 
caused the increase in the relative size of government in developed mixed 
economies over the past four decades? What has caused the decline of the size of 
government in some countries in the last few years? One of the main aims of this 
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thesis is to give answers to these questions. The originality of our approach to 
answering these questions is that we, unlike most of the empirical studies in this 
field, propose a simple but coherent theoretical framework to guide the empirical 
analysis of the core determinants of government size in developed economies 
during the past four decades. Furthermore, to arrive at precise estimates of the 
effects of explanatory variables identified in the literature on the determinants of 
government size, we use a novel econometric technique that tackles some 
methodological issues that were “swept under the rug” in the earlier studies. 
In addressing these and other interesting questions, the thesis consists of six 
chapters developed as follows. Chapter 1 provides a conceptual background for 
addressing the phenomenon of government involvement in the economy. Why 
does the government sector exist and how large should it be? What is the 
relationship between political parties, their ideologies and the actual government 
size? Should we expect the philosophical and ideological perspectives about the 
desirable government size by different political parties to be straightforwardly 
translated into their actual political choices once they become the government? In 
this chapter we discuss those and other ideological and political questions about 
the desirable government size. The discussion is followed by an illustration of the 
actual, generally increasing, trends in government size for a selected number of 
developed economies. To gain insights into the broad investigation of the optimal 
size of government from the economic point of view, in this chapter we also 
examine the theoretically hypothesised non-linear growth effects of government 
size and present the related, utterly inconclusive empirical findings.  
In Chapter 2 we empirically examine the validity of conventional wisdom that the 
size of government started to grow with the on-set of major social disturbances, 
such as World War I, the Great Depression and World War II. To proceed with 
such challenge we first needed to obtain a very long time-series of government 
expenditures that dates back to at least the pre-World War I period for as many 
countries as possible. While attempting to construct such a database we 
experienced a variety of practical issues related to non availability and poor 
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quality of historical data for some countries. Nonetheless, the effort paid off in 
that we were able to take advantage of this unique dataset consisting of historical 
time-series of government expenditures for the four developed market economies 
for which this data was available; namely, the US, the UK, Italy and Sweden. To 
identify the major break in the underlying growth rate of government expenditures 
for those four countries, we let the data locate the date of the break itself, by 
employing a relatively novel econometric test that has not, to the best of our 
knowledge, been used so far in this research context.  
Growing along with government, the literature on the determinants of government 
size has offered several separate theoretical explanations. The main aim of 
Chapter 3 is to provide a thorough review of those fundamental theoretical 
approaches to explaining the size of government. This literature dates back to the 
19
th
 century with Wagner‟s law, which relates the size of government sector to the 
process of modernisation, socio-economic complexity and the income-elastic 
nature of publicly provided services. Among the other factors explaining the 
extent of government involvement in the economy, mention is often made of the 
potential role of a country‟s economic openness, with the emphasis placed on the 
exposure to external risk on the one hand, and international competitive pressure 
on the other. Another, important economic perspective is associated with Baumol 
(1967), who hypothesised that the government sector is affected by a “cost 
disease” due to unbalanced productivity growth between the private and 
government sector. The politically oriented literature argues that government is a 
vehicle for various sorts of interest groups working to promote their own interest 
in big governments. This literature emphasises the strength of special interest 
groups which are assumed to have strong incentives to lobby for government 
“favours”. Niskanen (1971) stresses the importance of bureaucratic expansionism, 
while Brennan and Buchanan (1980) in their Leviathan theory focus on the power 
of centralised governments to maximise their size.  
Is the increase in government size a result of changing social and economic 
conditions, such as rising incomes, changes in the relative price of government 
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services, and increasing insecurity; or is it a result of lobbying activities, special 
interest groups and government bureaucrats? Is there a way to bring all these 
explanations together? The literature suggests that little work has been done to 
bring those approaches together, leaving us with no comprehensive, explicitly 
formulated and testable theoretical model. This analytical gap identified in the 
literature gives scope to contribute to the existing literature and forms the starting 
point of our aim to develop an integrative model of government size in Chapter 4. 
We argue that there is a confluence of all explanations and that all proposed 
approaches are pieces of the same “puzzle”. Our eclectic model rests on the 
assumption that the observed government expenditures are the recorded outcomes 
of the interaction between the demands of consumers-voters (and various interest 
groups) and the supply responses of the government, under their respective 
constraints.  
Building on the analytical foundation developed in Chapter 4; in Chapter 5 we use 
data on a set of developed OECD countries for the period 1970-2008 to examine 
the core determinants of government size. The originality of our approach lies not 
only in the developed underlying theoretical framework, but also in the 
methodology applied to estimate the determinants of the government size. 
Namely, we estimate the preferred model specification using a recently developed 
panel-equivalent error correction methodology. This technique addresses 
important methodological issues, rarely discussed in other empirical studies in this 
field. In particular, this technique allows a researcher to distinguish between the 
long-run effects on the share of government expenditures in GDP and short-run 
dynamics, to accommodate the joint occurrence of dynamics and parameter 
heterogeneity as well as to address the problem of endogeneity. Since the aim of 
this preface is to introduce the reader, in a non-technical way, to the main ideas 
and research questions to be investigated throughout the thesis, at this point we do 
not discuss technical details or the key findings. Instead, we let the reader 
discover those gradually, from one chapter to another. 
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In Chapter 6, we bring together the evidence from the preceding chapters, draw 
general concluding remarks and offer opinions on the most promising directions 
for future research. Although this research focuses on the determinants of the size 
of government in developed economies, we believe that its main findings may be 
of importance also for policy makers in transitional counties. The key results may 
convey implications for the process of rolling back the role of the state, which has 
been, and still is, the main issue in many developed and transitional economies. 
Our investigation is primarily of an exploratory kind, aiming at identifying the 
empirical regularities through econometric analysis. The main aim of this thesis is 
to assess empirically the contribution and respective relevance of each of the 
independent theoretical explanations of the size of government in the economy 
identified in the literature; thus offering additional insights into the size of 
government in mixed economies. In order to accomplish this ultimate aim in a 
conceptually satisfactory manner, we first set an analytical foundation by 
developing a simple but coherent integrative model of government size. If the 
thesis contributes, in some small way, to enhance understanding of the long-run 
determinants of government size, we shall be satisfied that our efforts have been 
worthwhile. 
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1.1 Introduction  
The question of where to draw a line between government and private sector 
activities is a fundamental issue in the political economy of mixed economies. 
Inevitably, the answer to this question implies normative judgements about the 
desirable role of government in the economy, which in turn depends on the 
paradigm in which the appropriate mix of private and government sectors is to be 
analysed. In this introductory chapter some of those normative judgements about 
the optimal size of government in the economy are tackled.  
Given that this thesis undertakes a positivistic approach to analysing the 
determinants of the size of government in the economy, some general trends in the 
size of government for a selected group of developed economies are illustrated 
and some practical issues related to difficulties in defining and measuring the 
government sector are emphasised. The selected data for the government 
expenditure share in GDP - as an imperfect but widely used measure of the size of 
government in the economy - suggest that some of the most developed world 
economies have devoted a relatively high proportion of their GDP to government 
activates for many years. Over the past four decades, the observed broad trends 
seem to indicate that the governments in those economies have grown, with some 
noticeable differences between different countries.  
The aim of this introductory chapter is to provide a conceptual background for 
addressing the phenomenon of government involvement in the economy. This 
chapter sets the stage for the investigation of the evolution and determinants of the 
size of government in the economy pursued in subsequent chapters. The chapter is 
organised as follows: normative issues about the desirable size of government in 
the economy, from different ideological perspectives, are discussed in section 1.2. 
Theoretically hypothesised non-linear growth effects of the size of government 
are discussed and graphically illustrated within this section. Political views about 
the size of government as well as a discrepancy between political rhetoric and 
actual political choices are examined in section 1.3. The actual figures of 
government expenditures in GDP for a selected number of developed economies 
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are presented in section 1.4 to indicate the dimension and direction of changes in 
the share of national output absorbed by the government over the past three 
decades. Complementary to discussion of the observed trends in the share of 
government expenditures in GDP, some of the main conceptual and practical 
problems in defining and measuring the size of government are addressed too. 
This chapter concludes with section 1.5.  
1.2 The size of government in the economy - ideological views  
The question of how big a role the government should play in the economy has 
been one of the major riddles among economists and political scientists. For good 
or ill, it seems that in modern societies a significant portion of economic resources 
is allocated and redistributed through the government sector. Since the “supply-
side revolution” of the 1980s, the widespread international concern that the size of 
government in the economy is “too large” implies that normative issues regarding 
an optimal or desirable level of government expenditure have already been 
resolved. This normative question, however, is still far from being answered. It is 
a formidable task that involves value judgements and depends on the framework 
or paradigm in which government sector is to be analysed (Cullis and Jones, 
1998). On the other hand, a growing positive literature analyses what the 
government actually does, why and how much its size in the economy has 
changed over time, and with what effects with respect to economic growth. The 
positive approach to government size is no less important than the normative 
setting - it tries to avoid economic value judgments and instead focuses on facts 
and cause-and-effect relationships to develop and test economic theories of the 
size of government. Once this has been established the normative issues of 
implementing particular policy to achieve a desirable goal can be addressed. The 
literature that addresses the impact of the relative size of the public sector on 
growth is a very important area of research. The main aim of this thesis, however, 
is an inquiry into the causes of the generally increasing size of the public sector 
rather than its effects.  
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This thesis, in fact, is an attempt to contribute to the public sector literature with 
an exploratory positive analysis of secular changes and determinants of the size of 
government in developed mixed economies
1
.
 
As Higgs (1987) remarks, there are 
two “research families” in the literature on government size. On the one side, 
those undertaking a “positive” approach have been aiming to explain the nature 
and causes of government size, while those pursuing a “normative” approach 
concentrated on the optimal government size. Our research takes on the former 
perspective. It contributes to the literature on government size by, first, describing 
the historical profile of the growth of government expenditures for four developed 
market economies; and, second, by integrating the various theoretical 
explanations into an eclectic model of government size and testing it on a sample 
of developed market economies for the period from 1970 to 2008. As a result, this 
research provides useful insights into the determinants of the size of government 
in developed market economies. Despite long-standing debates on government 
that has allegedly grown too big in developed market economies, and their 
reinvigoration by the fiscal consequence of financial crisis, there is surprisingly 
little scientific understanding of the forces driving the size of government. By 
contributing to better understanding of why the size and role of the public sector 
has tended to increase over the long run, we hope to inform debate on the 
appropriate size and role of the public sector in a mixed economy. In this light, 
our results provide worthwhile guidance for policy-makers.  
At this point, we believe it is worth devoting a few paragraphs to discussion of our 
adopted research approach in the light of the wider methodological and 
philosophical issues surrounding our understanding of economics as a science. 
This thesis follows the tradition of mainstream positive economics: as such, it 
involves the bringing together of economic theory, measurement and methods of 
statistical and econometric analysis; and the interpretation of the results of 
quantitative analysis to elucidate economic phenomena and to inform economic 
policy.  
                                                 
1
 Throughout the thesis, the term “mixed economy” is used to denote an economy in which both 
government and private decisions determine how resources are allocated.  
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While adopting this preferred research approach, we are aware that critics of 
modern positive economics are sceptical about the emphasis that mainstream 
economists place on methods of formal modelling. Specifically, the heterodox 
rejection of the mainstream tradition rests on the view that mainstream economics 
is rather unsuccessful in its attempts at explaining social phenomena, since formal 
modelling, which is at the heart of modern mainstream economics, is unsuited for 
the nature of the social world it seeks to illuminate. They call for a more 
pluralistic orientation to the discipline and practices of realist social theorising, 
instead of methods of formalistic closed-system modelling. When economic ideas 
are applied to more complex situations, Backhouse (2010) explains, economics, 
by some criteria, fails usually by neglecting to take into account of dimensions of 
behaviour that do not fit into the rational-actor, competitive-market paradigm. 
Namely, mainstream economics is strongly influenced by neoclassical economics, 
assuming that any outcome is a result of individuals making informed choices to 
optimise their returns under the constraints of their situation. In return, this 
approach meets, with relative ease, the requirements for formal deductive 
modelling to proceed (Lawson, 2003). In the last few decades, however, a number 
of new unconventional research programs have emerged to challenge the 
neoclassical orthodoxy.  
According to Backhouse (2010), there is no strict agreement on what scientific 
rigour in economics as a science should consist of. The mainstream economists 
believe that formalistic-deductive methods have many desirable features and that 
such methods add to clarity, rigour and consistency in economics as a science. 
Boumans and Davis (2010) emphasise the role econometricians have been playing 
in the development of the discipline during the last decades. They share the 
scientific ideals of the logical positivists, having a deeply held belief in 
mathematical rigour and the empirical testing of theories.  
Now that we have positioned our research approach, we proceed with discussion 
on different ideological views on the size of government in the economy. 
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It seems that among economists there is little dispute that the government should 
play a certain role in the economy, although there is a considerable debate as to 
how big or small this role should be in practice. Over the years, these normative 
attitudes towards the nature and scope of what the government should be doing in 
the economy have changed to accommodate and reflect the spirit of different 
economic schools of thought. Hillman (2009) starts from the proposition that 
views on the need for government differ according to whether a perspective is 
adopted from an ideology associated with the left and or the right of the economic 
spectrum. A view from the right focuses on the efficiency and freedom of market 
decisions and does not deny but, rather, is circumspect about improvements that 
political decision makers and government bureaucracies can achieve. A view from 
the left is more optimistic about what governments can achieve and more 
pessimistic that adequate social organization can be based on market decisions.   
Adam Smith (1723-90), a classical economist and the father of the “right” 
ideology (Hillman, 2009), accommodated self-interested human nature in his 
theory of the “invisible hand” - while pursing their personal market decisions 
interest, people unintentionally and spontaneously ensure that markets achieve 
efficiency. Given that markets on their own bring about efficiency and social 
benefit, classical economists assigned primacy to the market and condemned the 
inefficiency of governmental action. Nonetheless, they were aware that the nature 
of certain goods required public provision. Accordingly, they advocated a small 
role for the government limited to provision of some fundamental public goods 
and services such as national defence, the defence of property rights and the 
maintenance of internal law and order. Tanzi and Schuknecht (2000) speculate 
that a government expenditure share in the range of 12-18 percent of GDP was 
considered as heavy government involvement in the economy by the standards of 
classical economists.  
Whereas Smith argued that the individual‟s pursuit of self-interest would lead to 
an outcome beneficial to all, Karl Marx (1818-83), the father of the “left” 
ideology (Hillman, 2009), argued that the pursuit of self-interest would lead to 
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anarchy, crisis and the dissolution of economic organisation based on private 
property. He set out principles and ideas of socialism based on social and public 
ownership. Unlike competition, this system is believed to make the workers better 
off. According to Marxist ideology, Adam Smith‟s system of liberty and free 
market is exploitative and self-destructive.  
Although libertarian laissez-faire philosophy continued to predominate up to the 
onset of the Great Depression in the 1930s, certain ideas on the redistributive role 
of government had already started to emerge around the turn of the 20
th
 century. 
To different extents, this was influenced by the emergence of reform socialist 
tendencies within European social democratic parties, social Christian thinking 
within catholic and to some extent protestant churches, as well as some 
contemporary examples of state activism (e.g. the extension of education and 
welfare in Germany). By the end of the 19
th
 century, it seemed that the setting for 
the modern concepts of social protection was prepared, while by the late 1920s 
many European countries had introduced and developed social security systems 
(Tanzi and Schuknecht, 2000). Despite the then prevalent view among economists 
that the macroeconomy was a self-regulating system, Holcombe (2006) points out 
that even before the onset of the Depression some economists had begun to 
believe that the government could productively get involved in creating a more 
stable economic environment.  
Against this inter-war trend stood yet another heterodox school, which developed 
in the late 1920s - the Austrian School of economics. One of the most influential 
members of and, according to some commentators, one of the most important 
economists and political philosophers of the twentieth century, Friedrich von 
Hayek (1899-1992) extolled the virtues of a free market economic system while 
opposing socialist and collectivist thought. Opposed to Marxism, Friedrich von 
Hayek pointed out that markets and private property are the only institutions that 
consistently provide economic prosperity for a broad population. Friedrich von 
Hayek and other followers of the Austrian School of economics saw socialism as 
8 
 
the abolition of rational economy (Backhouse, 2010), while praising individual 
freedom, private property, limited government and free trade. 
As a reaction to The Great Depression, which is seen by many economists as a 
monumental failure of the market economy and of laissez-faire philosophy, many 
countries introduced major government expenditure programs. By 1937, 
according to Tanzi and Schuknecht (2000), the libertarian attitude toward the 
economy was on the way out and the ground had become fertile for the future 
growth of the welfare state. At that time, the Keynesian view that the government 
could eliminate or at least reduce business cycles and unemployment has become 
increasingly attractive to policymakers, and was also supported by the general 
public. Keynes‟s writings seemed to have thrown a positive light on the 
involvement of the government in the economy, and had a major impact on 
policymaking especially in the 1960s and 1970s. That was a period of intellectual 
belief in a positive role for government and the heyday of Keynesianism. It was 
believed that, in the event of insufficient demand, government activism with 
respect to expenditures and taxes could effectively offset the instability of the 
private sector, that monetary policy was potentially ineffective and that fear about 
budget deficits is unreasonable (Smith, 2006). At that time Musgrave (1959) 
summarises the three basic, by now conventional roles of the government: 
allocation of resources; redistribution of income; and stabilisation of the 
economy
2
. The development of the theory of public goods and of the concept of 
externality promoted a growing allocative role of the state, while the popularity of 
socialism among Western intellectuals and some political leaders made the 
redistributive role - aimed at lessening the difference between rich and poor and at 
improving the welfare of those who are least well off - particularly prominent 
(Tanzi and Schuknecht, 2000).  
Building on the views of Keynes, another influential author of that time - John 
Kenneth Galbraith - in his influential book The Affluent Society (1958) called for 
                                                 
2
 These government activities are a mixture of microeconomic and macroeconomic interventions. 
They do not necessarily have to come as a “package”. 
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more government activity in the production of public goods and services, as well 
as in pursuing the goal of greater economic security. He foresaw that ever more 
protection by the government would be required in modern economies since “with 
increasing well-being, all people become aware, sooner or later, that they have 
something to protect” (p.89). Some authors, for instance Rodrik (1998), used this 
idea of the risk mitigating role that the government should play to build a central 
explanation for increased government intervention in the economy.  
The popular views about the desirable role and size of government in the 
economy started to change in the early 1970s. The belief that “Keynesian „fine-
tuning‟ by wise and omnipotent centralised decision makers could keep the 
economy humming along smoothly” (Shaviro, 2007, p.73) came into question. 
According to Smith (2006) the Keynesian view became discredited because of 
weak economic growth, rising unemployment, rapid inflation and massive fiscal 
deficits. The tide of opinion about the desirable size of government started to flow 
increasingly towards the view that government involvement in the economy 
should be smaller. This anti-government perception was also encouraged by the 
“resource crowding out” argument that the expansion of the government sector 
would undermine economic growth because it was taking away resources that 
could have been used for more productive private sector investments. Many of the 
economists and theories that became influential in the 1970s had strong free-
market convictions. Backhouse (2010) comments that there is no doubt that 
ideological commitments were a factor in the new theories, even if those involved 
were entirely honest in proclaiming their commitments to rigorous scientific 
analysis. Buchanan (1975, in Tanzi and Schuknecht, 2000, p.19) warned that 
“government had grown much beyond its justified role, undermining economic 
incentives, property rights, and economic freedom, and “mortgaging” the income 
of future generations”.  
Monetarists ruled out the possibility that government can influence the level of 
employment (Mullard, 1993), while public choice and new institutional 
economists warned about the importance of constraints on fiscal policymaking 
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(Holcombe, 2006). In general, the 1980s and 1990s, saw a growing scepticism 
towards government intervention. As Mullard (1993, p.244) puts it, “the politics 
of consent founded on the economics of Keynes and the public provision of 
services that had gained ascendance in most countries in the aftermath of the 
Second World War has been replaced by market liberal economics and 
individualism in the 1990s”.  
The Chicago School of neoclassical economics, whose followers share the 
assumptions that markets work competitively and that individuals are generally 
rational has been increasingly influential in guiding the direction of global 
economic policy since the 1970s (Boumans and Davis, 2010). The Chicago 
economist Milton Friedman and fellow monetarists were sceptical about the 
benefits of government intervention. Instead, markets were their preferred form of 
social organisation. As a professor of the Chicago School of economics, Milton 
Friedman had great influence in determining the research agenda of the entire 
profession. The growing influence of Friedman‟s ideas coincided with the 
emergence of the school of public choice, known for its hostility towards 
government intervention in the economy. 
In recent years, however, the issues of the desirable role of government have 
again started to preoccupy economists‟ minds as well as newspaper columns. 
“Fifteen years ago it seemed that the great debate about the proper size and role of 
the state had been resolved ... today big government is back with a vengeance: not 
just as a brute fact, but as a vigorous ideology ...” (The Economist, 2010, p.22).  
With the onset of the financial crisis of 2008/09, the role of the government sector 
in the economy is once again at the top of the agenda of economists and 
policymakers. Whatever the causes to this global financial crisis, it seems that the 
problem is lack of demand. As a reaction, in many developed economies 
governments have stepped in to offset substantially shrunken private-sector 
demand, and to rescue potentially insolvent financial institutions and other 
companies that were judged too important to fail. Consequently, due to bail-outs, 
fiscal stimuli, tax cuts and recession many countries have witnessed a significant 
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increase in the share of government in the economy coupled with large 
government deficits and debts. Some commentators compare those soaring 
deficits to a loaded gun that governments have put at their own heads. Whether or 
when it will go off is hard to speculate.  
1.2.1 How big a size of government in the economy is too big? 
In principle, the share of national output absorbed by the government sector could 
range from 0 to 100 per cent. Those two extreme poles can be thought of as 
theoretical concepts. At the one extreme is the purist market system with no 
government intervention. As seen by Smith (2006, p.149), the pure free market 
capitalism is “a system in which the owners of human, physical and financial 
capital can do what they like with their resources and are free to allocate the 
returns from their enterprise and endeavours as they see fit”. The polar opposite of 
the free market is a system of pure socialism and fully planned economy. 
Rothbard (1970) describes socialism, or collectivism, as a system where the 
government owns all the means of production and prohibits any kind of private 
initiative. It is a system in which, according to Shaviro (2007), government 
decision makers do not just establish background institutions, but also determine 
what is produced and who ends up with how much.   
In practice, however, the actual share of government in the economy is never even 
close to such extremes poles. Instead, in market economies it is always 
somewhere between one tenth and three quarters of GDP, subject to the practical 
measurement problems involved (Smith, 2006). That almost all countries with 
market economies find themselves within the range proposed is demonstrated in 
Chapter 5 where the data reveals that the overall average share of government 
expenditures in GDP, for the sample of twenty six OECD countries in the period 
1970-2008, equals to 42 percent, reaching its lowest level at 16.15 percent in 
Korea in 1987, and its highest value at 67.47 percent in Sweden in 1993. Not even 
in the most extreme cases of ex-socialist countries did the government sector take 
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over the whole economic system
3
. Likewise, it would be hard to imagine a 
sovereign country with no resources allocated at least to national defence and the 
maintenance of internal law and order. Modern developed countries, in fact, can 
be properly described as mixed economies, meaning that goods and services are 
allocated by a combination of free markets and government intervention. Some 
countries are closer to the lower boundary, while others in which relatively 
significant share of economy is absorbed by the government seem to be heading 
towards the upper bound. Where the optimal share of government and private 
sector in a mixed economy is remains far from being answered.   
By investigating the literature on the growth effects of the size of government in a 
mixed economy, we hope to gain some insights into the optimal size of 
government. Whether or not a large government sector hinders economic 
performance, as measured by the growth rate is an important issue, closely related 
to the notion of the optimal size of government in the economy. The literature on 
this topic, reviewed in the following sections, is utterly inconclusive. As pointed 
out by Nijkamp and Poot (2004), this may not come as surprise given the many 
ways in which government policies can influence the economy. The increase in 
the share of GDP accounted for by government may have negative, zero or 
positive growth effects, according to the attained level and composition of 
government shares and the growth model used to analyse it. In the neoclassical 
framework, huge increases in the share of government expenditures are assumed 
to exert negative effects on the level of investment and output. This is because an 
increase in the size of government crowds out resources that could have been used 
for more efficient private investments, hence reducing the growth potential. 
Neoclassical growth models, however, assume that long-run growth rates depend 
solely on the exogenous factors of technological change and population growth. 
Hence, in this context, the share of government expenditure in GDP may not be 
relevant for the long-run growth rates. Endogenous growth models, developed in 
                                                 
3
 Even the former Soviet Union, where the government owned almost all means of production and 
where central planners dictated how resources were to be allocated, made limited use of free 
markets. Smith (2006), points out that the former Soviet Union had an underground black market 
economy equal to around one quarter of GDP in the 1970s.   
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recent years, have challenged the conventional wisdom of the neoclassical growth 
model. These models highlight the possible effects of the government sector on 
long-run growth through its impact on investment in physical, human and 
knowledge capital. A potentially positive linkage between government 
expenditures and economic growth lies in productive government services that are 
an input to private production (Barro, 1990). A central idea of the theory of 
endogenous growth is that private-sector production requires more than just direct 
investments in physical capital. Investments in knowledge and human capital, in 
research and development and in public infrastructure play an important role in 
this regard. The provision of certain public goods and services is assumed to 
increase the overall efficiency of the economy, because of positive externalities 
accruing to the private sector. On the other hand, while government expenditures 
can stimulate private sector productivity by the externality of the provided public 
goods and services, the taxes required to finance them are assumed, as in the 
neoclassical model, to crowd out private investments and production. With higher 
taxes, individuals retain a smaller fraction of their returns from investment. 
Consequently, they have less incentive to invest, and the economy tends to grow 
at a lower rate (Barro, 1990). The detrimental growth effect of taxes is 
particularity pronounced if they are used to finance so-called non-productive 
government expenditures which, unlike productive expenditures, have no direct 
positive effect on private-sector productivity. Yet, in practice there are no 
operational rules on how appropriately to distinguish between productive and non-
productive government expenditures. Most researchers agree that government 
investment expenditures, in particular the provision of public infrastructure 
services, increase the private sector productivity and facilitate economic growth. 
The empirical evidence is relatively strongly supportive of a positive effect of 
public infrastructure on growth (Nijkamp and Poot, 2004). As for government 
transfers, there are a number of forces at work that may have opposite effects on 
economic growth. Grossman (1987) sees government transfers as inputs into the 
attainment of social harmony or inputs that increase the productivity of certain 
segments of the labour force resulting in greater private sector output. Bellettini 
and Ceroni (2000) find evidence of a positive relationship between social security 
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expenditure and economic growth and explain it by the positive influence of 
social security expenditure on human capital formation. On the other hand, it can 
be argued that redistribution reduces investment and growth since it is typically 
accompanied by a progressive income tax structure, which is likely to reduce the 
rate of savings (since those on high incomes tend to have a higher savings rate 
than those on low incomes) as well as work effort (Knowles, 2005). Gwartney et 
al. (1998) point to a negative effect of the increased availability of government 
subsidies, since these may increase the incentive of both businesses and organized 
interest groups to seek gains through government benefits rather than increases in 
productivity. The growth effects of government consumption expenditures are 
difficult to predict, since this category of government expenditures is very 
heterogeneous in the sense that it consists of many different types of expenditures, 
some of which may have opposite effects on economic growth. Barro (1990, 
1991) finds that the level of government consumption, excluding education and 
defence, as a share of GDP has a negative association with investment and 
growth. He explains this finding on the grounds that government consumption has 
no direct effect on private productivity. Instead, it introduces distortions, such as 
high tax rates, crowding out private resources and reducing investments and hence 
growth. Expenditures on education and defence are excluded from the measure of 
government consumption on the grounds that such expenditures can be thought of 
as public investment rather than public consumption. Investments in human 
capital are assumed to increase the productive capabilities of the private sector. 
Along the same lines, consumption expenditures on national defence, police and 
judicial services that protect property rights and safety may also be growth 
enhancing. As explained by Grossman (1987), such expenditures result in greater 
output, since a private investor is certain that the rights over the fruits of his 
labour and capital are protected. Barro (1990) argues that, from the standpoint of 
investors, enhanced property rights have effects similar to reductions in marginal 
tax rates, and hence increase the rates of investment. Further, public expenditure 
on communications, environmental protection, research and development, and 
health care are all forms of capital accumulation rather than current consumption. 
Since many of the listed expenditures are classified as government consumption 
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in the official statistical figures, it would be misleading to say that all government 
consumption expenditures are expected to lower the economic growth rate. 
Kneller et al. (1999) treat expenditures with a substantial (physical or human) 
capital component as “productive” and show that such expenditures, unlike non-
productive ones, enhance growth rates in a sample of the 22 OECD countries over 
the 1970 - 1995 period
4
. Schaltegger and Torgler (2006) find that expenditures 
used for payments in the operating budgets significantly reduced economic 
growth in Switzerland over the 1981 - 2001 period, while payments in the capital 
budget had no significant growth effect. By means of meta-regression analysis, 
Nijkamp and Poot (2004) provide an objective assessment of the empirical 
evidence on the link between government expenditures and economic growth. 
They distinguish between studies that use different disaggregated measures for the 
size of government; namely, government consumption, defence expenditures, 
investment in public infrastructure, and education expenditure in relation to 
overall GDP. On balance, their results indicate that the analysed studies offer no 
clear support that government consumption, as well as defence expenditures, has a 
negative effect on long-run growth.  The evidence, however, is relatively strongly 
supportive of a positive effect of public infrastructure and education expenditures 
on growth.  
In their review article, Agell, Lindh and Ohlsson (1997) conclude that both the 
theoretical literature and the empirical evidence offer no clear answer on whether 
the relation between individual components of government expenditures and 
economic growth is positive, negative or non-existent. This is even more true for 
the relationship between the aggregate measure of total government expenditures 
and economic growth. Studies that investigate the association between the 
aggregate measure of the government sector, which includes both the productive 
and non-productive government expenditures in GDP, and economic growth are 
                                                 
4
 More precisely, according to Kneller et al. (1999), the productive expenditures include general 
public services expenditure, defence expenditure, educational expenditure, health expenditure, 
housing expenditure, transport and communication expenditure, while the unproductive 
expenditures consist of social security and welfare expenditure together with expenditure on 
recreation. 
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quite rare
5
. In fact, Nijkamp and Poot (2004) find that the majority (about 90%) of 
93 studies on the relationship between government expenditures and economic 
growth, published between 1983 and 1998, measured government size by means 
of only government consumption as a percentage of GDP.  
One should be cautious when interpreting the results of the empirical studies, 
since there are some methodological issues that may lead to biased estimates of 
how the public sector impacts on growth. Agell et al. (1997, 1999, 2006) 
particularly point to the problem of endogeneity resulting from simultaneous 
determination of variables. The assumption of exogeneity of the government 
expenditure variable in a growth regression is theoretically questionable. 
According to Wagner‟s law, which is discussed in more detail in subsequent 
chapters, the size of government in the economy is indeed expected to increase 
with the level of income. Recent studies (Fölster and Henrekson, 1999, 2001; 
Kneller et al. 1999; Schaltegger and Torgler, 2006) use first lags of the 
government expenditure as instruments and estimate the regression in first 
differences. Agell et al. (1999, 2006) are sceptical about this approach, since they 
argue that the implemented instruments may still be correlated with the error term. 
The problem of endogeneity may also arise due to omitted variables. The problem 
of omitted variables is not unexpected given the absence of a generally accepted 
theoretical frame of reference to guide the empirical studies (Agell et al., 1997). 
The hypotheses about the growth effects of government expenditures are 
commonly tested as a part of more general growth regressions, by adding the size 
of government to the more traditional list of determinants of economic growth. 
Because they include different sets of explanatory variables in their growth 
regression equations, researchers may arrive at different results. Levine and 
Renelt (1992) emphasise the importance of examining the sensitivity of the 
findings of growth regressions. Their findings indicate that the relationship 
between economic growth and various indicators of government expenditure are 
                                                 
5
 Fölster and Henrekson (1999, 2001) and Agell et al. (1997, 1999, 2006) are among the rare to 
employ an aggregate measure of the size of government; namely, the share of total general 
government expenditures in GDP.  
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not robust. The sign of the coefficient on the share of total government 
expenditures in GDP remains negative but becomes insignificant with the 
inclusion of only one additional variable. They also tested the robustness of 
disaggregated measures of government expenditures. None of the variables 
examined - the ratio of government consumption, government capital formation, 
government education expenditures, and government defence expenditures to 
GDP - proved to be robustly correlated with growth rates. Likewise, Agell et al. 
(1997) illustrate with a simple cross-country growth regression that the relation 
between growth and government expenditure reverses from negative to positive 
when additional control variables are introduced.  
The empirical studies typically specify a linear relationship between the size of 
government and the rate of economic growth. This may be a source of 
misspecification given that the theory implies that even if government funds are 
always spent on growth-promoting goods, there may be nonlinear trade-offs 
between the beneficial effects of government services and the disincentive effects 
of distortionary taxes (Levine and Renelt, 1992). When government absorbs a 
very small proportion of the economy, the growth rate is expected to be low. This 
is due to under-provision of some basic public goods and services, which are 
expected to increase the efficiency of the private sector. An increase in 
government expenditures from that very low level brings about efficiency gains 
and a higher growth rate. At these still relatively low levels of government 
expenditures, positive effects on private sector productivity of an increase in the 
productive government expenditures are expected to exceed the disincentive 
effects of taxes required to finance them. Yet, as government continues to absorb 
more economic resources, the beneficial effects on economic growth are expected 
to get smaller and eventually become negative. Additional government 
expenditures become increasingly less productive, while more private resources 
get crowded out. The disincentive effects of higher taxes reduce the private sector 
incentives to work, save, invest, and take risks. This results in ever smaller 
increases in the rate of economic growth. Eventually, these factors will dominate 
and the marginal government expenditures will begin to exert a negative impact 
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on growth. This leads to a conclusion that the share of government expenditures in 
GDP increases economic growth but at a decreasing rate until it reaches a 
maximum point beyond which it actually begins to impair economic growth. 
Figure 1.1 graphically depicts this hypothesised inverted U-shaped functional 
relationship between government size and economic growth.   
Figure 1.1: The growth effect of the size of government  
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In Figure 1.1, the horizontal axis measures the government size in the economy, 
proxied by total government expenditures as a share of national output, while the 
vertical axis measures the growth rate of economic activities, proxied by the 
growth rate of GDP. The curve depicting the relation between the size of 
government and economic growth is initially upward sloping. As government 
grows in size, the slope of this curve declines and eventually reaches a maximum 
at point A and then declines. Along the upward-sloped part of the curve, increases 
in shares of economy absorbed by government bring about higher rates of 
economic growth, but those increases become smaller and smaller as the size of 
government approaches point A. At point A government expenditures produce the 
highest rate of economic growth beyond which further increases in expenditures 
produce negative marginal effects on economic growth. Theoretically, a negative 
effect should only be expected in countries where the size of the government 
sector exceeds this threshold. Fölster and Henrekson (1999) warn against the 
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practice of analysing the growth impact of the size of government for a 
heterogeneous sample of countries with very different attained shares of 
government. Since some of them may lie on the upward as well as on the 
downward sloping portion of the curve in Figure 1.1, results might be 
inconclusive. Instead, they suggest that restricting the empirical analysis to a more 
homogeneous sample of rich countries may add to our understanding of whether 
large government expenditures have negative growth effects. According to Fölster 
and Henrekson (1999), with few exceptions, we only observe very large 
government sectors in rich countries. This argument is not quite in line with the 
evidence from the sample of developed OECD counties that is employed in the 
empirical analysis in our thesis. While it is true that some of the most developed 
world economies have devoted a relatively high proportion of their GDP to 
government expenditures for many years, a preliminary look at the basic 
descriptive statistics set out in Chapter 5 suggests that the variation in government 
shares across developed countries is quite substantial.  
While we restrict the discussion about the optimal size of government to the 
hypothesised effects of government shares on the growth rates of GDP, we 
acknowledge that it is not an ideal approach to discuss welfare only in terms of 
economic growth. There are some social gains, as well as social costs stemming 
from government intervention that are not reflected in the rate of GDP growth. 
The optimal, that is the social-welfare-maximising, share of the government is, 
according to Smith (2006, p.32) is “the share of national output at which the 
discounted net present value of the marginal social utility derived from the extra 
government spending is equal to the opportunity cost in terms of the net present 
value of the forgone economic output, and also personal liberty, arising from the 
need to pay for it”.  
Of course, it is a particularly formidable, if not impossible, task to operationalise 
each of these concepts. Instead, we proxy at least the economic part of the 
analysis by the government share that delivers the highest sustainable growth rate 
of GDP. GDP growth rates have been widely used within the field of economics, 
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since there is no agreed method of measuring welfare (Clarke and Islam, 2003). 
Nonetheless, as a measure of well-being, or even of market activity, GDP has 
been criticised on the grounds that it does not reflect many important elements, 
such as the value of non-marketed goods, the state of the environment, people‟s 
health, happiness, leisure, the distribution of income etc.. It does not take account 
of sustainability that implies harmonization between economy, ecology and 
society. Several attempts were made during the past four decades to develop 
indices of development that are more welfare-sensitive than GDP growth rates. 
Happiness functions, for instance, have become quite popular among researchers 
(Oswald, 1997; Frey and Stutzer, 2000; Di Tella et al., 2003). Unlike standard 
economic theory, where preferences are inferred from observed choices, in this 
concept happiness functions are modelled using responses from happiness surveys 
where people are directly asked about their subjective life satisfaction
6
.  
In the literature, there is no agreement about the optimal share of government in 
the economy. The complexity of operationalising this concept, however, has not 
discouraged some researchers to speculate about the optimal size of government. 
Their speculations, however, can be thought of as reflecting their personal views, 
rather than being a result of a formal statistical investigation on whether the 
existing level of government expenditures is too much or too little.  
At the extreme, Rothbard (1970) advocates virtually no state involvement in the 
economy. He goes as far as arguing that every single good and service - including 
defence and enforcement - could be supplied by the free market. He criticises 
even proponents of the philosophy of laissez-faire for having a peculiarly narrow 
view of the free market and for being contradictory in their defence of a 
                                                 
6
 Despite the fact that the literature on the economics of happiness has been steadily growing 
during the last decade, not many studies investigate the relationship between the size of 
government and happiness. Bjørnskov et al. (2007) analyse the effect of disaggregated measures of 
government size on life satisfaction in a sample of developed countries. Findings indicated a 
negative relationship between life satisfaction and government consumption spending. The effect 
of capital formation and, more surprisingly, welfare spending on life satisfaction was statistically 
insignificant. Ram (2009) replicates this study employing a broader sample of transition, 
developed, African and Latin American countries. Contrary to Bjørnskov et al. (2007), Ram 
(2009) finds a statistically significant positive relationship between government consumption and 
happiness. 
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“nightwatchman” role of government. This is because, Rothbard (1970) argues, as 
soon as government intervention - even in the most trivial manner - is established, 
conflict in the society emerges inevitably. In his ideal free market system, defence 
against violence would be a service like any other, obtainable from freely 
competitive private organisations. Likewise, government action is not needed to 
define or allocate property rights, since principles of a free society imply a very 
definitive theory of property rights; namely, self-ownership and the ownership of 
natural resources found and transformed by one‟s labour. Social utility cannot 
possibly be increased with government intervention, since one group gains 
inevitably at the expense of another. This is one of the rare analyses of the 
economics of government to argue that no provision of goods and services 
requires the existence of government.  
Galbraith (1958, p.178), on the other hand, argues that government size is too 
small, and that there is always a scope for government to increase its size in the 
economy, since government expenditure is “likely at any given time to be near the 
minimum which the community regards as tolerable”. Richard Musgrave is also 
well-known for his consistently favourable view of the government. He views 
government as an entity that is receptive to general public preferences expressed 
through a democratic voting rule. More precisely, he sees government as “an 
association of individuals, engaged in a cooperative venture, formed to resolve 
problems of social coexistence and to do so in a democratic and fair fashion. The 
state, in short, is “a contractarian venture, based on and reflecting the shared 
concerns of its individual members” (Buchanan and Musgrave, 1999, p.31).  
James Buchanan, on the other hand, has been consistent in his suspicious views of 
the government. He is known as one of the founders of the school of public 
choice. Backhouse (2010) emphasises Buchanan‟s antigovernment background - 
he and other founders of the school of public choice shared a clear ideological 
stance in that they preferred the market as a form of social organisation over 
government. Buchanan himself emphasises his fascination with the allocative 
achievements of the price mechanism (Buchanan and Musgrave, 1999). Unlike 
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Musgrave, Buchanan and other proponents the school of public choice insist on 
the idea that individuals, both in markets but also within government, make 
decisions in pursuit of their self-interest. In other words, politicians and public 
officials are assumed to be focused on their own income and not on the “public 
interest”. As a result, public choice economists call for a restricted size of the 
government sector in the economy, since it has a built-in tendency to increase its 
weight in the economy (Brennan and Buchanan, 1980). The established theories 
of “government failures” were taken as a reason that government intervention in 
the economy should be minimal. 
Despite their opposing views of the government, both Musgrave and Buchanan 
emphasised the importance of the historical and philosophical context in 
appraising the character of government and the need for government in the 
economy (Buchanan and Musgrave, 1999). 
Tanzi and Schuknecht (2000) argue that the growth of government expenditure 
over the past three decades has not brought about much additional social and 
economic welfare in industrialised countries. They suggest that total government 
expenditure could be reduced to, perhaps, 25 percent to 35 percent of GDP 
without sacrificing the essential activities of the government sector. These include 
setting the “rules of game” and strengthening the institutions and legal framework 
for market forces to operate freely. Without providing any formal statistical model 
or relevant empirical evidence for their claim, they derive their estimate of the 
optimal size of government by simply comparing changes in some socioeconomic 
indicators that had accompanied the increase in government expenditures for a 
group of developed countries. Building on Tanzi and Schuknecht (2000), Smith 
(2006) surmises that GDP growth would almost certainly have risen more quickly 
and pre-tax incomes might be double what they are today had government 
expenditure been kept at the more moderate level experienced in the early 1960s. 
The optimal size of the government sector, according to his opinion, is in the 
range of 30 to 35 per cent of GDP. Government expenditures at those levels could 
provide defence, policing, as well as a range of public goods and a basic welfare 
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system. The government expenditure share of 45 to 50 per cent of GDP that is 
now widespread across Europe, Smith (2006, p.142) argues, is a reflection of 
“predatory” politicians who wished to maximise the resources and powers of 
patronage under their command in the short term, and were indifferent to the long-
term welfare. Countries in which the public expenditure shares go beyond 55 per 
cent of GDP are heading towards what Smith calls a “predatory state”. Once this 
maximum level is reached, social cohesion would break down, since there would 
be no incentive for private initiative. Instead, everyone would try to hide under the 
umbrella of government rather than rely on their own efforts in the market. Pretty 
much in the style of Tanzi and Schuknecht (2000), Smith (2006) offers no 
relevant empirical studies to support his various threshold levels of government 
shares.    
1.3 The size of government in the economy - political views 
Decisions on government expenditure outcomes continuously involve political 
judgement, political calculation and political choice (Mullard, 1993). Although 
later in the thesis it is argued that the observed quantity of government actually 
complies with what the general public demands, by no means is the political 
dimension completely disregarded. While some theorists argue that differences in 
government expenditure can be explained in terms of which political party has 
formed the incumbent government, we argue that ideological differences and, 
even more so, ideological influences on actual decisions made by different 
political parties, are melting away. The relationship between political parties, their 
ideologies and the actual government size is not straightforward. Namely, more 
than blindly following their ideologies, political parties seem to be interested 
primarily in increasing the odds of being elected or re-elected. This narrows down 
their ideological differences and makes them more inclined to tailor their actual 
political decisions closer to what the voting public (and pressure groups) 
demands. Furthermore, it would be somewhat unrealistic to think that all members 
of a political party are homogeneously gathered around exactly the same shared 
values and beliefs. In reality, the major political parties are made up of groupings 
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and factions. Sometimes interests and ideas shared among members of different 
factions within the same political party can be even more divergent than between 
different parties. 
Of course, this is not to say that the ideological political differences do not count 
in reinforcing the virtues of pluralism and diversity and in creating the 
opportunities for political choice to be exercised by voters. As pointed out by 
Mullard (1993), the presence of political parties is an essential dimension that 
legitimises the process of democracy, since parties seek to represent different 
views and ideological visions, hence providing electors with the opportunity to 
choose between policy alternatives. In what follows we give a brief overview of 
the ideological perspectives of different political parties in terms of the desirable 
size of government in the economy. Yet we also present some historical examples 
to support our view that there is a discrepancy between what political parties 
claim they would do and what they actually do when they form the government.  
Conventionally, values and perceptions that we associate with different political 
parties are derived from the expectations that “parties of the Right are more likely 
to prefer tax cuts rather than increase public expenditure while, in contrast, parties 
of the Left are described as being more interventionist, less trusting of the market 
and more inclined towards increases in public expenditure as the means to 
increasing employment and re-distribute income” (Mullard, 1993, p.52).  
We would expect right-leaning, that is conservative, parties to believe in private 
enterprise and less government and to advocate lower tax rates. If they are honest 
and principled, rather than just playing politics, according to Shaviro (2007), they 
also advocate spending cuts, especially cuts in transfers and subsidies. Parties of 
the left, on the other hand, are expected to advocate government committed to 
social justice.  
Two forceful conservatives and opponents of big government who came into 
power in the 1980s - Margaret Thatcher as prime minister of the UK and Ronald 
Reagan as president of the US - are well-known for turning the tide in favour of a 
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smaller government role. President Reagan, known for his famous charge that 
Democrats like nothing better than to “tax and spend” (Shaviro, 2007) popularised 
the view that, far from being a solution to problems, the government could be a 
cause of them (Holcomb, 2006). Mrs Thatcher was considered a tight-fisted 
guardian of the public purse (Smith, 2006) who, according to Mullard (1993, 
p.150) “brought into prominence a conservative philosophy that encouraged the 
freedom of the individual, and which placed emphasis on self-help, thrift, the 
importance of the family and the need to push back the frontiers of government”.  
1.3.1 Do political perspectives make a difference? 
In practice, regardless of the political orientation, each political party generally 
avoids political unpopularity and confrontation with strong interest groups. They 
try not to “upset” the electorate while promoting their own political choices. 
Analysing the political scene in the UK, Smith (2006) finds that the views of the 
main parties on the level of government spending and taxation are now virtually 
identical. Likewise, another relevant commentator on UK politics, Mullard (1993, 
p.53) reaches a similar conclusion: “... public expenditure has continued to grow 
irrespective of which party has been in government. Under both Labour and 
Conservative Governments expenditure has continued to move in an upward 
direction”. 
Although Ronald Reagan and Mrs Thatcher will probably remain well-known for 
their determined political attack on large government, analysis of their political 
choices, as well as of those by their political predecessors and successors, reveals 
some interesting facts.     
According to Shaviro (2007), the American tradition of anti-tax sentiment has 
frequently been at the centre stage in the US politics and, in modern times, goes 
back to the late 1970s
7
. It seemed to have peaked in 1981, when Ronald Reagan 
took office. Although President Reagan had an ambitious agenda to change the 
                                                 
7
 In a longer perspective, we note the prominence of taxation by the then British colonial 
administration as the occasion for the American War of Indepence.  
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course of government expenditure, he seemed to be reluctant when it came to 
cutting social and health benefits. It is true that he introduced significant tax cuts, 
but he “belied his reputation as a simplistic ideologue by supporting significant 
tax increases in 1982, 1983 (for Social Security) and 1984” (Shaviro, 2007, p.73). 
It seems that Reagan attacked big government by reducing tax burdens, while 
being reluctant to reduce also government expenditures. However, to reduce the 
size of government requires cutting government expenditure alongside tax cuts. 
Otherwise, tax cuts today are likely to require much tighter spending controls in 
the future. Consequently, the administration of the next two presidents - George 
H. W. Bush and Bill Clinton in particular - made significant deficit reduction 
efforts. Although a Democrat, Clinton pursued quite a conservative fiscal agenda, 
unlike his republican successor, George W. Bush who “ran for office believing 
that „when somebody hurts, government has got to move‟” (The Economist, 2010, 
p.22) allowed government spending to increase substantially. 
Along those lines, Mullard (1993) carries out an analysis of the British political 
scene that reveals some interesting political inconsistencies. In the early 1970s, 
despite Conservative Government (1970-74) promises of the “Quiet Revolution” 
against big government, the actual increase in government expenditure suggest 
that this government was still pretty much committed to an interventionist state, 
welfare and full employment. In fact, this government showed no particular 
commitment to market liberalism, the concept of market forces and free enterprise 
that lie at the heart of conservative thinking. Surprisingly, it was the Labour 
government (1974-79) that, in 1976, first made the break with the post-war pro-
government politics. As pointed out by Holland (1980, in Mullard, 1993, p.139), 
“... in practice...it was not Mrs Thatcher but Jim Callaghan as Prime Minister who 
declared that we could no longer spend our way out of a slump”. Although left-
oriented and with the expansion of the government sector at the heart of its 
policies, the Labour Government abandoned the commitment to full employment 
while accepting some of the major aspects of monetarist thinking. Even at the 
expense of increasing unemployment and lowering welfare standard, it made clear 
that it would reduce government expenditure to control inflation. On the other 
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hand, despite commitments to push back the frontiers of the state, there seems to 
be little evidence to suggest that the size of government was shrunk during the 
first term of Mrs Thatcher (1979-83). Instead, it appears that the first Thatcher 
Government was still quite committed to the continuity of subsidies to specific 
interest groups, such as home owners, pensioners, transport, agriculture and grants 
to students. It is only in her second and third terms that Mrs Thatcher introduced 
some serious attempts to reconcile her actual political choices with the ideology 
that the Conservative Party stood for. In contrast to the first term, between 1983 
and 1990 the Government made efforts to reduce public expenditure, while at the 
same time introducing new policies that were directed towards privatisation of 
nationalised industries, deregulation and competitive tendering for local 
government services. This same Conservative party, while still in power, seemed 
to have modified and reversed its attitude towards government expenditure at the 
beginning of the 1990s. It seems that the those members of the Conservative Party 
who thought that the Party should move closer to the views of the social market, 
as articulated by the Christian Democratic parties in Europe and the Clinton 
Administration in the USA, dominated over those members who wanted the Party 
to remain committed to the politics of markets and private initiative. The 
Conservative Party with John Major as Prime Minister seemed to be shifting away 
from a private market approach and towards a more caring public sector 
attempting to be both more redistributive and more expansionary. This is not 
surprising though, given the mood of the electorate, best described by Mullard 
(1993, p.225): “...whilst the electors had supported the privatisation of gas and 
British Telecom, they seemed unhappy about proposals to privatise health care 
and the possibility of introducing charges for health services. Voters seemed to 
have reached a new saturation level concerning further privatisation of the welfare 
state”. On the other hand, the Labour Party seemed to have moderated its views 
too - instead of challenge the fundamentals of the Thatcher reforms, it based its 
policy promises on efficiency and effectiveness in the public sector. As explained 
by Smith (2006, p.22), “the marketing brilliance of the Blair project was to 
promise the electorate that New Labour had moved from the socialist part of the 
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triangle to the classical-liberal part and would maintain Lady Thatcher‟s low tax 
policies”.  
The discussion brought up in the above sections, points to an idea that 
philosophical and ideological perspectives about the desirable size of government 
in the economy by different political parties are not straightforwardly translated 
into their actual political choices once they enter government. Mullard (1993, 
p.71) points out that “many studies that have sought to evaluate the impact of 
political parties on public expenditure have tended to conclude that different 
parties, despite their rhetorical statements, tended to pursue similar policies when 
they formed the government. Utilising econometric methods to define the 
meaning of politics, these models tend to suggest that political parties do not have 
much success either in their attempts to control public expenditure”.  
Later in the thesis, especially when building an eclectic model of the size of 
government, this proposition informs our assumption that the supply of 
government goods and services is perfectly elastic, while the actual changes in the 
quantity of government are the result of demand-led factors.      
1.4 The size of government in the economy - some figures and 
facts   
A researcher attempting to undertake a thorough positive analysis of the nature, 
causes and consequences of government size in the economy is faced by 
measurement difficulties in regards to quantification of government activities in 
the economy. Nothing comes unquestionably measured, Cullis and Jones (1998) 
argue, and what is understood by the government sector is no exception. In 
appraising the importance of the size of government, most researchers agree that 
the absolute size of the government is a relatively meaningless concept. To get a 
more realistic idea of the size of government, one should focus on the proportion 
of total economic resources absorbed by the government. Relative figures are also 
more convenient for comparative purposes than the absolute quantities of 
governments. Expressing general government expenditure relative to GDP, in a 
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way, standardises this measure of the size of government across countries and 
avoids the complications of using different currency units. Here and elsewhere in 
the thesis, we employ the most commonly used measure of the size of the 
government sector - the share of government expenditure in total expenditures or 
outputs, approximated by GDP. Some limitations in regards to this common 
practice are discussed in a subsequent section of this chapter. In what follows, we 
present some common features and trends in the share of total general government 
expenditure in GDP for a selected number of countries over the last four decades. 
Due to the illustrative nature of this introductory chapter, we confine this 
presentation to only a few countries that have been selected as representative 
developed mixed economies
8
. Denmark is a representative of the Scandinavian 
countries typically characterised by large government sectors. The UK and France 
represent, respectively, the “Anglo-Saxon” free market and “continental” social 
market varieties of European capitalism, which display correspondingly greater 
and lesser faith in the virtues of the market. Finally, the USA and Japan are non-
European economies with relatively small government sectors in the economy. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
8
 Figure A.2.1 in Appendix 2 depicts the government expenditure share in GDP over the period 
1970 to 2008 for a larger number of individual countries analysed in Chapter 5 (on a county-by-
country basis, with a country-specific Y-axis range of scale). 
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Figure 1.2: The total government expenditure share in GDP for selected countries, 1970-2008 
 
Source: OECD National Accounts and OECD Historical Statistics 
The evidence presented in Figure 1.2 suggests that some of the most developed 
world economies have devoted a relatively high proportion of their GDP to 
government expenditures for many years. The share of total general government 
expenditures in GDP, that is our measure of the size of government in a mixed 
economy, includes all types of government expenditures - consumption 
expenditure, investment expenditures, interest and transfer payments - accruing at 
all levels of government (central, state and local). We emphasise this point to 
ensure that the growth trends and different levels illustrated in Figure 1.2 are not 
merely an artefact of measurement. Some studies use only government 
consumption expenditures, or central government expenditures, as a share of GDP 
to measure the size of government in the economy. This practice, however, can be 
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highly misleading. The government consumption figures are expected to 
substantially understate the size of government for countries with large transfer 
payments and/or large government investments. Along the same lines, the central 
government figures are expected to understate the size of government for 
countries (for instance, the United States) where substantial expenditures are 
undertaken at sub-central levels of government. A detailed description of how this 
measure is constructed is provided as a part of a broader discussion of data 
construction, sources and coverage in Chapter 5.  
As pointed out early in the text, we do not want to engage in a normative 
discussion of whether the 40.08 percent of GDP that has been absorbed, on 
average, by the government sectors of the selected countries over the past four 
decades, is too much or too little. We do want to point out, however, that the 
broad trends are sufficiently clear to indicate that government shares have grown 
in recent decades. Although, for clarity of illustration, in Figure 1.2 we present the 
evidence for only five world economies, the suggested rise in the government 
expenditure ratio is common also among other developed countries. In fact, most 
if not all public finance economists agree that the increased role of the 
government represented one of the main developments of the twentieth century. 
Tanzi and Schuknecht (2000) emphasise how remarkable it is that the growth in 
government expenditure has been such a general phenomenon despite the 
considerable institutional variation among different countries. Of course, this 
increase was different for different countries and in different time periods. 
Denmark, as a representative of the Scandinavian countries commonly known for 
their approval of “generous” governments, throughout the whole period has had 
the highest government expenditure ratios, at some points - at the beginning of the 
1980s and of the 1990s - almost reaching a ratio as high as 60 percent of GDP. At 
the beginning of the period, though, it started off from a government expenditure 
share close to 40 percent of GDP, pretty much in line with the ratios attained in 
France and the UK at that time. On the other hand, the Anglo-Saxon counties are 
generally considered to have more faith in the virtues of markets and smaller 
government. Yet, there are some noticeable differences in the course of 
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development of the government shares in the UK and the USA. Throughout the 
whole period, government shares in the British economy have been higher 
compared to the American ones. Despite the allegedly strong “attack” against 
excessive government expenditures in the 1980s, there is no strong evidence that 
the size of government in the USA has actually reduced. Government expenditure 
shares have tended to increase, although the rate of increase has slowed. In the 
UK, the share of the economy absorbed by government declined over the period 
from the mid 1970s to the early 1980s. Interestingly, expenditures reached a 
maximum of 46.1 percent of the economy in 1981, and remained above the level 
of 45 percent during Mrs Thatcher‟s first term in office. Only during Mrs 
Thatcher‟s second term did government expenditures started to fall again, but this 
period of decrease came to an end in 1989, when government size again started to 
grow. Yet another significant period of decrease took place during the years 1993 
to 2000. Ever since, the trend has been continuously upward.  
Since the mid 1980s, trends in the size of French government have followed those 
in the UK, but at a higher level and with less profound oscillations. Japan started 
off as the country with the smallest share of government in the economy. 
Interestingly enough, in 1970 only 18.9 percent of the Japanese economy was 
absorbed by the government, while this share almost doubled by 2008. 
Throughout the whole period, the trend in the share of Japanese government has 
been continuously upward, except during the 1980s when it more or less stabilised 
at around 30 percent. In each country, the size of government increased in the 
early to mid-1990s. Since the mid-1990s there is some evidence of a decline in the 
proportion of GDP devoted to government expenditure in all countries, except in 
Japan. Yet again, in recent years, it seems that government expenditures have 
risen from their level reached at the end of the 1990s, especially in the USA and 
even more evidently in the UK, where the government is now making up almost 
half of the economy. The share of government in GDP in the UK has risen from 
37.6 percent in 2000 to 45.9 in 2008, indicating that “Britain‟s initially frugal 
Labour government went on a splurge” (The Economist, 2010, p.10). The change 
has been less dramatic in France, but in that country the government already made 
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up half of the economy. Despite a small increase at the turn of the century, the 
share of the government sector in the Danish economy has been decreasing ever 
since 1993 when it peaked at 58.08 percent. In the USA and Japan, the share of 
government appears to have stabilised at around 35 percent of economy.  
Economists are still struggling to give a decent theoretical clarification of the 
factors that can explain the behaviour of the government expenditure shares. In a 
positivistic manner, this thesis is an attempt to contribute to such studies by 
developing and testing an eclectic model of the size of government in the 
economy. 
1.4.1 Measurement issues  
The concept of the size of government involves so many multidimensional issues 
that no single comprehensive measure can embrace them all in practice. So far, 
most researchers attempting to quantify the size of government in the economy 
ended up employing the conventional budgetary measure - the government 
expenditure share(s) in GDP. This indicator of the size of government reflects 
various activities undertaken by the government in relation to the total economy. 
Government expenditures as a proportion of GDP is one of the most available, 
easily measured, and widely used indicators of the scope of public sector activity 
and power vis-á-vis the national economy. There are, however, a number of 
conceptual problems with that measure. It is arguable that this indicator is only a 
partial measure of the scope of public sector activity in any complete sense. 
One issue of measurement concerns what should be included within the definition 
of government. Ideally, we would like to measure public sector “presence” or the 
degree of influence the government has over the economy encompassing all 
activities undertaken by the government. The problems in constructing such a 
measure is that many government activities that may have significant efficiency 
and equity implications do not take the form of neat columns of numbers; in other 
words, they do not lend themselves to ready commensurability and aggregation, 
and do not appear in budgetary accounts. As a result, it is arguable that 
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government expenditure figures do not capture the overall significance of 
government in many countries. A comprehensive measure of the size of 
government should ideally also include quasi-fiscal activities and regulation by 
governments of economic activity as well as ownership of firms by governments. 
For instance, regulations such as employment laws, health and safety standards or 
minimum wage laws are all examples of government intervention in the economy 
that may exert far-reaching effects on the allocation of resources but that do not 
directly generate any measurable government expenditure. In this light, the 
existing expenditure figures typically understate the full influence of the public 
sector on the economy. As Higgs (1987) puts it, government expenditures derive 
from, but do not themselves constitute, the power of government. Quantitative 
indexes may register little or no change even when the substance of governmental 
power changes enormously.  
The influence of government in an economy unquestionably depends on the scope 
of the institutions and individuals that government owns, controls and/or 
regulates. Garen and Trask (2005), highlighting the importance of non-budgetary 
aspects of government, demonstrate that countries with less government 
expenditure tend to be more interventionist and encompass a great deal more 
government in other forms, such as government ownership of enterprises in the 
economy, the extent of price controls, the risk of expropriation by the government 
and the risk of contract repudiation by the government. Instead of taking over 
production directly, Holcombe (2006) suggests that the alternative would be for 
the government to regulate the behaviour of market participants. However, he 
warns that government regulations, being a direct product of political discretion, 
may go hand in hand with special interest groups that tend to create political 
pressure while being well informed about the issues that concern them directly, 
whereas the general public remains rationally ignorant. As a result, governments 
may end up undertaking certain regulative actions that are not necessarily in the 
public interest. In the same vein, Shaviro (2007) foresees increased use of 
regulatory activities as a substitute for government expenditures that would 
otherwise have been financed by taxes. However, methodological issues involved 
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in classifying and gauging different regulative activities by governments and the 
non-availability of data on such activities are the main reasons why corresponding 
measures have not proliferated in practice.   
A category of expenditures that may blur the budgetary government expenditure 
measure of the size of governments is off-budget expenditures. Holcombe (2006) 
explains that governments can place expenditures off-budget by creating 
government-owned corporations to administer activities and giving those public 
corporations budgets separate from the governments‟ budget. Within the System 
of National Accounts (SNA), which has conventionally been used to develop 
comparative indicators of the size of government in the economy, the general 
government sector excludes most public enterprises other than those which mainly 
produce goods and services for the public on a small scale. Hence, it excludes 
other government enterprises and public corporations which are encompassed in 
the more broadly defined public sector. Holcombe (2006) warns that such 
expenditures increased dramatically in the US beginning in the 1950s when many 
state and local governments engaged in substantial amounts of off-budget 
expenditures by creating independent authorities to operate water districts, civic 
centres, toll roads, public housing projects etc.  
Our study need not halt, however, because no comprehensive, unambiguous 
quantitative measure of the government sector is available. Despite the many 
defects of the available quantitative measure of government expenditures, 
economists and political scientists, with few exceptions, continue to focus their 
studies of the growth of government on that kind of evidence (Higgs, 1987). Our 
task is to examine whether the available data yield robust, significant, and 
compelling conclusions, while recognising the limitations inherent in the available 
data.  
At this point, it should be mentioned that the available data on aggregate 
government expenditures can be grouped in a variety of ways, both horizontally 
and vertically. Horizontally, government expenditures may be broadly 
disaggregated into government final consumption expenditure, gross capital 
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formation and transfer payments. Vertically, general government expenditures can 
be divided into different levels of government - central, state and local. It is 
possible - should the nature of research aims require so - to disaggregate figures of 
total government expenditures both horizontally (hence, focusing on a specific 
type of government expenditures) and vertically (hence, focusing on government 
expenditures accruing at a specific level of government).   
Whether to use the aggregate government expenditures or its disaggregated 
components depends ultimately upon the main purpose of a study. Mullard (1993) 
distinguishes two perspectives in perceiving government expenditures. On the one 
hand, the macro perspective tends to perceive public expenditures as one 
aggregate - whatever the government spends must be contained in the definition 
of government expenditure. Hence, there is no dilemma about what should or 
should not be encompassed by the definition of government expenditure, since all 
government activities recorded under government expenditures, including 
consumption expenditure, investment expenditures, interest and transfer payments 
accruing at all levels of government, ultimately need to be financed either through 
taxes or borrowing. In contrast, the micro perspective concentrates on individual 
expenditure programmes. A breakdown of government expenditures by specific 
functional areas indeed allows a clearer picture to be developed of what 
governments actually do and a better understanding of how they do it. Moreover, 
this is of particular interest to researchers concerned with analysing and 
understanding the changes in specific government programmes. As argued by 
Mullard (1993) this approach is more concerned with changes in government 
expenditure plans and allocations and with measuring the quality of government 
service in relation to a specific budget.  
Given the above discussion and the aim of exploring the nature and theoretical 
approaches to the relative size of the government sector in the total economy, this 
thesis takes on the macro frame of reference in that it builds on the “holistic” or 
“aggregate” view that all government expenditures (including all types of 
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government expenditures recorded in the official statistics accruing at all levels of 
government) should be analysed in the aggregate.  
A debatable issue that might arise in discussion of measurement of government 
expenditures is whether to include transfer payments or not. Commentators who 
believe that transfer payments should not be included in the measure of 
government expenditures argue that transfers do not reallocate resources from the 
private economy to government, but merely redistribute income from one group 
of individuals to another. In this sense, the government acts as an intermediary; 
thus, counting them in would overstate government expenditures. However, 
transfer payments are a large and growing component of government activity - 
redistribution of income represents a serious activity undertaken by the 
government. Transfers are a product of government action and they do impose a 
real cost on those who finance them. Since our strategy of arriving at an 
acceptable measure of the size of government influence in the economy is to take 
into account all available government expenditures that mirror various 
government activities, we thought it essential to include transfer payments. This 
broader measure, which includes the government transfer payments, better reflects 
changes in the size of total government activities in developed market economies.  
1.5 Conclusion  
The polemics about governments that have allegedly grown “too big” imply that 
the optimal size of the government in the economy is well known and understood. 
Some economists have tried to estimate where this optimal size of government is 
in practice. Yet, the best they ended up with is a speculation about the range 
within which the optimal size of government could be. The optimal size of 
government in the economy is, no doubt, one of the major riddles confronting 
economists. Identifying the optimal size of government is beyond the scope of our 
thesis. The empirical literature on the effects of government expenditures on 
economic performance is utterly inconclusive and subject to methodological 
flaws. It offers no reliable answers and no consensus on the growth effect of the 
size of government in a mixed economy. In our view, judgements on the optimal 
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size of government in the economy are derived too much from ideology and too 
little from empirical investigation. Although this literature clearly represents an 
important topic, our thesis is primarily concerned with analysis of the causes of 
the generally increasing size of the public sector. If the relevant 
economic/ideological paradigm is such that government actions are perceived as 
intrinsically good, then the more activities that government undertakes, the 
wealthier and happier society will be. Such an atmosphere - or “Zeitgeist” - was 
prevalent during the heyday of Keynesianism. Conversely, if government 
involvement in the economy is commonly thought of as a bad thing, then every 
action undertaken by government that goes beyond the minimal “nightwatchman” 
setting is seen as socio-economic devastation. In between, economists generally 
think that there is a role for government and that government should undertake 
activities that are in the public interest. They refrain, however, from defining an 
optimal size of government in a mixed economy. 
In democratic societies, political parties provide electors with the opportunity to 
choose between different policy options in that they represent (or, at least, say that 
they represent) different views about the “appropriate” size of government 
involvement in the economy. In reality, as illustrated by numerous historical 
examples, there is a need to distinguish between political rhetoric and the real 
political choices that parties make once they form governments. As explained by 
Rose (1984, in Mullard, 1993, p.53), “rhetoric has its place in securing the support 
of activists within the party and in swaying the opinions of voters.” In the USA, 
for instance, President Reagan convinced his electors that he was fighting big 
government by means of tax cuts, while avoiding corresponding expenditure 
cutbacks.  
To gauge the size of government in the economy, researchers typically use an 
imperfect, but best available measure - the government expenditures share in 
GDP. Due to the multidimensional nature of government activities, it is not 
possible to embrace all those various forms in a single aggregate measure. 
Although it would be preferable to supplement budgetary expenditure measures of 
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government size with indicators of other forms of government intervention, such 
as government regulation and ownership, this has proved to be difficult to achieve 
in practice, at least within a comparative framework. Illustrative as it is, the 
presentation of trends observable in relation to the share of government in GDP 
for a selected number of developed economies (Figure 1.2) indicates that each 
government absorbs a significant share of its respective economy and that this 
share shows a general tendency to increase.    
The global financial crisis of 2008/09 seemed to have put the issue of the 
government size in the economy back at the centre of political debate. Now, at the 
beginning of the 21
st
 century, government seems to be a major player in the 
economy. It seems that even in traditionally market-oriented countries, such as the 
USA and the UK, government intervention ultimately became the only option to 
prevent a deeper recession.  
As a final point, our discussion of the wider philosophical issues surrounding our 
understanding of economics as science suggests that the present-day economic 
methodology is a highly diverse and increasingly complex area of investigation in 
its own right (Boumans and Davis, 2010). There are important questions that are 
faced by economics as a social science, some of which we discuss in this chapter. 
According to Backhouse (2010), economics has a strong disciplinary identity, but 
it lacks the degree of consensus that characterise the natural sciences. Unlike in 
natural sciences, there is no clear view of what is and is not legitimate science. 
Also, it does not fit the model of the social science, such as psychology, sociology 
and political science, where much greater pluralism is accepted. We do not engage 
in a detailed discussion of all current issues and concerns in economic 
methodology; instead, we define the boundaries of this research within the 
mainstream positive tradition, which is dominant in modern economics. 
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2.1 Introduction 
The main goal of this chapter is to demonstrate how the size of government 
evolved throughout a relatively long time period and to test empirically a 
generally held view that the government started to grow at an unprecedented pace 
at the on-set of World War I (WWI), the Great Depression and World War II 
(WWII). In order to address those research questions, we compile a valuable 
database covering countries for which the data on government expenditures dates 
back to the 19
th
 century. While compiling the database, the main selection 
criterion has been the length and consistency of the time series. Due to the typical 
non-availability and poor quality of the historical series, we ended up with a rather 
limited, but to our knowledge the maximum available, number of countries for 
which this historical data exists; namely the US, the UK, Italy and Sweden. In this 
chapter we thoroughly investigate, on a country-by-country basis, the secular 
behaviour of the size of government in those four developed market economies.  
Until recently, to account for possible structural breaks, researchers would 
typically determine the date of a structural break exogenously, based on 
conventional wisdom, or their own judgements and knowledge of some major 
changes that might have resulted in a structural break in the series. Because it is 
difficult to validate empirically that the break occurred precisely at the 
hypothesised date, it is also very difficult to establish whether or not the results 
from such studies are simply an artefact of a researcher‟s subjective judgements. 
To circumvent that problem, and also to test indirectly whether structural breaks 
in government expenditures indeed occurred at the conventionally assumed dates, 
we employ the recently developed Bai-Perron (1998, 2003) procedure. This 
procedure allows for endogenous detection of structural break points. In other 
words, instead of relying on a subjective speculation that breaks which brought 
about a considerable increase in government expenditures occurred along with, 
for example, the on-set of WWI, the Great Depression or WWII, we let the data 
“speak for itself” by using a sophisticated algorithm to identify the location of 
major break points.  
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This chapter is organised as follows: section 2.1 discusses the famous Peacock-
Wiseman observation that there is a ratchet effect after major socio-economic 
crises. Instead of re-setting to its pre-crisis level, Peacock and Wiseman (1961) 
argue that government expenditures tend to persist and develop from a higher 
level than before the onset of the crisis. We believe that this hypothesis may be to 
blame for the conventionally held view that the growth of government size is 
closely related to WWI, the Great Depression and WWII. In section 2.2 we 
introduce the historical data at hand and discuss some of its limitations. As a first 
step towards a more thorough investigation, in this section we illustrate 
graphically the series, country by country, and provide a commentary on their 
historical path. Following the data description section, in section 2.3, we 
undertake a statistical scrutiny of the underlying processes that generate the series. 
First and foremost, this refers to testing for the presence of a unit root, i.e. 
employing statistical procedures to assess the evidence that each series is non-
stationary. Section 2.5 closely examines the issue of structural breaks. We 
introduce the newly developed Bai-Perron procedure and provide an intuitive 
explanation for the underlying statistical mechanisms behind this procedure. We 
apply this procedure to test whether there were any major breaks in the growth of 
government; and, if there were, when exactly they took place. In section 2.6 we 
offer some broad explanations for the main findings and provide concluding 
remarks.  
2.2 Conventional wisdom and the Peacock-Wiseman 
displacement hypothesis  
When did the growing tendency of government start? Conventional wisdom holds 
that the increase in the growth of government is related to major socio-economic 
disturbances, in particular WWI, the Great Depression and WWII. It is arguable 
that this conventionally held perception is to some extent based on the work by 
Peacock and Wiseman (1961). The authors argue that there is a ratchet effect both 
after major wars and serious economic crises, so that instead of re-setting to its 
pre-crisis level government expenditures tend to persist and develop from a higher 
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level than before the onset of the crisis. Although intuitively appealing, the 
Peacock-Wiseman displacement hypothesis is criticised for its loose theoretical 
underpinnings. Tress (1963) and Henrekson (1993a) argue that it is nothing more 
but authors‟ commentary on the statistics and a simple observation that large 
increases in the British government expenditures coincide with periods of war and 
preparation for war. In their book, Peacock and Wiseman (1961, p.xxi) 
themselves remark that the main purpose of their study is “to present the facts 
about the behaviour of British government expenditure since 1890, and to explain 
that behaviour by reference to basic propositions about the character of 
government and the facts of British history”. In order to explain the observed 
pattern in government expenditures or, as they depict it - plateaus of ascending 
height separated by peaks - Peacock and Wiseman (1961) argue that in peacetime 
periods governments have incentives to increase their size in the economy, but 
they fear a possible resistance from voters which prevents the actual increase from 
taking place. Social disturbances, however, produce a displacement effect because 
people are willing to accept, in a period of crisis, higher tax levels that in 
peacetime or “normal” periods would have been thought intolerable. Because this 
acceptance remains even when the disturbance itself has disappeared, government 
is assumed to use this as an opportunity to increase its weight in the economy, 
with new expenditures quickly displacing those called forth to meet the 
necessities of disturbance. Even if government expenditures fall when the 
disturbance is over, it is likely that they will not return back to the pre-crisis level. 
In a way, this describes a hysteresis effect; namely, public expenditures are quite 
flexible upwards, but somewhat less flexible downwards. In the aftermath of 
social upheavals, governments will work to sustain such increased levels of 
government expenditures. In other words, crises are expected to produce not only 
a temporarily bigger government, but a permanently bigger government. In 
addition, Peacock and Wiseman (1961) view periods of disturbances as being a 
fertile ground for initiating and strengthening the process of government 
expenditure centralisation, which then persists to operate in normal times, and by 
itself contributes to increasing the size of government.  
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By considering that governments aim at maximizing their size in the economy and 
that centralised governments are in a better position to exploit their power over 
the citizenry, Peacock and Wiseman (1961) introduce important considerations 
which are further elaborated and more formally established in the public choice 
literature, foremost in Niskanen‟s model of bureaucracy (1971) and Brennan and 
Buchanan‟s Leviathan model (1980). Later, Peacock and Wiseman (1979) revised 
their original idea, arguing that the observed “structural breaks” - as they framed it 
- in government expenditure series are due to changes in citizen‟s tastes, 
preferences and institutions after the upheaval.  
Despite the absence both of coherent theoretical underpinnings for the 
displacement hypothesis and of formal empirical validation, it is still 
conventionally considered that WWI, the Great Depression and WWII are major 
social and economic disturbances that have produced major increases in the 
growth path of government expenditures. 
In order to test whether this concept is empirically supported by the available data, 
in what follows we employ novel econometric techniques to identify when the 
growing tendency of government started. Before pursuing that, we believe it is 
useful to clearly present the historical tendencies in the size of government in 
economies for which the historical data is available. 
2.3 Illustration of the historical path of government size 
A first challenge we encountered while aiming to identify the occurrence of major 
shifts in the historical path of government size was to collect the historical data on 
the share of government expenditures in the economy. While attempting to 
construct a database covering as many countries as possible with as many time 
observations as possible we encountered a variety of practical issues. This 
foremost concerns the non availability and poor quality of historical data for some 
years and/or some countries, lack of uniformity in the definitions over time and 
across different countries, changes in territorial boundaries, etc. These limitations 
resulted in a dilemma: namely, whether to examine the size of government for 
45 
 
more countries with fewer time observations; or fewer countries with a longer 
time span. We decided to go with the latter for several reasons. Ideally, from the 
statistical point of view, to perform a reliable time-series analysis one should use 
the longest possible time span of the series. The more observations at hand, the 
more likely it is that the observed series is representing the true or underlying data 
generating process. An unresolved question is how lengthy the series should be in 
practice. The criterion to resolve this issue in our case stems from nature of the 
research question that we aim to address. Since we aim to test whether the date of 
the major increase in the size of government coincides with, in particular, the on-
set of WWI, the Great Depression or WWII, it is important that long periods 
before and during the two world wars and the Great Depression are included, 
since Perron (1989) establishes that break points close to the start or end points of 
series cannot be well determined.  
Given those aims of the investigation, as well as the prerequisite of having 
consistent and comparable data, we are left with a sample of four countries; 
namely, the USA, the UK, Italy and Sweden, with the series of government 
expenditures in the economy beginning in 1789, 1830, 1862 and 1881 
respectively.  
The measure for the share of government expenditure in the economy is 
calculated as a ratio of the central government expenditure to some standardized 
measure of the national economy‟s production. As already pointed out in Chapter 
1, using the data for only the central, and not the total, government expenditures 
could provide a misleading picture of the overall growth trend in government size, 
especially for federal countries where sub-central levels of government amount to 
a significant share of general government. While we acknowledge this limitation, 
we have no other choice but make the most of the data that is available for the 
very long time period that our analysis requires. The measure of the national 
economy‟s production also depends on the availability of such indicators across 
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countries - for the US and Italy we used gross domestic product (GDP), while for 
the UK and Sweden  we used gross national income (GNI)
9
.  
Secular data on public expenditures and GDP are difficult to find, and we need to 
rely on previous work by economic historians, rather than on official sources. For 
period up to 1975, the data on the central government expenditures and the 
economy‟s production are taken from Mitchell (1981, 1998). Subsequently, for 
the period from 1975 onwards, respective figures are taken from the International 
Monetary Fund‟s data base on CD ROM (edition 2006), International Finance 
Statistics (IFS) - Government Statistics section, which is the internationally 
recognised statistical framework for fiscal reporting. As far as the quality of the 
data on central government expenditure taken from Mitchell (1981, 1998), the 
author himself points to some caveats that need to be addressed. Mitchell (1998) 
notifies that the detailed figures of government expenditures are so heterogeneous 
and subject to frequent changes in accounting methods and organisation, that it 
would be unwise to assume that they are always fully comprehensive and 
identified. Comparisons over time, therefore, even within a single country, need to 
be made with caution, and this applies in particular to comparisons between 
countries. Moreover, the areas of responsibility of central and local governments 
differ quite a lot in different countries, especially where there are federal systems 
in operation (Mitchell, 1998, p.633). Because of somewhat unclear explanation of 
the data on the central government expenditure by Mitchell (1981, 1998), we have 
closely examined the conformity of the data from the two sources - namely, 
Mitchell (1981, 1998) and IFS (2006) - during the overlapping period (1945-
1975). Establishing that the values from both sources are consistent during the 
overlapping period, we gain confidence in compiling the two sources and 
extending the Mitchell (1981, 1998) series with the IFS series
10
. The extension of 
                                                 
9
 The difference between the two measures is that GNI is equal to GDP plus net factor 
income/payments abroad.   
10
 For the US, Italy and Sweden, the figures from both sources were almost identical. The IFS 
figures for the UK data, however, were persistently higher compared to the Mitchell figures for 
21.3 percent, on average. Hence, we have scaled the IFS share figures (1975-1999) down by 21.3 
percent, to arrive to a coherent series. 
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the series varies from country to country, depending primarily on the availably of 
the data in the IFS. We have discontinued the series after the last observation is 
available from IFS; namely in 2005, 1999, 1998, 2005 in the case of the USA, the 
UK, Italy and Sweden, respectively. For a more detailed description of the 
compilation of the data for each of the four countries in the sample, see Table 
A.1.1 in Appendix 1.1.  
In an attempt to include more countries in our sample, we also considered several 
other European countries that might be eligible for the analysis, given the criteria 
of the sample construction and the aims of the investigation. However, due to 
specific problems encountered while compiling the data for each of those 
countries, which are briefly discussed in Table A.1.2 in Appendix 1.1, regretfully, 
these countries were not included in our sample.   
Figure 2.1 - Figure 2.4 illustrate the historical tendencies in the size of central 
government expenditures for the US, the UK, Italy and Sweden, respectively. 
Given that graphs in general contain a great deal of information, we believe that 
visual inspection of the plots of each series is a good starting point for a more 
formal statistical examination.  
Figure 2.1: The central government expenditure share in GDP: the US, 1789-2005 
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Figure 2.2: The central government expenditure share in GNI: the UK, 1830-1999 
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Figure 2.3: The central government expenditure share in GDP: Italy, 1862-1998 
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Figure 2.4: The central government expenditure share in GNI: Sweden, 1881-2005 
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Figure 2.1 depicts a steady increase in the US federal government expenditures as 
a share of GDP from the early 20
th
 century onwards. Throughout the 19
th
 century, 
it accounted for about 3 percent of GDP, fluctuating only a little from year to 
year. The only exception is the period of the American Civil War (1861-1865) 
when the shares increased to almost 20 percent of GDP. WWI increased the 
federal government share in GDP to more than 21 percent. It looks as if the shares 
descended after WWI almost as rapidly as they ascended, stabilising at a level 
only slightly higher than that of the pre-WWI period. Another jump came with the 
onset of the Great Depression. The outbreak of WWII led to another steep 
increase of the size of government expenditures, so that it absorbed, in the period 
1941-1945, around 46 percent of the economy. After WWII the expenditure 
shares fell back to around 12 percent, which is not much higher compared to the 
pre-WWII period. Ever since, the trend in the US federal government shares in 
GDP has been upward.  
Illustrated in Figure 2.2, the shares of the UK central government expenditures in 
GNI seem to be trending upward, certainly after the last two decades of the 19
th
 
century. Up to that point, a slight negative trend is evident. This downward trend 
taking place during most of the 19
th
 century might be due to the fact that a high 
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percentage of the total government expenditures was undertaken by local 
governments during that period. This phenomenon, however, is not accounted for 
by the data at hand, since our data pertain only to the central government level. It 
seems that there is a reverse of the trend in the share of the UK central 
government expenditures in the economy somewhere in the last decade of the 19
th
 
century. The average share of central government expenditure in GNI in the 
period from 1830 to 1890 amounted to around 8 percent, growing at a rate of - 0.8 
percent per year. From 1891 onwards, the average share increased threefold, 
absorbing, on average, 25 percent of GNI, while growing at a rate of 1.37 percent 
per year.  The striking change in the sign and the size of the average share growth 
rate could be an indication that there was a break in the trend of the series. This 
possibility will be explored and tested for in more detail in the following sections. 
Pretty much in line with the US experience, major jumps in the shares of the UK 
central government expenditures coincide with the two world wars. Although a 
few years of retrenchment followed the end of each war, in the aftermath of wars, 
the government share has remained at a level somewhat higher than before the 
wars. The share increased sharply at the onset of both WWI and WWII, in both 
cases reaching around 60 percent of the economy. 
Figure 2.3 depicts the historical path of the shares of Italian central government 
expenditures in GDP. The visual inspection of the series reveals an upward trend 
up to the 1990s when it started to decline. By eye, we could speculate that there 
has been an increase in the slope of the trend after the first decade of the 20
th
 
century. From the beginning of the period under consideration, that is from the 
second half of the 19
th
 century, up the first decade of the 20
th
 century, central 
government expenditures accounted for around 11 percent of GDP, growing at a 
rate of less than 1 percent per year. From that period up to the early 1990s, the 
average share of GDP absorbed by the central government doubled, amounting to 
around 22 percent, while growing at an average rate of 4.4 percent per year. The 
major jumps during this period are related to two world wars and the Great 
Depression. WWI lifted the share of central government expenditure to more than 
40 percent of GDP. The share came back to its pre-WWI only in the mid 1920s, 
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after which it trended upwards, with a sharp rise in 1936, followed by yet another 
episode of expansion during WWII. By the 1950s the central government spent 
around 18 percent of GDP. From the mid-1950s to the early-1990s there was 
again an evident upward trend. 
Finally, Figure 2.4 illustrates the time evolution of the shares of Swedish central 
government expenditures in GNI. Again, it seems that the series have been 
trending upwards from the very beginning of the period under consideration; 
namely from 1881. This somewhat steady upward trend has reversed in the last 
decade of the 20
th
 century, when the share of government expenditure in GDP 
stared to decline. The case of Sweden is particularly important for the 
investigation of whether the growth of government size is related to two world 
wars, since Sweden did not take part in those wars. If the growth of government is 
a consequence of the ratchet effects of major social disturbances, then how can we 
explain the steady upward tendencies, at least up to the 1990s, in the Swedish 
case? During the last two decades of the 19
th
 century and the first decade of the 
20
th
 century, it seems that the share of central government expenditures was quite 
stable, fluctuating around 6 percent of GNI. From the first decade of the 20
th
 
century up to the late 1980s, the share of central government expenditure has been 
growing at an annual rate of 4.3 percent, absorbing, on average, 20 percent of 
GNI. Figure 2.4 suggests that the share first started to increase slightly faster 
during the couple of years preceding WWI. The share jumped to almost 20 
percent during WWI, fell back in the 1920s, and then drifted slowly upward 
during the 1920s and 1930s. Another massive increase in the series coincided with 
the period of WWII. In the aftermath of WWII the expenditure shares fell back to 
around 16 percent, which is somewhat higher compared to the pre-WWII period. 
Despite the fact that Sweden did not participate in the two world wars, Swedish 
government might have increased its spending as a precautionary measure against 
a potential enemy‟s occupation. Since the early 1950s to the late 1980s, the trend 
in Swedish central government shares in GDP has been continuously upward. 
That upward trend reversed in the late 1980s when the share started to decline. 
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During that downwardly sloped period, however, a large increase occurred in 
1991-1993 possibly due to the financial crisis that Sweden underwent at that time.  
In general, visual inspection of the graphs reveals that the government sector, 
measured by central government expenditures relative to the rest of economy, has 
grown significantly during the 20
th
 century, at least for the four investigated 
countries. In general, visual inspection suggests that the shares are trended 
upwards over very long periods. Not surprisingly, the plots also suggest possible 
structural instability throughout the investigated period. However, from the graphs 
we can only get a broad impression of the data generating process. It is very 
difficult to speculate whether the series have a (non)stationary data generating 
process interrupted by one or more structural breaks and, if so, when exactly those 
breaks occurred. Since a visual inspection may not permit any conclusive 
judgment, a more thorough investigation of the data generating process is carried 
out in the following sections.  
2.4 Unit root testing  
Before we start a more thorough investigation of the presence of structural breaks 
in the series of government expenditure shares, we undertake a statistical scrutiny 
of the underlying processes that generate the series. First and foremost, this refers 
to testing for the presence of a unit root, i.e. the evidence that series is non-
stationary. Finding evidence of a unit root implies that the behaviour of the series 
is of a stochastic nature and that its future movements are highly unpredictable. It 
may distort important information about the underlying statistical and economic 
processes generating the data, and may lead to nonsensical results from many 
statistical tests (Harris and Sollis, 2003). Hence, the application of many statistical 
tests, including the one that we use later to test for and identify structural breaks, 
requires that the series be stationary.  
So far, many statistical tests have been developed to determine whether a series is 
stationary or non-stationary. The most popular one is the Dickey-Fuller (DF) test. 
In short, by means of the DF test we can statistically test whether 1  in the 
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following equation: ttt uYY  1  (2.1), where tY  is a time-series, 1tY  is the first 
lag of tY ,   is the coefficient on 1tY , and tu is the usual white-noise error term. 
Testing the hypothesis 1  is equivalent to testing the hypothesis 0  in 
equation (2.2): ttt uYY  1  (2.2), where 1  and  is the difference 
operator. The auxiliary equation (2.2) is, in fact, an algebraic transformation of 
equation (2.1), obtained by subtracting 1tY  from both sides of equation (2.1). The 
common practice in the empirical literature is to estimate equation (2.2) and test 
the null hypothesis that 0 , i.e. that the series is non-stationary. Equation 
(2.2), which specifies a pure random walk, is often augmented by deterministic 
elements; namely, a drift term ( 0 ) or/and time trend ( t ). Whatever the 
specification of the regression equation, the obtained t-statistics on   is compared 
to the appropriate non-standard critical values originally calculated by Dickey and 
Fuller. In the presence of a unit root, the critical values depend on whether a drift 
term and/or time trend in included in the regression equation. If the obtained t-
statistics exceeds the appropriate critical values, we reject the null hypothesis that 
the series is non-stationary. The regression equation that includes both intercept 
and time trend is the most common form used in practice (Harris and Sollis, 
2003). 
If the true data generating process has more than one lagged value of Y on the 
right-hand side - i.e. if it is, statistically speaking, autoregressive of higher order 
than 1 - in the DF testing specification, this may give rise to residual 
autocorrelation due to misspecification of the dynamic structure of the series. 
Autocorrelated residuals in this case invalidate the use of DF distributions, which 
are based on the assumption that residuals are “white noise” (Harris and Sollis, 
2003). To overcome this problem, Dickey and Fuller augmented the auxiliary 
regression equation (2.2) by the lagged values of the dependent variable. In the 
literature this modified version of DF test is known as the ADF, or augmented 
Dickey-Fuller test. In this case, the auxiliary regression (2.2) is adjusted by adding 
an appropriate number of lagged dependent variables: 
tntntttt uYYYYtY    ...221110  (2.3), where ntttY  ,...,2,1  
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are lagged dependent variables, n is the maximum number of lags of the 
dependent variable, n..2,1 are the coefficients on the lagged dependent variables 
and tu  is error term. In the literature there is a debate on the appropriate criteria to 
be used when choosing the right number of lag length. Too few lags are not 
enough to “whiten” the error term and standard errors of the estimated coefficients 
will not be well-estimated. On the other hand, introducing too many lags results in 
a loss of degrees of freedom, which reduces the power of the test to reject the null 
of a unit root (Enders, 2004)
11
. To include the appropriate number of lags in the 
regression equation, we stick to the rule of introducing as many lags as needed to 
“whiten” the error term12. To test for the presence of a unit root the same 
procedure as in the case of non-augmented DF test is employed. We compare t-
statistics on   to the appropriate non-standard critical values. Again, the 
appropriate critical values depend on the deterministic components included in the 
regression equation.  
Table 2.1 reports the results of the classical ADF tests for the series specified both 
in levels and logarithms, on a country-by-country basis. The lag length in the 
testing equation is chosen as to “whiten” the residuals. Should there be no 
evidence of serial correlation in the residuals; no additional lag is added to the 
model. All tests include both the time trend and an intercept. Along with the lag 
lengths, appropriate ADF statistics and t-statistics on the coefficient on the drift 
and on the trend term, Table 2.1 also reports the main diagnostic tests. Apart from 
the reference to the problem of serial correlation in the residuals, implications of 
other model specification problems, to our best knowledge, are not discussed in 
the context of unit root testing. To be on the safe side, if there is evidence of 
heteroscedasticity, i.e., the evidence that the variance is not homoscedastic, we 
report “adjusted” t-statistics using White‟s heteroscedasticity adjusted standard 
                                                 
11
 The degrees of freedom decrease when we increase the number of parameters to be estimated, 
because the number of usable observation decreases.  
12
 Enders (2004) suggests to start with a relatively long lag length and pare down the model by the 
usual t-test or/and F-test and once the tentative number of lags is decided upon, the diagnostic of 
the model should be checked, especially for serial correlation.      
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errors and report them in parenthesis in Table 2.1. The augmented Dickey Fuller 
tests are computed in the statistical software package MicroFit
13
.  
Table 2.1: Results of the ADF unit root tests for series in levels (G) and logs (lnG); the US, 
the UK, Italy and Sweden 
Series 
ADF-
statistics 
Constant Trend 
Lag 
length 
Diagnostic tests 
(p-values) 
T
h
e 
U
S
 
G 
-5.409***  
 
-1.63  
 
4.266***  1 
Serial Correlation 0.665 
Functional Form   0.231 
Normality n.a. 
Heteroscedasticity 0.212 
lnG -4.276** 0.072 3.676*** 1 
Serial Correlation  0.723 
Functional Form   0.110 
Normality n.a. 
Heteroscedasticity 0.112 
T
h
e 
U
K
 G 
-5.399***  
(-3.59**)  
0.74519  
(1.47) 
3.7598*** 
(3.69***) 
1 
Serial Correlation 0.595 
Functional Form   0.756 
Normality n.a. 
Heteroscedasticity 0.098 
lnG -3.8314** 3.4220*** 3.0923*** 1 
Serial Correlation  0.662 
Functional Form   0.119 
Normality n.a. 
Heteroscedasticity 0.091 
It
a
ly
 
G 
 
-3.481** 
 
 
1.9190* 
 
2.544** 1 
Serial Correlation 0.490 
Functional Form   0.035 
Normality n.a 
Heteroscedasticity 0.098 
lnG -4.062*** 4.014*** 3.155*** 0 
Serial Correlation  0.172 
Functional Form   0.315 
Normality n.a 
Heteroscedasticity 0.311 
S
w
ed
en
 G 
-2.495 
(-1.494) 
0.445 
(0.565) 
2.154 
(1.617) 
0 
Serial Correlation 0.500 
Functional Form   0.041 
Normality n.a 
Heteroscedasticity 0.000 
lnG 
-1.869 
(-1.944) 
2.147 
(2.140) 
1.612 
(1.745) 
2 
Serial Correlation  0.115 
Functional Form   0.242 
Normality n.a 
Heteroscedasticity 0.005 
Notes: Numbers in the table are t-statistics on the coefficient β, α and γ from the ADF testing equation (3). t-
statistics obtained using White's heteroscedasticity adjusted standard errors are in parentheses. The null hypothesis in 
the ADF test is that β=0. Critical values for ADF statistics tabulated in Fuller (1976; reproduced in Enders, 1995, p. 
419) are -4.04, -3.45 and -3.15 for the 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*) significance level, respectively. In the case of 
a unit root, critical values to test for the significance of the constant tabulated in Dickey and Fuller (1981, p.1062, 
Table II) are 3.78, 3.11 and 2.73 for the 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*) levels, respectively. Respective critical 
values for the significance of the time trend tabulated in Dickey and Fuller (1981, p.1062, Table III) are 3.53, 2.79 
and 2.38 for the 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*) levels, respectively. In the case of no unit root in the series, standard 
critical values apply. The order of the lagged dependent variable augmentation is selected using the ‟serial 
correlation-free residuals‟ approach. Tests for serial correlation, functional form, normality and heteroscedasticity 
are computed using chi-square statistics. 
                                                 
13
 ADF test was also computed in the statistical software package Stata. The results were the same 
in either package.  
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The obtained ADF results, in general, suggest that the shares of central 
government expenditures in the economy are trend stationary, with the exception 
of Sweden. This is because, for each country other than Sweden, the unit root null 
is rejected whereas the presence of a time trend is not. For Swedish data, there is 
not enough evidence to reject the null of a unit root.  
Aiming to specify the most parsimonious model; in other words, omitting lags of 
dependent variables that were insignificant at the 10 percent level, while ensuring 
that no series correlation in present in the residuals, in the case of the US data, we 
ended up with the model that includes only one lag of the dependent variable. The 
ADF-statistic turns out larger than the relevant critical values, indicating that the 
series is not characterised by a unit root; i.e. that it is stationary. Hence, we accept 
the alternative hypothesis that the series is stationary with a deterministic time 
trend. Since no evidence of unit root is found, we use standard critical values to 
determine the statistical significance of the time trend and the drift term. While the 
coefficient on the time trend is highly statistically significant, we cannot reject the 
null hypothesis that the constant term is statistically insignificant at conventional 
levels of significance. Hence, the series seems not to be characterised by the drift 
term. We replicate the ADF test for the unit root with the data subject to 
logarithmic transformation. The testing equation is exactly the same, since one lag 
of the dependent variable is enough to set the residuals free of autocorrelation. 
Again, the test suggests that the series is stationary. Here too, the trend is 
statistically significant while the constant term is not.  
The obtained ADF results for the UK data indicate that, at the 5 percent 
significance level, we can reject the hypothesis of a unit root for the variable 
specified both in levels and logs. Yet, in both models, the time trend is highly 
significant, while the drift term is significant only when the variable is specified in 
logs. Only one additional lag of the dependent variable was enough to “whiten” 
the residuals.  
The results for Italian data suggest that the series specified both in levels and logs 
is not characterised by a unit root, at the 5 percent level of significance. There is 
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an indication of a unit root when the series is specified in levels, at the 1 percent 
level of significance, in which case the critical values to compare with the t-stats 
on the constant and the trend are non-standard, as mentioned in the notes under 
Table 2.1. The drift and time trend terms are highly significant when the series is 
specified in logs. When specified in levels, the drift term is significant only at the 
10 percent level, while the time trend is significant at the 10 and 5, but not at the 1 
percent significance level. Taken all this evidence into account, we conclude that 
the Italian series is stationary around a deterministic trend with a significant 
constant. Finding of a positive and statistically significant drift term is an 
indication that the series has the same upward push in each period, increased 
further by the time trend.  
The results for the ADF tests applied to the Swedish data suggest that the series is 
characterised by a unit root, specified either in levels and logs. This implies that 
we cannot use the standard distributions of t-statistics and standard critical values 
to test for the significance of the drift term and constant. Instead, we use the 
Dickey-Fuller critical values (Dickey and Fuller, 1981, p.1062; Tables III and II). 
The comparison of t-statistics on the coefficients on drift and time trend with 
Dickey-Fuller critical values suggest that these coefficients are not significant. 
However, in terms of economic logic, this makes little sense, because we do not 
expect the share of government expenditure in economy to evolve as a random 
walk without drift. Hence, we proceed with a more thorough “testing down” 
procedure. We implement it first to the variable specified in levels and then we 
repeated the procedure for the variable specified in logs. We test the null that the 
constant and trend are jointly insignificant, using the F-test and corresponding 
non-standard critical values tabulated in Dickey and Fuller (1981, p.1063, Table 
V). Given that the computed F-statistics is smaller than the critical value (3.499 < 
5.58) at the 5 percent significance level, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that 
the constant and the time trend are jointly insignificant. Now that we establish that 
the deterministic trend lacks statistical significance, we delete it from the test 
equation and proceed with the test for the presence of unit root and the 
significance of the constant, in the testing equation without the time trend. The 
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results of the no-trend testing equation suggest that we still cannot reject the 
hypothesis of a unit root since the ADF-statistics is smaller than the critical value 
taken from Fuller (1976; reproduced in Enders, 1995, p. 419), at the 5 percent 
significance level. Further, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the constant term 
is statistically insignificant, since the computed t-statistic on the constant term is 
smaller than critical values given in Dickey and Fuller (1981, p.1062, Table I). 
Hence, we take the constant out of the testing equation and re-estimate it without 
a constant and time trend. Again, we cannot reject the hypothesis of a unit root, 
since the t-stat on the ADF coefficient is smaller than the critical value taken from 
Fuller (1976; reproduced in Enders, 1995, p. 419), at the 5 percent significance 
level. This is an indication the series specified in levels display a unit root and 
resemble a random walk; namely, it is not trended one way or the other over 
indefinite periods. This kind of pattern is a typical statistical description of some 
financial data (such as profit rates), but we certainly would not expect this pattern 
to explain our (real economy) series. Hence, we proceed with the same procedure, 
but this time with variable specified in logs. The conclusions regarding the 
significance on trend and constant are exactly the same, except in last step were 
we test for the unit root in no-trend-and-no-constant model. Here, however, the 
particular coefficient on the level lagged term is positive; namely, 0.0055. This is 
an indication of an explosive process
14
. Because of this, we consider the 
regression with constant but no time trend as relevant and conclude that the series 
is a random walk with drift. This finding is more in line with our a priori 
expectations. It is not surprising that the series displays a unit root with a 
significant constant term. Moreover, this is widely accepted statistical description 
of many upwardly trending macroeconomic series (national output, imports, etc.). 
Our series has a random part (the unit root) and a deterministic part (an upward 
movement in each period described as “drift”).  
                                                 
14
 This is because  is equal to α-1, where α is the coefficient on Yt-1 before the re-parameterisation 
of the random walk Yt = αYt-1 into the DF/ADF regression Yt = (α -1) Yt-1: consequently, if >0, 
then α >1 and Yt is explosive. 
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A complementary approach to unit root testing, preferred by many time series 
econometricians, is the Dickey-Fuller Generalised Least Squares (DF-GLS) test. 
It has been argued that inferences drawn from the DF-GLS test are likely to be 
more robust than those based on the previous versions of ADF tests. In particular, 
it has substantially greater power when a trend is present, compared to the ADF 
tests (Harris and Sollis, 2003). Intuitively, the test applies a generalised least 
square technique to detrend the series, which removes any deterministic trend 
from the series. The detrended series is then tested via the Dickey-Fuller testing 
regression. When implemented in the software programme Stata 9.0, as in our 
case, the optimal lag order for this test is calculated by three different criteria: Ng-
Perron, Schwartz criterion (SC) and Modified Akaike Information Criteria 
(MAIC).  
Sometimes, the lag length suggested by the three criteria differs; thus, we report 
them all. Given that the data at hand is annual, we specified 4 lags as the 
maximum number of lags to be included in the test model. The results from DF-
GLS are reported in Table 2.2. We test the level (G) and the logarithm (lnG), as 
well as the growth rates (dlnG) of the series, on a country-by-country basis. 
The DF-GLS results suggest, in general, that all series, when specified in either 
levels or logarithms, are stationary, except for the Swedish series, where the 
results indicate that we cannot reject the null of a unit root, at all levels of 
significance. For the US shares of government expenditures in GDP, the test 
suggests that we can reject the null of non-stationarity, when the series is specified 
in levels. When specified in logarithms, the specification suggested by Ng-Perron 
and MAIC criteria, however, indicated that we cannot reject the null hypothesis of 
a unit root. Nonetheless, at the 10 percent level of significance, the SC criterion 
indicates that the series is stationary. For the UK series, in general, it seems that 
there is no strong evidence to suggest that the series contains a unit root, 
according to all criteria, at all conventional levels of significance. When specified 
in logs, the DF-GLS statistics associated with the suggested lag order generally 
becomes lower; hence, the null of a unit root is more likely to be accepted. Indeed, 
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at the 1 percent significance level, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of a unit 
root according to all criteria. However, at the 5 percent significance level, we 
reject the null hypothesis as indicated by the DF-GLS statistics according to Ng-
Perron and SC criteria. According to the lag order indicated by the MAIC 
criterion, and the appropriate DF-GLS statistic, the logarithm of the series seems 
to be characterised by a unit root at all levels of significance. 
Table 2.2: DF-GLS tests for a unit root; max leg length 4; series in levels and logs; the US, 
the UK, Italy and Sweden 
 Series 
 Criteria for the lag length 
 Ng-Perron SC MAIC 
T
h
e 
U
S
 
G 
Selected no. of lags 1 1 3 
DF-GLS statistic -4.865*** -4.865*** -3.776* 
lnG 
Selected no. of lags 4 1 4 
DF-GLS statistic -2.581 -3.456** -2.581 
dlnG 
Selected no. of lags 0 1 2 
DF-GLS statistic - -10.279*** -8.256*** 
T
h
e 
U
K
 G 
Selected no. of lags 1 1 3 
DF-GLS statistic -5.064*** -5.064*** -3.776*** 
lnG 
Selected no. of lags 1 1 4 
DF-GLS statistic -3.241** -3.241** -2.494 
dlnG 
Selected no. of lags 0 1 1 
DF-GLS statistic - -7.666*** -7.666*** 
It
al
y
 
G 
Selected no. of lags 1 1 1 
DF-GLS statistic -3.451** -3.451** -3.451** 
lnG 
Selected no. of lags 0 1 1 
DF-GLS statistic - -3.418** -3.418** 
dlnG 
Selected no. of lags 0 1 1 
DF-GLS statistic - -9.436*** -9.436*** 
S
w
ed
en
 
G 
Selected no. of lags 0 1 2 
DF-GLS statistic - -2.083 -1.697 
lnG 
Selected no. of lags 2 2 2 
DF-GLS statistic -2.017 -2.017 -2.017 
dlnG 
Selected no. of lags 1 1 2 
DF-GLS statistic -11.590*** -11.590*** -7.093*** 
Notes: ***,**,* denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, 
respectively. Critical values are provided by Stata 9.0.  
The DF-GLS results for Italian data suggest that, at the 5 percent level 
significance, there is no evidence that the series, specified either in levels and 
logs, contains a unit root. The DF-GLS results for the Swedish data are somewhat 
in contrast to the results obtained for other countries. Namely, the test results 
suggest that, according to all criteria at all conventional levels of significance, we 
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cannot reject the null hypothesis that the series, both in levels and logs, contains a 
unit root.  
Finally, the DF-GLS results for the growth rates of the series indicate that, for all 
countries, according to all criteria, at all conventional levels of significance, we 
can reject the null of a unit root. That the growth rates are stationary is also quite 
apparent from the plots of the growth rates, illustrated in Figure A.1.1 - Figure 
A.1.4 in Appendix 1.2.   
The conventional “DF style” unit root tests are routinely used in testing for unit 
roots in practice. We warn, however, about some caveats related to these tests.  A 
well-known weakness of these tests is their potential confusion of structural 
breaks in the series with evidence of non-stationarity. A unit root test that does not 
take account of the break in the series will have very low power. As pointed out 
by Maddala and Kim (1998, p.389), one major drawback of the unit root tests is 
that, in all of them, the implicit assumption is that the deterministic trend is 
correctly specified. Hence, conventional unit root tests often indicate that the 
underlying data generation process of the most economic time series have the 
characteristics of non-stationarity. However, one can argue that this may be 
because structural changes are suppressed and not allowed for in those tests. 
Hence, many econometricians have attempted to deal with this confusion by 
devising unit root tests that allow testing for a unit root conditional on the 
presence of structural breaks. The most prominent approach to this issue is Perron 
(1989) who, in his seminal paper, argues that if there is a single break in the trend 
function, standard unit root test will be biased towards non-rejection of a unit root 
hypothesis while, in fact, the series might be characterised as stationary 
fluctuations around a “broken” deterministic trend function. Aiming to correct for 
the low power of conventional unit root tests in the presence of a structural break, 
Perron (1989, 1990) extends the ADF testing strategy to allow for the presence of 
one-time change in the level of the series (“crash” model) and/or the slope the 
series. More precisely, he develops three alternative models in which a one-time 
exogenous break in the series can occur; namely, Model A - allows for a break in 
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the level of the series; Model B - allows for a break in the rate of growth; and 
Model C - allows for a break in both the level and in the rate of growth. In each 
model, the analysis is restricted to the case of a one-time break point, which needs 
to be defined a priori; i.e. the date of the break is fixed rather than a random 
variable to be estimated (Perron, 1989). A common practice in the applied 
literature is to relate the break point to “major” events that are known to have 
occurred and which may have caused a structural change in the behaviour of the 
series (Perron, 1989). This is a major disadvantage of Perron‟s unit root test, since 
defining a single break point a priori may results in a great deal of arbitrariness 
and data mining. Likewise, there may have occurred more than one break in the 
series, which cannot be accounted for in these tests. The main aim of this part of 
our research is not to take the conventionally considered break points - WWI, the 
Great Depression and WWII - for granted, but instead to apply an appropriate 
statistical tool to estimate the break point(s) from the available data. Hence, we 
present Perron‟s unit root test (Model A, Model B and Model C) in more detail in 
Appendix 1.3, while in what follows we focus on a newly developed technique 
that identifies the break point(s) from the information contained in the data.  
2.5 When did the growing tendency of government start? The 
Bai-Perron procedure  
In recent times, econometric literature points to the problematic exogeneity 
assumption about the break point(s). As already pointed out, a researcher is faced 
with many dilemmas and seemingly ad hoc choices. To overcome this problem 
and to enable identification of the exact break point endogenously, several 
different tests for parameter stability have been developed. Some of these account 
for only one-time break in the series (Andrews, 1993), despite the fact that the 
series might be characterised by more than one break. To account for that 
possibility, the econometric literature on multiple structural breaks, occurring at 
unknown dates, has been growing rapidly in recent years. The two key influential 
figures in this field are Perron P. and Bai J. (1998, 2003) who provide a 
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comprehensive treatment of various issues in the context of multiple structural 
change models.  
It is in this field that we aim to strengthen our analysis of the major shifts that 
have possibly occurred in the growth of government size in the economy since the 
late 19
th
 century. From the point of view of our research aim, the most important 
advantage of this procedure is that it allows for endogenous detection of structural 
breaking points; thus, it requires no a priori knowledge about the occurrence of 
the break(s), and it also leaves open the possibility that some of the countries 
experienced more than one break in the growth of government size. This is 
particularly important for our research, since there are at least three major 
“suspects” that could be related to major breaks in the series - WWI, the Great 
Depression and WWII.  
Despite its many advantages, it seems that the application of this procedure is still 
quite limited in applied work. This could be partly explained by the computational 
difficulties related to it and the fact that it is still not readily available in user-
friendly statistical software. Fortunately, Bai and Perron (2003) made publicly 
available a Gauss algorithm to compute the estimates of the break dates. The 
algorithm, of course, needs to be modified to comply with the specificities of the 
research.  
In order to clarify the underlying statistical mechanisms behind this relatively 
sophisticated econometric technique, we provide a highly intuitive explanation. 
The algorithm that Bai and Perron (1998, 2003) derive is based on a dynamic 
programming approach to obtain global minimisers of the sum of squared 
residuals, from models of the type specified below:  
tjttt uzxy       for 1,...,1  mj      (2.4) 
The model (2.4) is a multiple linear regression model with m breaks (m+1 
regimes) where ty  is the dependent variable, xt )1( p  and zt )1( q , are vectors of 
covariates, and  and j  ( 1,...,1  mj ) are the corresponding vectors of 
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coefficients and tu  is the error term. The break points (T1,..., Tm) are treated as 
unknown. The purpose of Bai-Perron procedure is to estimate the unknown 
regression coefficients and, what is important for the purpose of our study, to 
estimate the break dates
15
.  
Intuitively, Bai-Perron procedure aims at estimating the preferred specification 
with m breaks, that is, m+1 regimes, that achieves a global minimisation of the 
overall sum of squared residuals from equation (2.4). To that end, via a sequential 
method, it estimates the m single equations allowing for l, l+1,…, l+m-1 possible 
structural breaks. In other words, it starts with the smallest number of breaks 
(normally, one break, i.e., two regimes) and sequentially adds an additional break 
to establish whether the sum of squared residuals in the specification with this 
additional break is lower compared to the specification without this additional 
break. In this manner, the estimated sums of squared residuals are compared 
across each of those m regressions and the global minimum value is established. 
Bai and Perron (1998) developed the so-called supFT(l+1/l) tests of the null 
hypothesis of l changes versus the alternative of l+1 changes that a researcher 
uses to decide on the statistically appropriate number of the breaks. 
Asymptotically valid critical values for this test are provided by Bai and Perron 
(1998). One concludes in favour of a model with (l+1) breaks if the overall 
minimal value of the sum of squared residuals (over all segments where an 
additional break is included) is sufficiently smaller relative to the estimated sum 
of squared residuals from the l breaks model (Bai and Perron, 2003, p.14).  
As explained by Bai and Perron (2003), this procedure is quite flexible as it 
allows the dynamic effects to be taken into account either in a direct parametric 
fashion (e.g. by introducing lagged dependent variables so as to have uncorrelated 
residuals) or in an indirect nonparametric approach (e.g. by leaving the dynamics 
in the disturbances and applying a nonparametric correction for proper asymptotic 
                                                 
15
 Note that in equation (2.4) there is no “j” subscript on  , which means that it is not subject to 
shifts and is effectively estimated using the entire sample. On the other hand,  is subject to m 
possible shifts, which means that its values are estimated for m+1 regimes separately. 
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inference). We decide to follow the former approach, i.e. we specify the 
autoregressive model with a sufficient number of lagged dependent variables to 
account for dynamics.  
A limitation of the Bai-Perron (1998, 2003) procedure is that it does not account 
for the simultaneous break in the level and the rates of growth. Also, it assumes 
the series examined for the unknown break dates to be stationary. To take both 
this limitation and this requirement into account, we implement the Bai-Perron 
procedure on the series specified in growth rates, rather than on the series 
specified in levels. Based on the visual inspection of the graph of the series, it is 
very difficult to speculate whether the break occurred in the level of the series or 
in the slope of the trend function. Taking all this into account, we decide to test 
for the break in the mean of the growth rates of the series. If identified, a mean 
break in the growth rates is, in fact, a break in the slope of the trend in the levels
16
. 
As already mentioned, before applying the Bai-Perron procedure, we ensure that 
the persistence in the growth rates is taken into account and that the relevant 
number of lagged dependent variables is included in the modelling procedure. To 
decide on the number of lags to be included in the model specification to be 
checked for the presences of structural breaks, in Table A.1.3 in Appendix 1.4 we 
summarise the results of tests of the significance of autoregressive coefficients of 
the growth rates for each country. In other words, we test whether an additional 
lag of the dependent variable, i.e. an additional lag of the rate of growth of 
government expenditures in the economy, is statistically significant. In order to 
account for the persistence in the growth rates, we include only one lag of the 
dependent variable for the UK and Italy, while for the US and Sweden we include 
two lags, since these proved to be statistically significant. Taking all this evidence 
into account, for the UK and Italy, we implement the Bai-Perron procedure using 
the following specification: 
ttt GlndGlnd   1)()(     (2.5), 
                                                 
16
 Given that the trend of the series is its long-run growth rate, a break in the mean (average) of the 
growth rates is a break in the slope of the trend of the series in levels.  
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where tdln(G)  is the rate of growth of central government expenditure in the 
economy,   is the intercept, 1)( tGlnd  is the first lag of the dependent variable, 
  is the coefficient on 1)( tGlnd , and t  is error term. For the US and Sweden, 
we also include the second lag of the dependent variable, 2)( tGlnd ; thus, the 
employed specification for those countries takes the following form:  
tttt GlndGlndGlnd    2211 )()()(     (2.6). 
In subsequent sections, by means of the Bai-Perron procedure, we search for 
evidence of instability of the estimated coefficients on the intercept ( ); in other 
words, evidence for one or more break(s) in the trend of the series in levels. The 
Bai - Perron procedure requires a minimum distance, h, between each break to be 
imposed. A researcher specifies the so-called trimming factor; 
T
h
 , where T is 
the total number of observations. Following the Bai and Perron (2003) example, 
we use a trimming parameter of 0.15. The value of 0.15 means that the minimal 
number of observations between two breaks should be 15 percent of the total 
number of observations, which in our case means that the minimal number of 
years between the two breaks is 32, 25, 21 and 18, for the US, the UK, Italy and 
Sweden, respectively. In all cases, the choice of trimming factor implies that the 
maximal number of breaks which this test can detect in our series is 5.  
The sequential Bai-Perron test procedure suggests that there was a structural break 
in the growth of the American federal government expenditures share in GDP, 
occurring in 1915. In the UK, the Bai-Perron test procedure located the break 
point in the growth rates of central government expenditures share in GNI in 
1898. In both cases, the supFT(2/1) statistics is statistically insignificant which 
supports the conclusion that the series is subject to only one break (and not 2). 
The estimated mean of the series over each segment (i.e., the segment before and 
the segment after the break date) indicates an increase in the growth rates after the 
break.  
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The Bai-Perron procedure identified no major structural break points in the 
growth rates of Italian and Swedish central government expenditures shares in the 
economy. In the case of Sweden, the test first pointed out the year of 1918 as a 
break date. We were, however, quite sceptical towards this finding. The estimated 
mean of the series in the segment before and after the break point, suggested that 
there was a decrease in the average growth rates during the period after the break, 
which is quite odd. A more thorough inspection of the data and its plot indicates 
there is a large positive spike associated with 1918. Because this spike is close to 
the beginning of the total period under investigation, which might distort the 
results of statistical test, we replace the actual value for that observation with the 
average value of the two years before and the two years after the 1918 
observation. We re-run the Bai-Perron procedure using this “1918-corrected” 
growth rate series. The test now suggests that the trend of the series is not subject 
to structural breaks, which is consistent with the interpretation of the classical 
ADF estimation results reported above.     
2.6 Conclusion  
Before investigating the question of why the government sector grows, in this 
chapter we demonstrated, for a selected number of developed economies, how it 
actually evolved throughout a relatively long time period. In particular, the aim of 
this chapter is to identify when the size of government started to grow and to 
determine whether the identified date coincides with the conventionally 
hypothesised dates - WWI, the Great Depression and WWII. At the outset of this 
chapter it is pointed out that our analysis is confined by the availability of 
historical data on government expenditures. While aiming to extend this analysis 
to as many countries as possible, we encountered various problems related 
foremost to non-availability and/or poor quality of the historical data. As a result, 
the analysis is carried out on the four developed economies for which the 
available data extends back to the pre-World War I period; namely, the US, the 
UK, Italy and Sweden.  
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The available data suggest that the government sector, relative to the rest of 
economy, has grown significantly during the 20
th
 century. It is very difficult to try 
to relate the turning point in the secular growth of government to a specific event 
in the economic history of each country. First and foremost, difficulties stem from 
the fact that economists still do not know what exactly could have been the 
trigger. In addition, such a task requires an exceptional knowledge of economic 
history and also the availability of historical data.  
Conventionally, major increases in government size have been related to major 
socio-economic disturbances, in particular the two world wars and the Great 
Depression. The displacement hypothesis developed by Peacock and Wiseman 
(1961) is one culprit for such conventionally held views. Intuitively appealing, but 
theoretically elusive, this explanation rests on the assumption that government 
expenditures show a displacement after periods of social disturbance. Ever since 
this work was published, social disturbances - WWI, the Great Depression and 
WWII, in particular - have been seen as having a major, long-lasting influence on 
the size of government expenditures.  
Instead of taking the conventional wisdom for granted, we used a newly 
developed statistical test to identify major break points in the growth of 
government expenditures for the four developed countries. Before focusing on the 
analysis of possible structural breaks, we carried out a statistical inspection of the 
underlying processes that generate the series. In general, the results of the applied 
unit root tests suggest that the series are trend stationary, with the exception of 
Sweden. For Swedish data, there is indication that the series is difference 
stationary, displaying a unit root with a significant constant term (i.e., a random 
walk with drift). On an intuitive level, the fact that we could not pick up a 
deterministic trend in case of Sweden could be due to fact that we had the shortest 
time span at hand for Sweden; and the shorter the time-series, the less we can say 
about the trend. It could be that we need a longer data series to identify a 
deterministic trend at work.  
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We now return to discussion of the main findings of this chapter that stem from 
the analysis of structural breaks. Contrary to popular perceptions, the obtained 
results suggest that the two world wars and the Great Depression had only 
transitory effects on the relative size of government. It should be emphasised that 
we refrain from any empirical generalisations, since drawing any kind of general 
conclusion on whether or not the conventional wisdom is supported empirically 
requires the analysis to be carried out on a much broader sample of countries. 
Suspecting that the break occurred in the slope of the trend of the series, rather 
than in the mean of the series, we applied Bai and Perron‟s test to the growth rates 
of the share of government spending in the economy. 
Our findings suggest either that if there was a break in the trend of the series then 
it predated WWI (as in the case of the US and the UK), or that there was no break 
related to major social disturbances (as in the case of Italy and Sweden). It is 
possible that we fail to identify the break in the series for Italy and Sweden for 
purely statistical reasons related to insufficient data for those two countries for the 
19
th
 century. In fact, in case of Sweden, we cannot pick up a trend at all. This is 
maybe due to fact that we had the shortest time span at hand for Sweden, and the 
shorter the time-series, the less we can say about the trend. 
Again, we attempt to make no general conclusions, but we believe that our results 
suggest that any theory of government growth that has its departure in post-WWII 
period might be suspect; it could be only a partial explanation at best.  
As for the UK and US, the two countries where a major break in the growth rates 
of government expenditures was detected, the Bai-Perron approach suggests that 
it occurred earlier than conventionally assumed; namely, in 1898 and 1915, 
respectively. It is very difficult to isolate a particular change or set of changes in 
the economic history of the UK and US that could explain why those breaks 
occurred exactly in the years identified through our testing procedure. We can 
only broadly comment on the then prevalent circumstances that might have 
possibly led to such major increases in government size, but due to non-
availability of historical data we cannot verify our speculations empirically. It is 
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arguable that government involvement in the economy started to increase 
massively before the outbreak of WWI due to substantial economic, social, 
political and ideological changes which set the stage for larger state activism 
throughout the 20
th
 century. Higgs (2003) points out that, by the early 20
th
 
century, the intellectual cutting edge in all the economically advanced countries 
had become more or less socialistic, and mass electorates also had become more 
inclined toward support for various publicly funded schemes. At the same time, 
governments began making increasing commitments to their citizens regarding 
the provision of public goods and services. Such favourable ideological conditions 
created a climate in which government expansion was encouraged. As mentioned 
in Chapter 1, by the end of the 19
th
 century, governments started to engage 
actively in providing social welfare programs and many other publicly-provided 
goods and services, which by that time were either nonexistent or provided on a 
small scale within the private-family sector. Adolph Wagner, whose “Law of 
increasing State activities” we discus and examine carefully in Chapter 3 and 5, 
was among the first to explain this massive growth in government activity by the 
increased demand for public goods and services, in particular education, health, 
social insurance, regulatory activities, transport, etc. brought about by the 
increasing complexity of emerging industrial societies. The emergence of large 
corporate firms and private monopoly power especially in the US, according to 
Higgs (1987), is yet another manifestation of economic modernisation in that 
period that could be related to the growth of government. It is arguable that larger 
governments were called for as “countervailing power”, by which the public 
resisted the influence that big business would otherwise have exercised over the 
nation‟s economic and political life under unregulated conditions. In addition, it 
should be emphasised that the second part of the 19
th
 century witnessed a 
remarkable growth of international economic integration, which could also be 
relevant for explaining the increase in government size. Capital and people moved 
relatively freely across the globe, and their mobility was facilitated by 
developments in transportation and communication (Ravenhill, 2005).  
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An intellectual climate favourable to the extension of public and social services 
was gaining ground also in the UK and US at the turn of the 19
th
 century. 
According to Orloff and Skocpol (1984), both the UK and US were part of the 
same community of policy discourse in the early 20
th
 century. Peacock and 
Wiseman (1961) explain that in the 1880s, the era of social activism had begun as 
the British intellectuals became increasingly dissatisfied with the doctrine of state 
retrenchment. In consequence, according to Peacock and Wiseman (1961), the 
secular rate of growth of government expenditures became much faster and 
continued so throughout the 20
th
 century. At almost the same time, an ideological 
turnabout took place also in the US as it went through the “Progressive Era”, a 
period of pro-government sentiment which was opposed to the excesses of 
“laissez-faire” capitalism and supported a bigger role for the government sector. 
According to Higgs (1987), the “Progressive Era” witnessed a profound 
transformation of the typical American‟s beliefs about the appropriate role of the 
government in economic affairs.  
Our results suggest that the major increase in the growth of the British 
government occurred somewhat earlier that in the growth of the American 
government. This finding could be interpreted as consistent with observations 
made by the economic historians Orloff and Skocpol (1984), who point out that 
the UK initiated all of the key programs of what would later come to be called a 
modern welfare state somewhat earlier than the US. The British government 
instituted workers‟ compensation, old age pensions, health insurance, and the 
world‟s first compulsory system of unemployment insurance well before the onset 
of WWI and a number of years before the US. Lindert (2004) also finds that the 
scope of social transfers in the UK started to widen already in the 1880s. The 
1915 break date in the American time series is consistent with Higgs‟s (1987) 
observation that federal expenditures jumped dramatically at the beginning of the 
20
th
 century. He argues that this upward break, followed by the steady growth of 
the government sector throughout the 20
th
 century, is the result of government‟s 
decision to provide various social and economic services. Governments started to 
make commitments in the late 19th century and those commitments gradually 
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grew larger and larger. The identified break date broadly coincides with the 
government‟s positive response to the railroad labour troubles of 1916-1917. This 
incident, according to Higgs (1987), may be seen both as the culmination of 
Progressivism and the onset of Big Government in the US, after which the 
Americans witnessed an enormous and wholly unprecedented intervention of the 
federal government in the nation‟s economic affairs. We recall here that the 
measure of government size used in this chapter refers only to central, i.e. the 
federal level of government. This means that it could understate the true 
budgetary size of government expenditures, particularly for the US where 
substantial expenditures are undertaken at sub-federal levels of government. 
Although the growth of the federal government is indeed only a part of the story 
of the growth of government, it seems to be an important part, especially for the 
period in American history for which the break is identified. Higgs (1987) and 
Tanner (2007) point out that there had been an immense move toward federal 
power at the turn of the 19
th
 century. Starting from the very beginning of the 20
th
 
century, virtually all important public-policy initiatives called for more extensive 
action at the federal level. In addition, Higgs (1987) remarks that the expansion of 
the American government size throughout the 20
th
 century has been most 
prodigious at this level of government.  
As already pointed out, the statistical evidence in support of our claims that 
governments started to increase their weight in the economy even before the onset 
of WWI needs to be complemented by an extended historical analysis of the 
underlying factors that could explain the behaviour of government expenditures. 
For the moment, our broad discussion on the possible factors should be accepted 
only as a plausible point of departure. Most important, we report our main 
findings on the weight of government in the economy to be: positive long-term 
trends, with plausible turning points, in the UK and the US; a positive trend 
throughout the observed period in the case of Italy; and a positive steady increase 
- captured by the “drift” term - in the case of Sweden. To explain this apparently 
generalised tendency to increase, we will shift from case-by-case historical 
discussion to large-sample econometric analysis. But first, this requires theoretical 
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analysis to inform the specification of a model to be estimated. Accordingly, in 
Chapter 3 we review the literature to identify the factors that might work to 
increase the size of government in developed mixed economies. Chapter 4 then 
synthesises these factors into an eclectic model. Finally, in Chapter 5 this model is 
the platform for econometric estimation.   
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3.1 Introduction  
A generally increasing size of the government sector in mixed developed 
economies has spurred an interest among economists in indentifying the forces 
which could explain the long-run tendencies of government expenditures. The 
main research question which emerged as the results of that interest has been the 
following: what has caused the increase in the relative size of government during 
much of the past century? This chapter examines some of the answers that have 
been offered in the literature. Despite the importance of the topic, from the 
standpoint of developing a comprehensive, generally accepted theory of 
government expenditures, it seems that the literature is still relatively 
underdeveloped, suggesting an analytical gap in the examination of the 
determinants of the size of government. The existing literature offers only various 
fragmented theoretical explanations that focus on different single factors, which 
are supposed to be driving forces of the overall government size. In other words, 
the existing theoretical explanations indicate that certain variables are likely to 
have some impact on government expenditures. The problem is that the literature 
does not offer a coherent theoretical framework within which a set of variables 
from the existing theories could be reconciled and tested empirically. Before 
proposing such an integrative framework later in the thesis, in this chapter we 
provide an overview of several theoretical approaches towards explaining the size 
of government in the economy and present the main empirical findings. In that 
way, we set the background for identifying the important long-run determinants of 
government size to be tested empirically in Chapter 5.    
The structure of this chapter is as follows: each section introduces and discusses 
one theoretical approach; thus, in total, this chapter overviews seven leading 
theoretical explanations for the size of government. Section 3.2 discusses one of 
the oldest explanations for the relative increase in government expenditures, 
known as Wagner‟s Law. In this section, we distinguish clearly between the two 
underlying hypotheses inherent in Wagner‟s writings - the “income-elasticity” 
hypothesis and the “modernisation” hypothesis - and argue that these hypotheses, 
particularly the latter one, may not be interpreted literally when examined in the 
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context of modern economies. While the globalisation orthodoxy predicts an 
inverse relationship between “stateness” and economic openness (Ravenhill, 
2005), in Section 3.3 we present an alternative approach, which assumes that 
economic openness is far more compatible with government expenditures than is 
conventionally assumed. We argue that the two hypotheses about the relationship 
between government size and economic openness relate to two different aspects 
of economic openness; namely, a county‟s degree of trade and its financial 
openness. In section 3.4 we explain why the government sector is assumed to be 
affected by Baumol‟s cost disease and discuss its implications for relative 
government size. Section 3.5 introduces the interest group hypothesis, according 
to which special interests groups benefit from various government actions at the 
expense of the overall taxpayer population, thereby creating a pressure for larger 
governments. Closely related to it is Niskanen‟s model of bureaucracy, discussed 
in section 3.6. Section 3.7 discusses the theoretical explanations that have been 
advanced for why a country‟s degree of fiscal decentralisation is expected to 
influence the total size of government in the economy. The chapter concludes 
with section 3.8.  
3.2 Wagner’s Law 
In the late 19
th
 century in a number of European industrialising countries Adolf 
Wagner, a German political economist, observed a tendency for the government 
sectors to increase, both absolutely and relative to the rest of the economy. This 
empirically observed regularity of the government sector to grow alongside 
economic activity has ever since been referred to as Wagner‟s Law. Even today, 
more than a hundred years later, economists generally consider Wagner‟s Law to 
be an important theoretical explanation for the long-run behaviour of the size of 
government in the economy.  
The economic underpinnings of the Law relate to two main reasons for the 
observed long-run tendency of the government sector to grow. First, the income 
elasticity argument refers to the “luxury” nature of some government-provided 
goods and services. According to this proposition, as per capita income rises over 
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time, people devote a larger share of their available income to goods and services 
provided by the government sector. Implicit in this assumption is the idea that 
people are trustful of government to deliver efficiently certain types of goods and 
services, thus indicating a social preference for the government rather than the 
private sector to arrange the supply of such good and services. As a result, the 
government sector increases more than proportionally with income. Some types of 
government-provided goods and services more than others are expected to 
increase at a rate faster than income. For instance, demand for “cultural and 
welfare” expenditures, in particular, education, health, social insurance and 
redistribution is expected to rise as a response to increased personal income
17
.  
Another main force which could explain the rising weight of the government 
sector in the economy is an increased complexity of the socio-economic system. 
Reflecting on the implications of the then prevalent structural changes - in 
particular, industrialisation, increased population density and urbanisation - 
Wagner foresaw an increased necessity for the administrative, regulatory and 
protective activities of the government. The underlying idea is that socio-
economic changes are expected to result in more complex market and legal 
relationships, additional pressure on public infrastructure, congestion, higher 
social tensions etc. This, in turn, increases the demand for government activities, 
primarily of the above mentioned type.  
In passing, we point out that Wagner also envisaged an increase in the number of 
public enterprises to prevent private monopolistic practices and to meet large-
scale investment requirements for some emerging industries. In practice, the 
literature on Wagner‟s Law, however, mostly focuses on fiscal aspects of 
government, typically represented by government expenditures. This practice is 
particularly criticised by Peacock and Scott (2000). However, to an extent, it is a 
result of measurement difficulties, whereby public enterprises as well as other 
                                                 
17
 According to Gemmell (1993), the income elasticity proposition does not need to hold for every 
particular type of the government expenditures. It is sufficient that the proposition holds for the 
average or typical category that government expenditures consist of. 
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“non-budget” aspects of the government involvement in the economy are not 
included in the most widely used budgetary measures of the size of government
18
.  
If we ignore the aspect of Wagner‟s writings that relates to increasing number of 
public enterprises then, taken together, there are two “interpretations” of 
Wagner‟s Law which could be translated into testable hypotheses.  
According to the first, income-elastic demand interpretation, the share of 
economic resources absorbed by the government sector increases because 
government-provided goods and services generally have a high income elasticity 
of demand. As a result, consumers-voters spend a larger share of their available 
income on some government-provided goods and services as their income rises. 
To test this income-elasticity hypothesis, the empirical studies commonly employ 
GDP per capita on the right-hand side of the testing equation, where the 
dependent variable is a measure of the size of government. Some authors use the 
absolute size of government as the dependent variable, whereas a more common 
approach is to use the size of government relative to the size of economy (more 
precisely, the share of government expenditure in GDP). From the econometric 
point of view, it is convenient to adopt a double-log functional form, in which 
case, the estimated coefficient on income gives a constant elasticity score on the 
dependent variable with respect to income. For a model specification in which the 
dependent variable is the absolute size of government, validation of Wagner‟s 
Law requires this coefficient to be statistically significant and greater than 1. 
Consequently, where the dependent variable is the size of government relative to 
the size of economy, the estimated coefficient on the income variable is expected 
to be statistically significant and greater than 0 to confirm that government-
provided goods and services are of a “luxury” nature, as hypothesised by Wagner.  
                                                 
18
 In addition, increased number of public enterprises might be something of a temporary 
phenomenon due to massive privatisation in developed market economies, especially since the 
1980s and to capital market development. 
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A second interpretation of Wagner‟s Law rests on the modernisation of the socio-
economic system or, in the spirit of Wagner‟s writing, the transformation of rural 
traditional society into industrialised society, which creates pressure for various 
types of government activities. Industrialisation and modernisation would lead to 
a substitution of public for private activity, since many goods and services once 
produced in the private-family sector were displaced into the government sector. 
In addition, in an increasingly complex society, the need and demand for public 
protective and regulative activity is expected grow to ensure the smooth operation 
of the economic system. To capture and measure the effect of increased socio-
economic complexity on the size of government, researchers generally employ 
some proxy for the degree of industrialisation and urbanisation, since Wagner 
pointed out that it is particularly those processes that best reflect the 
“modernisation” or “restructuring” of society and economy. However, as we 
argue in Chapter 5, for developed countries in the post-industrial stage of 
development, such measures could be a poor proxy to the theoretical concept that 
they are suppose to represent. Accordingly, this is one of the points where our 
study departs from the existing empirical strategies; namely, we employ an 
alternative proxy to account for the concept of post-industrial modernisation more 
appropriately than the degree of industrialisation, urbanisation and the like.   
Many empirical studies have been carried out to test the validity of Wagner‟s 
Law. The results so far have generally been mixed, thus “leaving the door open” 
for further empirical tests of this hypothesis. The prevalent approach in the 
empirical literature has been to investigate the relationship between the size of 
government expenditures and national income for an individual country or a 
group of countries, on a country-by-country basis in a time-series framework. 
From the point of view of the applied econometric approach, the empirical 
studies, at least those reviewed here and performed from the 1990s onwards, 
follow a similar methodology. In fact, most studies use the cointegration approach 
to identify and estimate a long-run cointegrating relationship between the size of 
government and national income. Most of the recent studies also perform Granger 
causality tests to confirm that the direction of causality runs from the national 
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income to the size of government, and not vice versa. According to economic 
theory, it is reasonable to suspect causality running the other way around, so that 
the government expenditures influence the level of economic activities. We return 
to this issue of the possible reverse causality in Chapter 5, where we provide a 
more thorough discussion of it and explain our strategy to account for it in our 
econometric approach to test Wagner‟s Law. Oxley (1994) confirms the validity 
of Wagner‟s Law for Britain in the period 1870-1913. The author follows a 
procedure typical for the cointegration approach: first, the stationarity properties 
and order of integration of the data are examined. Since both the government 
expenditures in GDP and GDP appear to be non-stationary, in the next stage the 
Johansen test for cointegration is conducted to test for a long-run relationship 
between the two variables. Finally, a Granger-type test of causality is performed 
to suggest that Granger causality runs from national income to the size of 
government. Using data from around the mid-19
th
 century to 1913, Thornton 
(1999) investigates, on a country-by-country basis, the relevance of Wagner‟s 
Law for six developed European countries: Denmark, Germany, Italy, Norway, 
Sweden, and the UK. On the whole, the results suggest that the variables are non-
stationary and cointegrated in five out of the six countries, with Granger causality 
running mainly from income to government expenditure. It is arguable that the 
data used in those studies cover precisely the time period for which Wagner‟s 
Law is suppose to prevail. As already pointed out, Wagner‟s Law was originally 
conceivable as applicable to “industrialising countries”, i.e. to the industrialisation 
phase of development when the production of many goods and services shifted 
from the “family” to the government sector and when economic transactions 
became more complex. However, Gemmell (1993) argues that the application of 
Wagner‟s Law to later stages of development should not be ruled out only 
because Wagner failed to foresee, in his day, a time when social progress might be 
associated, actually, with “de-industrialisation”.  
Henrekson (1993b) fails to find evidence of a long-run relationship between the 
government spending share and real income per capita in Sweden, during the 
period 1861-1988. Chletsos and Kollias (1997) test the validity of Wagner‟s Law 
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for Greece in the period 1958-1993. The specificity of their study is that they use 
disaggregate government expenditures. The reported results suggest that the only 
type of government expenditures that is positively related to national income is 
the defence expenditures. Iyare and Lorde (2004) examine the relationship 
between the national income and the aggregate government expenditures for nine 
Caribbean countries from around the mid-20
th
 century to 2000. The obtained 
results indicate that a long-run equilibrium relationship between the two variables 
exists in three out of nine countries, and in only one out of those three countries 
does the direction of causality run from income to government expenditure. 
Chang (2002) investigates the validity of Wagner‟s Law in a sample of six 
countries over the period 1951-1996, on a country-by-country basis. Of those six 
countries, three are emerging industrialised countries in Asia - South Korea, 
Taiwan and Thailand, while the remaining three - Japan, USA and the UK - are 
developed countries. The results show that there exists a long-run relationship 
running from national income to government expenditures for all the investigated 
countries, except for Thailand. Islam (2001) examines Wagner‟s Law using, as 
compared to the previous studies, data with a much longer time span. He employs 
US data covering the period 1929 to 1996. The results lend support to Wagner‟s 
Law. Johansen-Juselius cointegration and causality tests found both strong 
evidence of a long-run equilibrium relationship between per capita real income 
and the relative size of government and that causal linkage flows from national 
income to the relative size of government. 
The overviewed empirical studies use different definitions and measurements of 
the variables, and also data for different countries and for different time periods, 
so their results are not directly comparable. In general, it seems that the 
verification or refutation of Wagner‟s Law still remains an empirical challenge. 
While Wagner‟s Law has been upheld in some empirical studies, or for some of 
the countries tested, in others it is not confirmed; thus, no clear pattern of results 
emerges from the empirical tests. The employed methodology - i.e., cointegration 
analysis - in general can be regarded as consistent with Wagner‟s view that there 
is a long-run relationship between the size of government in the economy and the 
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level of economic activities. However, none of the overviewed studies uses a 
panel estimation approach to exploit also the cross-section dimension of the 
dataset to improve the estimation precision. Given the recent advances in 
econometric techniques, especially developments in panel-equivalent 
cointegration techniques, there seems to be scope for adding to the existing 
empirical literature. In Chapter 5 of this thesis we address this identified limitation 
in the literature and propose a more appropriate econometric methodology. 
However, our contribution to the existing literature relates not only to employing 
a recently developed estimator but also to developing a coherent theoretical 
framework, within which we embed and investigate the validity of Wagner‟s Law 
together with other relevant explanations for the size of government identified in 
the literature. The studies reviewed here examine the validity of Wagner‟s Law in 
the absence of a clear and coherent theoretical model of government size; hence, 
in the absence of competing explanations. As a result, it is difficult to separate 
those studies attempting to test specifically Wagner‟s law from those generally 
exploring various determinants of government sector size. In fact, most of the 
theories reviewed in this chapter have been tested in a piecemeal framework 
where one determinant has been tested at a time, or different determinants are 
included in an ad hoc manner. In Chapter 4, we make a small but important step 
towards bringing Wagner‟s Law and other theoretical explanations together in an 
eclectic theoretical framework, thereby setting the stage for the empirical 
investigation in a conceptually satisfactory manner.  
3.3 Economic openness 
Up to the late 1960s and early 1970s the literature on the size of government 
ignored, or at least did not pay enough attention to a possibility that a country‟s 
degree of openness could be an important determinant of government 
expenditures. In the 1970s, however, the observed positive co-movement of 
government expenditures and economic openness prompted an interest among 
researchers to take into consideration a country‟s degree of openness as a factor 
which could also have an influence on the size of government. In the next section, 
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we explore theoretical approaches to explaining the channels through which the 
effects of a country‟s economic openness might be translated into the size of 
government. Before pursuing with the existing theoretical explanations, we briefly 
make some terminological clarifications. In the literature, terms such as 
globalisation and economic openness are often used interchangeably. 
Globalisation, however, is a more widely defined concept and refers to the 
expansion of economic transactions, social interactions and political integration in 
general, whereas economic openness captures only the economic dimension of 
globalisation. Since our primary interest is investigation of the effects of the 
economic dimension on the size of government, we use the concept of economic 
openness or economic integration in our analysis. By the degree of economic 
openness we mean the extent to which a country is integrated into the world 
economy; that is, the extent to which a country‟s borders are open to economic 
transactions (Bernauer and Achini, 2000). Within the concept of economic 
openness, we distinguish a country‟s trade openness and financial openness. 
Those two aspects of economic openness, for the reasons explained later in the 
text, relate to two alternative hypotheses proposed in the literature on the size of 
government; namely, the compensation and efficiency hypotheses.  
There are broadly two strands of literature which aim at explaining the effects of 
economic openness on the size of government. The one that builds upon the 
compensation hypothesis foresees a positive relationship between the size of 
government and a country‟s trade openness. The underlying idea is that societies 
are willing to accept an expanded role of government as a price for exposing 
themselves to larger doses of external risk that lead to greater volatility in 
domestic income and consumption. The compensation literature assumes that 
governments, by increasing their expenditures, stabilise national income and 
deliver social peace and political stability.  
Cameron (1978) was among the first authors to empirically test the hypothesis 
that the openness of a country‟s economy to the international market stimulates an 
expansion in the role of government. He tested the hypothesis using data on 18 
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OECD countries to find that there is a positive relationship between a country‟s 
trade openness and the size of government. As a way of explanation for this 
finding, Cameron (1978) suggests that small industrialised open countries tend to 
have a high degree of industrial concentration and, as a result, a high degree of 
unionisation and a wide scope for collective bargaining. Risk-averse unions in 
those countries are expected to increase the demand for different types of 
government transfers, particularly social security, pensions, unemployment 
insurance, job training etc, since these are seen as risk-reducing instruments. 
However, this causal chain proposed by Cameron (1978) might be called into 
question in terms of the “changing balance of class forces”, particularly since the 
1970s, as organised labour has been weakened, so the political priorities of 
organised labour have lost influence.  
Building on the work by Cameron (1978), Rodrik (1998) further explores the idea 
of the risk-mitigating role of government in economies subject to external risk. 
Using data for a broad sample of countries in the period 1960 - 1992, he 
demonstrates that the positive effect of a country‟s trade openness is more of a 
global phenomenon, which extends to countries of all income levels, not just 
developed countries with strong labour lobbies, as argued by Cameron (1978). 
Arguing that Cameron‟s collective bargaining explanation is unlikely to explain 
the observed correlation in countries where the labour is not well organised, 
Rodrik (1998) proposed a more universal explanation for this apparently global 
phenomenon. By breaking down government consumption expenditures into 
different categories, such as expenditures on general public services, education, 
health, housing and community amenities, and economic affairs and services 
Rodrik (1998) demonstrates that all of them are positively associated with trade 
openness. He explains that such results, which appear to be quite robust to the 
inclusion of various control variables, are an empirical validation of the 
compensation hypothesis. The external risk to which more open economies are 
subject mostly stems from exchange rate risk and/or supply and demand 
fluctuations abroad, and spills over into domestic income instability. Assuming 
that some portion of risk cannot be diversified away, this will increase the demand 
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for government insurance against the external risk. Hence, the knowledge of 
greater instability and uncertainty of domestic income due to trade openness leads 
to a greater reliance by citizens on government. According to Rodrik (1998), 
benevolent, welfare-maximising governments respond to those demands by 
increasing the level of government expenditures, which serve as a form of 
insurance and stabilisation. Unlike Cameron (1978) who argued that the 
fundamental influential factor working behind the scene is actually the strength of 
a particular interest group - namely, labour unions - Rodrik (1998) argues that the 
demand for larger government expenditures comes from the general public. In line 
with Rodrik (1998), Garrett (2001) also finds that higher levels of trade openness 
are associated with higher levels of government expenditures in a sample of both 
developed and developing countries during the period 1985-1995.  
Garen and Trask (2005) argue that there are also other, non-fiscal measures, such 
as government regulations and tariffs, which governments, especially in less 
developed countries, can use to mitigate the increased external risk. They criticise 
Rodrik (1998) for relying on strictly budgetary figures as the measure of the size 
of government. They demonstrate that less open economies have less government 
expenditure, which is in line with Rodrik (1998), but they also suggest that such 
countries tend to be more interventionist and encompass more non-expenditure-
based government activities. Given that an encompassing measure of the size of 
government, which would include both budgetary and non-budgetary aspects of 
government activities, does not exist, it is difficult to speculate which of the two 
groups of countries, those that are more or less open to international markets, have 
the bigger governments in total. 
According to proponents of the so-called efficiency hypothesis more open 
economies are expected to have smaller governments. On some occasions referred 
to as hyperglobalists, advocates of this hypothesis predict an inevitable 
retrenchment of government expenditures due to heightened mobility of capital 
and footloose transnational corporations, which tend to “avoid” heavily regulated 
and taxed economies. More competitive deregulation and greater competition for 
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mobile factors increases the constraints on the government‟s ability to tax, spend 
and regulate relative to its neighbours and induces a race-to-bottom behaviour in 
terms of social protection and provision of government goods and service. 
Metaphorically put by Garrett (2001), governments are held to ransom by mobile 
capital; the price is high, and punishment for non-compliance is swift. If the 
policies and institutions of which the financial markets approve are not found in a 
country, then money will “haemorrhage” unless and until they are. Bernauer and 
Achini (2000) point out that capital markets have become increasingly integrated 
since the 1970s and by now international financial flows are far larger than the 
monetary value of trade in goods and services. Accordingly, they speculate that 
the effect of financial openness on the size of government could be even more 
profound than the effect of trade openness. Hansson and Olofsdotter (2008) argue 
that some types of government expenditures more than other are affected by 
governments‟ efforts to render their economies competitive at the global level. 
The most affected ones should be social welfare and other non “competitiveness-
friendly” expenditures, which are particularly viewed as inimical to the “interests” 
of capital and the operation of markets. In the sample of 20 developed countries 
during the period 1970 to 2002, however, they fail to find a statistically significant 
relationship between deepened integration and the level of transfers.  
Rather than being two competitive explanations for the same phenomenon, the 
two hypotheses of the effect of economic openness on the size of government 
seem to relate to two different aspects of economic openness. Since the external 
risk is related primarily to a country‟s openness to international trade, it can be 
argued that the compensation hypothesis relates to a country‟s trade openness, 
while the efficiency hypothesis relates more strongly to a country‟s financial 
openness, since it relates more to the effects of capital mobility on the size of 
government.  
In the empirical literature, it seems that the impact of financial openness on the 
size of government has not been systematically tested. This could be partly 
explained as a result of some difficulties, discussed in Chapter 5, related to the 
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construction and non-availability of financial openness data. Quinn (1997), using 
a de jure measure of financial openness that he constructed himself, finds that 
higher levels of capital mobility are associated actually with higher levels of 
government expenditures in a sample of 38 countries. Using a much broader 
sample of 182 countries and an alternative de jure measure of a country‟s 
financial openness, Garrett (2001) finds no empirical evidence that an increase in 
capital mobility has a statistically significant impact on the trajectory of 
government expenditures. To the extent that the proxies used do indeed reflect the 
degree of a country‟s financial openness, the findings of those studies seem to 
suggest that the constraints imposed by financial market integration upon the size 
of governments have been exaggerated. We do not focus on the specificities of the 
measures of financial openness used in the above cited studies, since a more 
thorough discussion of those, as well as of other available measures of financial 
openness, is given in Chapter 5. 
3.4 Baumol’s cost disease 
That services in general, and government-provided services in particular, suffer 
from a “cost disease” is an idea developed by Baumol (1967). This disease 
manifests itself as a continuous increase in the relative prices of government-
provided goods and services, which ultimately increases the relative size of 
government in the economy. The underlying cause of the disease lies in an 
unbalanced productivity growth between technologically progressive industries 
that are subject to rapid and continuous productivity growth, e.g. the 
manufacturing sector, on the one side, and the productivity-lagging services 
sector, on the other. Because the “cost-affected” government sector services are 
predominantly labour-intensive and generally entail direct person-to-person 
contact between those who provide the service and those who consume it, 
productivity rises are likely to be small compared to those in progressive, capital-
intensive industries. This unbalanced productivity growth, given the assumption 
of a perfect labour market and homogeneous wage setting across sectors, will 
result in higher relative prices of government-provided goods and services. The 
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logic is quite straightforward: price increases in the various sectors depend on the 
difference in the growth of wages and the growth of labour productivity. In 
technologically progressive sectors, wages increase without any major influence 
on prices since the productivity gains in this sector “absorb” increases in wages. 
This “absorbing effect”, however, is not possible in the services sector, due to 
small, if any, increases in productivity in this sector. According to the assumption 
of homogenous wage setting across all sectors in the economy, wages are formed 
in that part of the economy where productivity growth is fastest, and are followed 
by all other sectors in the economy. As a result, the sectors where productivity 
grows the slowest will have the fastest growth of prices. In other words, since 
there is slower productivity growth in the government (service) sector than in the 
private sector, while wage increases are about the same, we can expect the relative 
prices of government-provided services to increase, making the share of 
government in GDP grow over time. Homogeneous wage setting and perfect 
labour mobility are important assumptions underlying Baumol‟s model: if other 
sectors‟ wage rates do not follow the technologically progressive sector‟s wages 
but fall behind then, in the long run, they would lose their labour force. The 
service sector employees‟ wages must go up to keep them at work, because their 
potential value in manufacturing industries - or, indeed any industry with rapid 
productivity growth - continuously increases. In sum, an unbalanced productivity 
growth accompanied by a uniform wage setting across different sectors in the 
economy will result in unavoidable relative increase of the costs and prices of the 
productivity-lagging government sector. If we further assume that demand for 
government services is price-inelastic, then the low productivity growth of 
government production - or, in other words, continuous increase in the 
government sector‟s prices - becomes an apparent explanation for the growth of 
the economic resources absorbed by the government. Price-inelastic demand for 
government services is another important assumption underlying Baumol‟s model 
(1967).  
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In sum, the core argument of the Baumol‟s cost disease is very intuitive: with a 
common wage rate rising in accordance with productivity gains in the private 
sector, costs in the labour-intensive government sector will be unmatched by 
improvements in productivity and, consequently, will rise. This increase in the 
relative price of government-provided services, in turn, implies an increased in the 
relative size of government in the economy, should the demand be price-inelastic. 
Ferris and West (1996) find empirical support for the Baumol‟s cost disease in the 
US for the period between 1959 and 1984, suggesting that changes in real 
manufacturing wages increase the real cost of government, measured by the ratio 
of the deflator for public consumption to the deflator for private consumption. 
Using the US data for the period 1948-1979, Berry and Lowery (1984) also find 
evidence that the relative prices of government services are positively influenced 
by the increase in private sector wage rates.  
3.5 Interest groups 
In the literature on the size of government involvement in the economy, pressure 
for government “favours” stemming from special interest groups is argued to be 
an important determinant of government expenditures. A comprehensive 
treatment of the idea that governments are inclined towards providing “favours” 
to well-organised and strong interest groups of producers, employees, consumers, 
etc., at the expense of the whole society is given in Olson‟s (1965) seminal work.  
The underlying assumption is that special interest groups can benefit from various 
government actions at the cost of the overall taxpayer population. In return for 
such favours, a party expect from the groups‟ members both direct and indirect 
political support. A pressure group may endorse a party, supply volunteers, or 
contribute funds to the party‟s campaign. Each of those translates into votes which 
the pressure group attempts to “trade” with a given party in exchange for a 
promised favour should the party succeed (Mueller and Murrell, 1986). In this 
manner, interest groups can ultimately influence government activity and its share 
in the economy. The benefits for each individual of a small lobbying interest 
90 
 
group can be huge, whereas the costs of such political “transactions” are typically 
spread out through higher taxes (or debt) over the entire population of taxpayers. 
In other words, the benefits of government “favours” are concentrated upon the 
winner(s) with related costs being finely divided among large numbers of tax-
payers or customers (Beck and Connolly, 1996). Consequently, the costs to the 
average taxpayer seem small and, hence, are likely to be unnoticed and tolerated. 
As a result, it creates little cost to government to satisfy the demands of interest 
groups, while the political benefits may be considerable.  
Government activities which benefit special interest groups may take various 
forms, including different forms of subsidies, government regulations to restrict 
output and raise prices, low or interest-free loans, loan guarantees, grants, lower 
taxes or royalties, higher tariffs and quotas etc. While the actions of some of the 
interest groups may actually lead to a smaller government size (for instance, when 
business lobbies achieve lower taxation), empirically the net effect of the various 
interest groups in most countries seems to have been an increase in government 
spending (Muller, 2003). It is possible that some government “favours” sought by 
interest groups, such as price supports, tariffs, price ceilings, regulations that 
reduce competition, etc. will not be shown as increasing the budgetary measures 
of government size, since none of the above mentioned types of government 
interventions directly affects the “measurable” size of government. On many 
occasions so far in the thesis we emphasised the problem of measurement of the 
government sector. At this point, we draw attention to this problem again. To 
explore adequately the fullness of the concept of interest groups, as well as of 
many other concepts of government sector size discussed so far, requires a 
comprehensive measure of government size that would quantify all budgetary and 
non-budgetary activities of governments. Unfortunately, to our best knowledge, so 
far no one has constructed such a measure. 
Special interest groups, as rational agents with limited resources aiming at 
maximising the impact of their actions, will organise and lobby to protect and 
promote their interests in big governments; either directly or indirectly via 
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influencing the views of the general public, or in both ways. However, not all 
interest groups are equally efficient in pursuing their goals. Indeed, Olson (1965) 
argues that narrow special interest groups will be more powerful than larger 
groups, which may suffer more free riding problems within the group. Hence, the 
strength of an interest group‟s influence may not be a simple positive function of 
its size. Presumably, interest groups with intensely engaged members that employ 
more suitable tactics and/or are equipped with more resources probably have a 
better chance of realising their goals. Further, according to Mahoney (2004), those 
types of groups that are traditionally resource rich will comprise a larger 
proportion of the interest group community and therefore have stronger influence 
on policy-making in general. This, of course, complicates the operationalisation of 
this effect, since data on the strength of interest groups, to our best knowledge, is 
not available. In fact, the empirical investigation of this concept, more than others, 
is subject to many limitations, the most important of which relates to defining an 
appropriate proxy to measure the strength of interest groups in a country. This 
limitation can partly explain the fact that surprisingly little has been done to 
empirically test hypothesis concerning the impact of interest groups on 
government size. We return to this point in Chapter 5, where we discuss various 
different attempts made in the literature to construct a proxy that could be an 
adequate empirical counterpart to this theoretical concept. 
It seems that economists have little idea about how successful interest groups are 
formed and what contributes to their expansion. Olson‟s (1965) argues that a 
stable economic and political environment is an important factor that favours the 
formation and growth of interest groups. The hypothesis that the formation of 
interest groups is fostered by periods of democratic stability suggests that older 
and politically stable countries may have the strongest interest groups. On the 
other hand, social and political upheavals, revolutions or wars destroy the existing 
interest groups along with the total “fabric” of society, thus preventing interest 
groups from settling in. As a result, in a society that had recently experienced a 
major social or political shock (e.g. Germany in the period 1948-70) the inherited 
stock of pressure groups is expected to be smaller. Murrell (1984) empirically 
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examines the potential determinants of interest group formation, using a sample of 
OECD countries in 1970. The results of this cross-section study suggest that the 
most important determinants of the number of interests groups are the size of 
population, the degree of decentralisation and the length of time that a country has 
had freedom of organisation, i.e., the length of time during which interest groups 
could have formed. This results should, however, be treated with caution on the 
grounds that it examines a phenomenon which is essentially time evolving using 
only a single-year snapshot of data.    
It could also be argued that an increase in the size and scope of government in the 
economy itself might induce greater opportunities for interest groups to thrive. 
Intuitively, the greater the extent of government involvement in the economy the 
more potential for interest group influence there is and the greater the number of 
interest groups there will be. As interpreted by Grossman (1987), the influence of 
special interest groups is expected to increase with the size of government. When 
government is small there is a little incentive for special interest groups to form 
and attempt to attain special advantages for their members. On the other hand, as 
government grows, the “profits” to be earned from forming special interest groups 
and exerting their power increases. In addition, as government grows, it become 
more costly and viable for voters to remain informed of all activities undertaken 
government, thus making it easier for governments to deliver “favours” to interest 
groups unnoticeably. As a result, from the econometric point of view, we might 
arguably suspect a problem of endogeneity stemming from bidirectional 
causation.  
In passing, we note that Olson (1965) foresaw that inefficiencies created by high 
levels of lobbying activities in politically stable environments would reduce 
innovation and economic growth. He argues that, by increasing the size of the 
government sector relative to GDP, pressure group activities divert scarce 
economic resources away from technological advances and other growth 
enhancing activities.  
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Assuming that, on average, the programs arising as a result of bargains between 
government and special interests groups require an expansion of government 
expenditures, the derived testable hypothesis is that the relative size of 
government in the economy is positively related to the number or, more precisely, 
the strength of organised interest groups. As already pointed out, the empirical 
studies that test this hypothesis are very limited in number. In a cross-sectional 
sample of OECD countries for the year 1970, Mueller and Murrell (1986) suggest 
that the number of organised interest groups in a country, measured as the number 
of industry and trade association, labour unions and chambers of commerce, has a 
positive and significant effect on the relative size of government, represented by 
three various measures of the size of government - the share of total government 
expenditures in GDP, the share of total tax revenue in GDP and the share of 
government consumption in GDP. The positive association between the number 
of interest groups and the size of government expenditures proves to be robust to 
changing sets of independent variables, changing the samples of nations, and 
treating the number of interest groups as either exogenous or codetermined. The 
authors interpret this to suggest that interest groups are indeed able to influence 
public policies in such a manner as to lead to increased government size. 
However, in Chapter 5, we thoroughly examine the data sources used in this study 
and identify some practical limitations related to them. 
3.6 Bureaucracy 
Among theories which emphasise the importance of “supply-side” factors for 
explaining the size of government, Niskanen‟s (1971) seminal work on the impact 
of bureaucracy on its own growth is one of the most important
19
. Following his 
work, many authors have argued that rational bureaucrats primarily pursue their 
own self-interest and, due to asymmetric information, are able to “exploit” the 
                                                 
19
 Consistent with the literature, we use the terms bureaucracy, bureau, bureaucrats and alike, 
although there are other expressions, such as public administration, public service, civil servants, 
etc. which could also be used. An important characteristic of bureaus is that they supply public 
services (however, some public services may be supplied by other forms of organisation) and are 
generally financed from taxation. 
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taxpayers. Indeed, one of the main stereotypes of the public bureaucracy is that of 
an acquisitive and expansive set of organisations (Peters, 1989). 
Niskanen (1971) hypothesises that bureaucrats, particularly the top level 
bureaucrats, have a desire for larger budgets, because for them larger budgets are 
the source of higher wages, prestige and power, more subordinates etc. As a 
result, they continuously seek to increase their budgets even, according to 
Niskanen (1971), above the level desired by those whom they supply; namely, 
legislatures and citizens. Niskanen (1971), argues that the behaviour of a 
bureaucrat, or of a public sector employee, is entirely driven by his/her personal 
motives. Moreover, as interpreted by Muller (2003), it is unlikely that bureaucrats 
will have strong incentives to produce low cost/high-quality services in the 
manner demanded by taxpayers.  
In this model bureaucrats are assumed to have a good bargaining position, 
because of their monopoly power over the supply of their outputs on the one hand, 
and the relatively passive and ignorant legislatures that supervise them, on the 
other. Bureaucrats are assumed to have a monopoly position and inside 
information on the quality and costs of their services, which gives them the power 
to set their own levels of production and mask the true costs of production. On the 
other hand, passive legislatures, dependent on a specific bureau to supply a given 
service do not have the incentive or opportunity to obtain true information on the 
minimum budget necessary to supply that service. In sum, according to the 
Niskanen model, the bureaucracy has an informational advantage compared to 
government, which it can use to demand too large budgets in order to serve its 
own purpose.  
Niskanen‟s model has been criticised on several grounds. According to Peters 
(1989), it is not quite clear how larger budgets translate into bureaucrats‟ personal 
gains, particularly pecuniary ones, given the relatively inflexible pay schedules 
based on formal position and longevity rather than on the size of a bureau. In 
addition, Cullis and Jones (1998) argue that in many cases power and prestige are 
not so much a function of the size of the budget, but rather of the importance and 
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tasks of the bureau. Muller (2003) points out that the power of bureaucrats to 
actually succeed in their quests for larger budgets might be exaggerated, since 
there is no reason to believe that the legislature is mostly ignorant of the true 
quantities of a bureau‟s output and of its unit costs, or that it has absolutely no 
control over bureaucrats. 
From the econometric point of view, the issue of reverse causality in the 
relationship between government size and government employment is inevitable. 
Indeed, Cullis and Jones (1998) argue that it is hard to tell whether the growth of 
the public bureaucracy is a by-product of the growth of government, or the major 
cause of that growth. As the extent of government increases, so do the 
opportunities to budget-maximising bureaucrats to exploit their control over 
information on costs and measures of performance.  
Empirical investigation of the relationship between the size of government and 
bureaucratic power requires an appropriate measure of bureaucratic strength. 
However, to form a single indicator that could adequately reflect the scope and 
scale of the activities of bureaucrats seems to be a difficult task. The empirical 
studies typically employ the share of those employed in the public sector in total 
employment to test the effect of the bureaucratic power.  
According to the underlying assumption that government sector employees 
aiming at increasing quantities and/or costs of their deliveries, Niskanen‟s budget-
maximising theory is essentially a supply-side theoretical approach to explaining 
the size of government. To comply with the main assumptions underlying our 
integrative demand-led model developed in Chapter 4, in Chapter 5 we motive 
and test a demand-side explanation for the influence of government sector 
employees, treating them as a special interest group inclined towards protecting 
and expanding their own sector. Assuming that they may derive some benefits 
from an oversized public sector perhaps in terms of job security or increased 
prospects of promotion, we presume that they act both as voters and as a pressure 
group to achieve their goals and to defend a larger public sector. Similar to any 
other interest group, government sector employees are motivated to transfer a 
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share of the wealth of taxpayers in their favour. We return to this discussion again 
in Chapter 5 where we provide a more thorough explanation of the hypothesised 
effect of government sector employees on the size of government.  
3.7 Fiscal decentralisation 
In their influential work within the public choice literature, Brennan and 
Buchanan (1980) depict government as a monolithic Leviathan, which seeks to 
increase its weight in the economy. They argue that “total government intrusion 
into the economy should be smaller, ceteris paribus, the greater the extent to 
which taxes and expenditures are decentralised” (Brennan and Buchanan, 1980, 
p.15).  
The underlying argument is that the centralised/monopolistic government‟s 
position makes it easier for government to promote its selfish interests, since 
“deceived” voters have little control over such large and distant government. An 
efficient way to “constrain” the Leviathan, according to Brennan and Buchanan 
(1980), is decentralisation of government‟s spending and taxing powers. 
Assuming that firms and citizens are mobile across jurisdictions, fiscally 
irresponsible behaviour of one sub-national unit will result in a migration of its 
economic resources to an alternative sub-national unit. Because of this 
competitive pressure, each sub-national unit will aim at reducing the “tax price” 
and, in consequence, given the balanced-budget proposition, the supply of sub-
national public goods and services. In the worst case scenario, this may result in a 
worrisome “race to the bottom” and, consequently, under-provision of certain 
public goods and services. In the Brennan and Buchanan (1980) model, the 
presumption of government benevolence is dropped (Nelson, 1986), and the 
observed level of government expenditure in the economy is predominantly 
determined by the supply of government expenditures. Although the work of 
Brennan and Buchanan (1980) assumes the preference of the state, rather than 
voters, to be decisive for determining the total extent of government involvement 
in the economy, in Chapter 5 we demonstrate how the Leviathan hypothesis can 
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be interpreted to comply with the demand-side perspective on the size of 
government.  
An important presumption underlying the Leviathan hypothesis is that sub-
national units are given both expenditure and taxing autonomy. However, it is 
arguable that this assumption may not hold in practice since, in reality, not many 
countries have absolutely self-financing sub-national governments. Instead, a 
large part of the regional and local government expenditures is funded primarily 
by intergovernmental grants, revenue-sharing programs, or other centrally 
controlled funds. This type of decentralisation, that is, expenditure 
decentralisation without corresponding tax decentralisation, may not result in the 
tax competition that drives the Leviathan model and, in fact, may result in an 
effect opposite of the one hypothesised by Brennan and Buchanan (1980). It is 
arguable that the resulting vertical fiscal imbalances can blur, rather than clarify, 
the responsibility for spending decisions by dispersing it among a potentially large 
number of different levels of government, which may make consumers-voters less 
rather than more confident about their true tax burden (Rodden, 2003). In general, 
the problem of vertical fiscal imbalance is actually expected to increase the total 
size of government by concentrating taxing power in the hands of the national 
government and by weakening the fiscal discipline that should, according to the 
Leviathan hypothesis, be imposed on sub-national governments for the financing 
of their own expenditures. Intergovernmental transfers and revenue sharing 
schemes in general make it more possible for sub-national governments to impose 
the political and economic costs of their spending decisions on residents outside 
their jurisdictions. Sub-national governments, aiming to maximise their own share 
of the “common revenue pie”, may face an incentive to overfish and, as pointed 
out by Fiva (2006), to push for higher taxes at the central level, which in turn 
yields expenditures with sub-nationally concentrated benefits. This means that 
sub-national governments would behave as interest groups and would engage in 
“competition” for intergovernmental grants, rather than in competition for mobile 
tax bases, as assumed by the Leviathan hypothesis. This, according to Stein 
(1999), could be avoided should the intergovernmental transfers be very strictly 
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defined, with resources allocated according to objective criteria and with little 
room for discretion and corresponding bargaining between the different levels of 
government. If such conditions are not satisfied, however, sub-national 
governments may have an incentive to over-borrow and over-spend, and then shift 
the burden onto the central government and other governmental units. This issue 
bears important implications for the empirical work and we return to it again in 
Chapter 5, when discussing the appropriate proxy for fiscal decentralisation, 
which should effectively quantify the autonomy that different levels of 
government are given in making both expenditure and revenue decisions.  
The ongoing intensive empirical “search” for the Leviathan was initiated in the 
1980s. Oates (1985), in the pioneering empirical study, using separate measures 
for expenditure and revenue decentralisation fails to find evidence to support the 
Leviathan hypothesis, both in the sample of the 48 US state governments for the 
year 1977 and in the sample of 43 developed countries for the year 1982. None of 
the used decentralisation variables exerted a statistically significant effect. 
Employing similar measures of government size and fiscal decentralisation, 
Nelson (1986) also finds no evidence in support of the Leviathan hypothesis for 
the state governments in the US in the 1976/77 fiscal year. He does provide, 
however, some evidence that a greater number of relatively homogeneous sub-
state governmental units exert a constraining effect on the level of state revenues. 
As a note, we point to the measure of government size used in both Oates (1985) 
and Nelson (1986) and potential problems related to it. Namely, the relative size 
of government in both studies is measured in terms of the share of tax receipts in 
national income. Although, as argued throughout the thesis, there is no single best 
measure of the government size in the economy, the majority of the studies in this 
field use the share of government expenditures (rather than tax receipts or 
revenues) in the total economy. Since total government expenditures can be 
financed from several sources - directly and/or indirectly, through money creation, 
inflation, debt - it is argued in the literature that measures of government size 
defined in terms of total expenditures reflect a more complete and meaningful 
measure of total resources absorption by government than those using revenue-
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based measures. While Oates (1985), Nelson (1986), Feld, Kirchgässner and 
Schaltegger (2003), and Prohl and Schneider (2009) use revenue-based measures 
of government size, all other studies reviewed in this chapter employ the 
expenditure-based measures for the construction of the dependent variable.  
A negative statistically significant relationship between fiscal decentralisation and 
the size of government, as an empirical support of the Leviathan hypothesis, is 
found in Marlow (1988). Using data on aggregate US government expenditures 
from 1946 to 1985, he shows that increased levels of expenditure decentralization 
lead to a smaller total general government size. Using the same sample, Grossman 
(1989) confirms Marlow‟s results. Among other interesting intra-national studies, 
we draw attention to the study by Feld, Kirchgässner and Schaltegger (2003) who 
search for the Leviathan in Switzerland. Feld, Kirchgässner and Schaltegger 
(2003) investigate the influence of fiscal federalism on the size and structure of 
revenues of Swiss cantons using data for 26 Swiss cantons from 1980 to 1998. 
They find that fiscal decentralization - measured by the share of local in cantonal 
and state government revenues - has a statistically significant negative effect on 
the size of cantons - measured by the cantonal and local government revenues per 
capita. This revenue-reducing effect of fiscal decentralization, as argued by Feld, 
Kirchgässner and Schaltegger (2003), originates primarily from the considerable 
tax autonomy granted to the cantons by the constitution.  
All the empirical studies reviewed so far employed accounting measures of either 
revenue or spending shares for sub-national relative to general government as a 
proxy for fiscal decentralisation, irrespective of whether sub-national 
governments actually have discretion over those assigned functions or revenues. 
Since, as already pointed out, fiscal decentralisation seems to have occurred 
almost exclusively through increased grants and shared revenues rather than the 
devolution of expenditure and tax authority in the majority countries (Rodden, 
2003), those two accounting measures may not capture accurately the 
phenomenon of fiscal decentralisation. A country may formally allocate a large 
part of national government budget at sub-national level, but this does necessarily 
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mean that sub-national governments are granted autonomy over decisions 
regarding those expenditures and revenues. As pointed out by Stegarescu (2005), 
a system where sub-national levels of government have real autonomy to 
determine the allocation of their expenditures or to raise their own revenue is 
more decentralised than another system where sub-national government 
expenditures and revenues are determined by national legislation, even though the 
formal assignment of functions or revenues might be the same. It is only recent 
studies, such as Rodden (2003), Stegarescu (2005), Fiva (2006), Prohl and 
Schneider (2009), that take the distinction between spending decentralisation, 
revenue decentralisation and intergovernmental grants seriously. In all of the cited 
studies, the authors discuss the measurement problems related to the available 
accounting data, while Stegarescu (2005) makes a praiseworthy effort to improve 
the data on revenue decentralisation to better reflect the actual degree of sub-
national revenue decentralisation. Until recently, the standard source of data on 
revenue and expenditure shares for sub-national relative to total government has 
been the IMF‟s Government Finance Statistics (GFS). To a large extent, this is 
because, until recently, it has been the only official source of this type of data. 
However, despite being consistent and operational, as pointed out by Fiva (2006), 
this data set fails to address properly the intergovernmental fiscal structure of 
countries. Although the GFS database keeps track of certain types of grants and 
various forms of own source sub-national revenue, it fails to distinguish between 
tax revenues that are legislated and collected locally from those that accrue to the 
sub-national governments automatically through revenue-sharing schemes 
(Rodden, 2003). Consequently, it tends to overestimate sub-national revenue 
autonomy. It is also likely to overestimate the true nature of spending autonomy, 
since the figures on sub-national expenditures also include those expenditures that 
are funded by intergovernmental grants, mandated by the central government or 
spent on behalf of the central government. 
Aiming to overcome this deficiency, OECD researchers are making an effort to 
refine the measure of revenue decentralisation by classifying taxes in terms of the 
degree of autonomy they provide to sub-national governments. Stegarescu (2005) 
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draws on the OECD‟s analytical framework and expands the data set to cover 23 
OECD countries from 1965-2001. He distinguishes between different types of 
sub-national government revenues, according to the degree of discretion sub-
national governments are granted in determining them autonomously. As an 
improved measure of revenue decentralisation, Stegarescu (2005) constructs and 
proposes “purified” sub-national own-source revenues as a share of total 
government revenues. We were fortunate to obtain this data from the author 
himself and to use it in our own research (see Chapter 5). This improves the 
quality of our analysis, since this data seems to be the most appropriate proxy 
available for the degree of fiscal decentralisation. 
Rodden (2003) uses both the GFS and the OECD improved data set to 
demonstrate that the effect of decentralisation on government size is conditioned 
by the nature of fiscal federalism. Results from a somewhat limited data set 
consisting of 1985-1995 averages for 19 OECD countries suggest that 
decentralisation, when funded primarily by autonomous local taxation, is 
associated with smaller government. On the other hand, when funded by revenue 
sharing, grants, or centrally regulated sub-national taxation, fiscal decentralisation 
is associated with larger government. In the same study, Rodden (2003) extends 
the number of countries to a sample of 44 countries for the period 1978-1997, but 
at the expense of employing less satisfactory GFS data on fiscal decentralisation. 
The results obtained using this particular data set and data source also indicated 
that decentralisation funded by direct intergovernmental transfers is associated 
with larger government. Fiva (2006) employs the Stegarescu (2005) “purified” 
measure of revenue decentralisation; that is, the share of sub-national government 
autonomous own revenues - only those where the sub-national government has 
discretion over tax rate, tax base or both - in total general government revenues. In 
a sample of 18 OECD countries over the period 1970 to 2000, Fiva (2006) finds 
that tax decentralisation is associated with a smaller government sector, lending 
support to the Leviathan hypothesis. Prohl and Schneider (2009) study the effect 
of decentralization on the growth of government size for a panel of 29 countries 
over the 1978-2003 period. They employ two different proxy variables of fiscal 
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decentralization: the “classical” GFS measure of expenditure and revenue 
decentralisation; and their own index of fiscal federalism. Their index of fiscal 
federalism incorporates the fiscal and administrative autonomy that constitutional 
and statutory law grants to sub-national governments. It varies from zero (for low 
fiscal autonomy) to six (for high fiscal autonomy) and is highly correlated with 
the degree of expenditure and revenue decentralization as measured by the GFS 
data. The results indicate that the growth of government, measured either by the 
share of government expenditures or revenues in GDP, is inversely influenced by 
each of the decentralisation variables - the GFS‟s expenditure and revenue sub-
national government shares and the Prohl and Schneider (2009) index of fiscal 
federalism.  
The empirical findings do not unanimously point to a single conclusion. However, 
in general, the reviewed empirical studies do seem to offer some support to the 
Leviathan hypothesis.  
3.8 Conclusion  
This chapter reviews the most conventional theoretical explanations of 
government size
20
. A close examination of their underlying assumption about the 
nature of the state reveals that they can be divided broadly into two groups. Some 
of those theoretical explanations, in particular Wagner‟s Law of increasing state 
activities and Rodrik‟s compensation hypothesis, assume that the state exists to 
carry out the preferences of the citizens and that changes in the size of 
government are a consequence of changing socio-economic and market 
conditions. On the other hand, some theoretical approaches, like Niskanen‟s 
model of bureaucracy or the leviathan hypothesis developed by Brennan and 
Buchanan (1980), assume that it is the preference of the state rather than that of 
the citizens that is decisive. If either of these two conceptualisations of the state is 
fully accurate, according to Mueller (2003), then the other, along with the set of 
                                                 
20
 The other, by no means less important, explanations of government size, e.g., political effects 
and the Peacock-Wiseman effect are discussed and analysed in Chapter 2; while effects such as 
financial crisis and unemployment are dealt with in Chapter 5 
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hypotheses associated with it, must be rejected. In the subsequent chapter, we 
argue that it is very difficult to draw a clear line between the two concepts and 
that the observed government expenditures are the recorded outcomes of the 
interaction between demands of consumers-voters, various interest groups and the 
supply responses of the government, under their respective constraints. Building 
on this, we propose a simple but coherent framework within which we embed and 
empirically test different determinants of government size.   
Among the first theoretical approaches to explain the extent of government 
involvement in the economy is Wagner‟s Law. Wagner‟s writings, undoubtedly, 
were inspired by rapid urbanisation and industrialisation and the first welfare 
programs. According to Wagner‟s hypothesis, the share of government 
expenditures in GDP is expected to rise with income. This is explained by the 
income-elastic nature of government goods and services and by the transition 
from an agricultural, self-contained society into an industrialised and urbanised 
society. This transition, or modernisation, is supposed to increase the demand for 
publicly-provided goods and services, some of which were previously “produced” 
within the family, as well as for regulatory government activities, which are 
supposed to ensure the smooth operation of increasingly complex economic 
systems. Economists generally consider Wagner‟s Law to be an important 
theoretical explanation for the long-run behaviour of the size of government in the 
economy. This hypothesis has been widely tested in practice, but the empirical 
studies have yielded mixed results. At this point, we draw attention to a caveat 
common to all empirical studies that attempt to test the validity of a particular 
theoretical explanation. Given the absence of a formal theoretical framework for 
analysing the size of government in the economy, researchers have tested one 
theory at the time with no consideration to alternative or competing explanations; 
or all explanatory factors have simply been combined, in an ad hoc manner, 
which, while an improvement, is still conceptually unsatisfactory.  
The proponents of the compensation hypothesis consider government expenditure 
to be a risk-reducing instrument; thus, arguing that the vulnerability of the open 
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economy can be lessened by increasing the scope of the government sector.   
According to the compensation hypothesis, trade openness increases the external 
risk to which citizens in relatively more open economies are subject; thus, leading 
to a greater reliance by the citizens on the government. On the other hand, 
proponents of the efficiency hypothesis foresee an inverse relationship between 
government size and a country‟s degree of openness, due to competitive pressure 
and international competition for mobile factors. Rather than being competitive 
explanations for the same phenomenon, we argue the two hypotheses of the effect 
of economic openness on the size of government relate to two different aspects of 
economic openness, so that the compensation hypothesis refers to a country‟s 
trade openness, while the efficiency hypothesis relates more strongly to a 
country‟s financial openness. The reviewed empirical studies suggest a positive 
relationship between government size and trade openness, while there seems to be 
little empirical evidence of systematic retrenchment in response to financial 
openness, although the studies are so limited in number that it makes no sense to 
reach a firm conclusion on the empirical validity of this hypothesis.  
Baumol (1967) hypothesised that the relative increase of government sector shares 
in the economy is a result of the productivity-lagging nature of government 
services. Because the government sector largely comprises labour-intensive 
service activities, productivity rises are likely to be small compared to those in 
progressive capital-intensive industries. Assuming that wages in all sectors are 
oriented towards the technologically progressive sector‟s wages, increasing real 
wage rates causes the unit costs of government services to increase. If demand for 
government services is price inelastic, then this increase in the relative price of 
government services, in turn, implies an increase in the government expenditure 
share of national income. 
According to the interest groups hypothesis, the pressure for more government 
expenditures comes from special interest groups. Interest groups have every 
incentive to organise and lobby to promote their interests in big government. They 
are assumed to benefit from various government actions at the cost of the overall 
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taxpayer population. Because the costs of these benefits are dispersed widely 
across the taxpayer population, to the average taxpayer they seem “invisible”. As 
a result, governments are assumed to be inclined towards satisfying the demands 
of interest groups, appropriating taxpayer‟s money for private political purposes.  
Following Niskanen (1971), many economists have argued that the strength of the 
bureaucracy is an important force that leads to increasing size of government. 
Because they are assumed to have a monopoly or near monopoly position in 
supplying public goods as well as ignorant supervisors, Niskanen (1971) argues 
that government bureaucrats develop internal pressures for self-expansion. This 
model of monopoly bureaus is, in effect, consistent with the Leviathan model 
inasmuch as it builds upon the proposition that the size of government is larger 
than citizens prefer.  
The empirical literature examining both the influence of special interest groups 
and bureaucracy on government size is very limited. To a large extent, this can be 
explained by difficulties related to defining appropriate proxies for these 
theoretical concepts, since there is little agreement on how to measure the strength 
of interest groups or bureaucracy. 
Within the public choice framework, Brennan and Buchanan (1980) argue that 
decentralised authority over the provision and financing of certain public goods 
and services induces competitive pressure among different sub-national units and, 
consequently, reduces the size of government. This theoretical explanation 
warrants caution since, in reality, fiscal decentralisation seems to have occurred 
almost exclusively through devolution of expenditure activities, without 
accompanying devolution of tax authority. This situation, however, may not have 
the hypothesised negative effects on government size. Economists are still 
struggling to give a clear-cut theoretical explanation of the effect of 
decentralisation on the size of government, and the findings of the empirical 
studies, particularly intra-national studies, are mixed. However, the reviewed 
cross-country studies seem to provide some evidence for the Leviathan theory.  
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4.1 Introduction  
Reviewed in the previous chapter, the theoretical literature suggests that 
economists in this field have been offering new approaches to explain the size of 
government in the economy by adding new potentially influential factors and 
channels of influences, rather than building an encompassing model of the 
government sector. Despite the importance of this topic in political economy, 
there is no one single core theory of the size of government in the economy. In 
fact, one gets the impression of continued fragmentation rather than theoretical 
integration, leaving us with no comprehensive, explicitly formulated and testable 
theoretical model (Sørensen, 1988). A reason for this could be the fact that in the 
sphere of government sector production and intervention in the economy, there 
are no well-defined demand and supply functions and equilibrium prices. 
The main challenge of this chapter is to “bridge” this gap by offering a simple, but 
coherent theoretical framework to provide an analytical foundation for the testing 
specification of the subsequent empirical investigation.  
A coherent foundation for our simple integrative model of the size of government 
sector is set out in section 4.2. Certain assumptions, discussed in this section, 
motivate a perfectly elastic exogenously determined supply curve and a 
downwardly sloped demand curve. In our model, we hypothesise, for reasons 
which will become apparent later in the chapter, that the supply function is 
perfectly elastic and fixed at the exogenously determined level of relative prices. 
This is an essential assumption of our model, which solves the potential problem 
of identification. Upon defining the supply curve, we discuss the concept of 
demand in the government sector. By analogy with standard consumer theory, a 
downwardly sloped demand function is motivated, such that the relative quantity 
of government output demanded is inversely related to the relative price of 
government goods. The median voter model used to aggregate downwardly 
sloped demand curves is introduced and some limitations related to it are 
discussed. This section also discusses and graphically illustrates the repercussions 
of some hypothesised shifts of the demand and supply curves on the observed 
108 
 
value of the resources absorbed by the government. As a final note before 
proceeding with the subsequent empirical study, section 4.3 explains why a 
modification of the dependent variable in the empirical model does not change the 
implications of our theoretical model. This clarification is important since the 
dependent variable in our theoretical model is the real quantity of government 
deliveries, whereas in the empirical model, for the reasons explained in Chapter 5, 
the regresand is the share of government expenditures in the economy. This 
“bridging” chapter concludes with section 4.4.  
4.2 Building a simple eclectic model  
Up to the 1970s, theories developed to explain the size of the government sector 
in the economy typically assumed that governments had grown because the 
general public had demanded it. These theories are sometime referred to as 
citizens-over-government theories, since the government is considered to be a 
benevolent agent passively responding to public demand. A classical example of 
this type of theory is Wagner‟s Law.  
Since the 1970s, along with the development of the public choice literature, there 
has been an emergence of the so-called institutional or government-over-citizens 
theories. The proponents of those theories start with the assumption that the major 
reason for the increasing share of government in the economy can be found within 
the government sector itself. These theories usually point to institutional and 
political factors as important determinants of the size of government and assume 
that citizens‟ preferences are pretty loose constraints against which political 
leaders and bureaucrats pursue their own interest. This view underlies in particular 
the work of Niskanen (1971) and Brennan and Buchanan (1980). 
Despite this polarisation of demand- and supply-side explanations, observed 
government expenditures are the recorded outcomes of the interaction between 
demands of consumers-voters, various interest groups, including bureaucrats and 
politicians, and the supply responses of the government, under their respective 
constraints. The demand-side theories are considered to be explicitly based on the 
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logic of demand for government expenditures. However, one cannot overlook the 
fact that those theories make assumptions, at least implicitly, about the supply-
side factors; namely, the assumption that governments in elective democracies are 
willing to fulfil those demands. On the other hand, the supply-side theories insist 
on self-oriented government whose objective is to maximise its size and influence. 
However, in elective democracies those supply-side pressures must, at least at 
some point, be resisted by “taxpayers‟ revolt”. This revolt would jeopardise a 
government‟s chances to be re-elected, hence making it more inclined towards 
citizens‟ preferences. The idea that governments are willing to fulfil citizens‟ 
demands and that citizens can punish governments for pursuing policies that are 
not in line with their demands, of course, assumes an elective democracy. It is 
very hard to believe, particularly in a representative democracy, that public 
activity is exclusively supply-determined. Elected governments supply policies 
that voters (and interest groups) demand and, in exchange, they receive votes (and 
money for their campaigns). In general, it can be argued that citizens demand a 
certain level of government in the economy, probably up to the point where they 
reach the tolerable level of taxation, when they may want to oppose further 
increases of government. Even if governments are inclined towards larger public 
sectors, they get constrained by citizens (i.e., by fear that they may not be re-
elected) as well as by institutional (budget) constraints. The discussion brought up 
in Chapter 1 points to a conclusion that different parties, despite their rhetorical 
statements, tend to pursue similar policies when they form the government. In 
order to stay in power, elected governments ultimately adjust their actual policy 
decision to the voting public demands. The process of political-economy 
adjustment, however, may take many years to be completed. Nonetheless, it is 
arguable that, at least in the long run, the actual changes in the quantity of 
government are the result of demand-led factors. As additional evidence to 
support our view, Chapter 2 found no major breaks in the long time-series of 
government expenditures that could be related straightforwardly to major changes 
in the political system. To anticipate, this is also confirmed by the large-sample 
results reported in Chapter 5. 
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4.2.1 Demand and supply in the government sector 
Although economic problems can almost always be broken down into some 
variant of the demand-supply dyad, as Borcherding and Lee (2006) put it, the 
analysis of the government sector generally has been “schizophrenic” in this 
regard. In the sphere of government sector production and intervention in the 
economy, concepts of demand and supply certainly differ from their counterparts 
in the private sector. Here, one can hardly talk about well defined demand and 
supply functions and equilibrium prices. Despite no precise analogy with standard 
microeconomic theory, in what follows we develop a simple integrative model of 
government expenditure in the economy. Within the conventional microeconomic 
framework, we can assume that there is a two good economy with observed 
relative prices of government and private goods and observed quantity of 
government deliveries. Graphically, that can be presented in a coordinate system 
with relative prices of government to private goods set on the vertical axis and 
quantities of government deliveries set on the horizontal axis.  
Since there are typically no explicit prices in the government sector, it seems more 
appropriate to define prices as implicit tax prices to be contrasted with the prices 
of private goods. In fact, that is the opportunity cost of an additional unit of 
government goods in terms of private goods. In other words, if taxpayers want (or, 
at least, are provided with) one additional unit of government goods (g) then they 
must forego a certain number of private goods (p). This trade off defines the 
exchange rate or relative price of government goods. Whereas in standard 
economic models of demand and supply, the price level adjusts to equilibrate the 
two, in the public sector prices cannot freely fluctuate to reach equilibrium. In this 
quasi-market, prices can be treated as exogenously determined. However, the 
level of the relative prices of public to private goods is not defined arbitrarily. 
Instead, it is set at the level defined by the relative costs and the current levels of 
technology in the public and private sectors, as described by Baumol‟s cost 
disease theory. Given that in this quasi-market of government delivery there is an 
absence of equilibrating prices, adjustment proceeds through changes in 
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quantities. This line of reasoning, together with the idea that governments in 
elective democracies are responsive to citizens‟ demands, motivates a perfectly 
elastic supply curve (S in Figure 4.1 below), fixed at the exogenously determined 
level of the relative price of government to private goods (Pg/Pp)
21
. The concept of 
the supply curve of government expenditures, to our best knowledge, is not well-
established in the literature. The idea that government activity is not driven by the 
profit motive precludes us from making a simple analogy with the standard 
microeconomic theory where an upwardly sloped supply curve is typically 
derived from a production function, sensitive to technology developments and 
input prices. Instead, in elective democracies, governments are responsive to 
citizens‟ demands, partly due to the fear of being “punished” by the citizens‟ 
revolt and loss of votes. Hence, in our integrative model, we assume that the 
quantity of government activity supplied is not sensitive to relative price: i.e., 
higher (lower) relative prices do not directly cause governments to provide more 
(less). Consequently, the supply function is perfectly elastic and fixed at the 
exogenously determined level of relative prices. Hence, in this simple theoretical 
framework, Baumol‟s costs disease is not treated solely as one of the theories of 
government supply, but more as a concept that enables us to fix the perfectly 
elastic supply curve at an appropriate level of relative prices. By assuming that the 
supply curve is perfectly elastic and that prices are exogenous, we solve the 
potential problem of identification in this simple model, since each change in the 
quantity of government stems from changes in demand-side factors. At this point, 
it is important to note that bureaucracy, whose influence could be alternatively 
analysed from the supply side, is treated as an interest group (pressuring from the 
demand side) in our model. This way, government itself is analysed as acting on 
the position of the demand curve rather than on the supply curve. In turn, this 
keeps the determinants of the supply curve as simple as possible. Most 
                                                 
21
 Other possible effects on the slope of the “supply curve” are ignored because, in principle, they 
do not affect the subsequent analysis. For example, we abstract from scale effects. If increasing the 
quantity of government goods yields scale economies (and/or vice versa for private goods), then 
the long-run supply curve could slope downwards. However, this does not affect the subsequent 
comparative static analysis (excluding the extreme case of non-intersection of downwardly sloping 
supply and demand curves). 
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importantly, this allows government to be self-interested with respect to 
government size, while being consistent with our exogenously determined supply 
curve, which is the necessary condition for solving potential identification 
problems.   
When deriving the demand function of government expenditures, certain concerns 
regarding the aggregation of the individual demand functions may arise. Whereas 
in markets for private goods, the aggregate demand curve is derived by 
horizontally summing individual demand curves, in the quasi-market for 
government goods aggregating individual preferences to guide a collective choice 
is less straightforward. A convenient approach to solve this problem is a 
constitutional rule that can be regarded as a mechanism for aggregating the 
preferences of individuals in order to establish a collective choice between 
different alternatives (Cullis and Jones, 1998). When individual demands are 
revealed through majority rule voting, the demand of the median voter can be a 
good approximation for the demand of the entire collective. This model has been 
widely used as a theoretical foundation for demand aggregation and public sector 
resource allocation. According to the median voter theorem, the median voter 
always gets his/her most preferred policy, to the extent that the elected candidate 
delivers on his/her campaign promises (Holcombe, 2003). If we arrange citizens‟ 
preferences with respect to expenditure decisions from low to high expenditure, 
the median voter is the citizen who divides those who want higher expenditure 
from those who prefer lower expenditure. Thus, he/she transforms a minority into 
a majority and the choice of the median voter defeats any other alternative. 
According to the rational choice model developed in microeconomics, the median 
voter will maximise his/her utility function, hence prefer the size of government 
that equates the marginal benefits of an expanded government sector with the 
marginal costs of implicit tax prices.  
The median voter theorem, however, relies on certain assumptions, some of which 
have been criticised for being unrealistic. Essential assumptions of this model are 
that each citizen-voter has single-peaked preferences and that the decision is one-
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dimensional. The single-peakedness means that options can be put in transitive 
order and that each voter‟s single preferred option is such that the utility for every 
other alternative decreases monotonically with the distance between the most 
preferred outcome and the alternative. However, in multi-dimensional cases, when 
voters vote on more than one issue, even if voters‟ preferences are single peaked, 
there is a possibility of intransitive cycles to occur. This means that as soon as 
three or more alternatives are to be compared pair-wise, the comparison would 
depend on the order in which the alternatives are evaluated. In this case, majority 
rule voting would not produce a unique and stable outcome since different 
outcomes depend on where one starts. However, this line of criticism does not 
apply to our particular model. Namely, in our model we consider only one issue 
that the median voters votes on; namely, the relative size of the public and private 
sectors, which we assume can be enforced by the government on behalf of the  
median voter.  
Another deficiency of the median voter model is that it implies that minority 
interests do not directly affect policies. Even within the majority, voters are 
assumed to feel equally intensely on an issue. Hence, the intensity of preference 
on some issue is not accounted for.   
One of the most important flaws of this model is that it neglects the impact of 
various interest groups and politicians‟ campaigns. The median voter model 
assumes that voters are fully informed about the choices that they confront and 
always vote in their best interest. According to the democratic ideal, the political 
outcome would reflect the interest of the median voter in a pure direct democracy 
with a simple majority rule (Cullis and Jones, 1998). However, such an ideal 
outcome may not exist in reality. There are reasons to argue that government 
expenditure decisions in a representative democracy may not fully reflect the 
preferences of the majority of the citizens, that is, of the median voter (Feld and 
Kirchgässner, 2006). Even though, based on the rational choice model, we assume 
that voters maximise their expected utility, there may be problems of information 
asymmetry and ignorance on the part of some voters. As already pointed out, the 
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median voter is assumed to maximise his/her utility function, comparing the 
marginal benefits of an expanded government sector with the marginal costs of 
extra implicit tax prices. It could be argued, however, that the precision of these 
balancing calculations is less straightforward when it comes to public goods 
compared to private. One reason could be fiscal illusion that the median voter may 
be subject to, which leads him/her to underestimate the marginal costs of an 
expanded government sector. This, to some extent, is a basis for the influence of 
interest groups who may persuade and manipulate voters and act counter to 
median voter interests, particularly in policy areas where the median voter is 
unlikely to be well-informed. In reality, democratic governments are vulnerable to 
pressure groups. The means of influence of pressure groups, especially financially 
powerful and organisationally coherent ones, on governments is the fact that they 
can provide the money for politician‟s campaigns, deliver votes, and influence 
other voters. If we assume that the objective of politicians is to maximise political 
power and hence votes, they may have the incentive to “buy” the loyalty of 
certain powerful pressure groups to maintain power and raise money for their 
campaigns. In fact, politicians can be thought of themselves as competing self-
interested pressure groups that realise their self-interest by maximising votes. 
Following their own interest, they use public institutions and/or public finances 
for private purposes, that is, to comply with pressure groups‟ demands22. This 
means that politicians may not always choose policies that fully accord with the 
“public interest”. At the margin, politicians balance the additional benefit of 
giving a pressure group what they ask for and the additional cost represented as 
lost voters. Their strategy is to expand the public sector until the marginal gain of 
voters favourable to expansion is equal to the marginal loss of voters opposed to 
tax increases. Putting it this way, it could be argued that elective democracy in 
countries with well-organised and effective interest groups might be tempted to 
                                                 
22
 It is usually assumed that pressure groups seek government favours that will increase the size of 
government expenditures. However, theoretically, such deviations do not have to result in higher 
expenditure. Expenditure might also be smaller, for example, if the pressure comes from small and 
medium entrepreneurs lobbying for lower taxes. At this point, we assume that the net result of 
interest groups‟ activities is to increase the size of government expenditures and we develop our 
arguments accordingly.  
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bring about a somewhat larger public sector. This is because it has a built-in 
tendency to expand expenditures too much, since the benefits of additional 
spending are taken in favour of and thus concentrated on, say, one group (who are 
informed, do notice the benefits and vote accordingly) while the tax costs are 
spread among all taxpayers (who, like the median voter, because of information 
asymmetries and because the additional costs are relatively small, may be easily 
deceived into underestimating the costs of public expenditure programs)
23
.  It may 
be the case that pressure groups give more weight to the demand curve of some 
people than to the demand of others (i.e., those not or under-represented by 
interest groups) and, hence, in that way, distort the aggregate. Pressure groups‟ 
members enter into the aggregation as do everybody else. Yet, pressure groups 
may add more weight to the demand curve of each individual that they represent. 
While votes are equal (one person-one vote), their weights need not to be. The 
open question is whether in reality each individual has a vote of equal weight and 
whether and, if so, how intensely the overall outcome is really influenced by 
interest groups.  
Although usually criticised for the reasons that we explained in the above section, 
the median voter model is still widely used in the literature to explain how voters‟ 
demands are aggregated thorough democratic decision-making (Congleton, 2003). 
Unfortunately, the literature does not offer a more appropriate model that would 
take account of various interest groups and the corresponding unequal weights of 
voter‟s demand curves. Instead, the median voter preferences are still assumed to 
be critical in determining the outcome of a majority vote. Majority rule voting 
may be imperfect, but so are all other decision-making systems. The attractiveness 
of this model lies in its simplicity. Moreover, it appears to be quite robust where 
the median voter is assumed to understand and care about the issue that he/she 
votes on (Congleton, 2003).  
                                                 
23
 Additionally, a fact that contributes to the fiscal illusion of taxpayers is that some government 
programs are funded by sources other than taxation (e.g., borrowing and/or sale of assets). 
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In our model, we use the median voter framework to motivate the idea of a 
downwardly sloped aggregate demand curve, with rational choice theory as its 
underlying basis. We can depict a median voter aiming to maximise his/her utility 
function while faced with a budget-income constraint. By analogy with standard 
consumer theory, a downwardly sloping demand function (D in Figure 4.1 below) 
can be easily motivated, such that the relative quantities of government/private 
output demanded is inversely related to the relative price of government goods. 
Any factors other than relative price that cause the median voter‟s demand to 
change over time shift the demand function and thus can be used in comparative 
static analysis of changes of government expenditures. As in standard demand 
theory, this implies that relative prices of public to private goods, income and 
taste variables become legitimate explanatory variables for the size of the 
government.  
In addition, we take into account that there are various interest groups in the 
economy, some working to increase and others to decrease government size. In 
our model, organised interest groups all work to increase the relative weight of 
their members‟ demand curves, and hence the location of the demand curve of the 
median voter, which represents the aggregate demand curve. For example, if the 
net result of interest group activity is to add weight to the demand of voters 
interested in enlarging the scope and expenditure of government, hence 
correspondingly down weighting the demand of voters whose interests would be 
served by smaller government, then the median demand function is likewise 
shifted in the direction of increased government spending.  
Changes in the relative price of government to private goods (Pg/Pp) result in 
movements along the demand curve, with higher relative prices being associated 
with lower quantity demanded. Changes in all other factors expected to have 
explanatory importance for the size of government in our model will shift the 
whole demand curve. As illustrated in Figure 4.1, if the influence is positive, the 
demand curve will shift to the right (from D0 to D1), resulting in the increase of 
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the quantity of government delivery (from Q* to Q1), other things being equal. 
The opposite would occur should the influence be negative.  
Figure 4.1: The shifts in the demand curve for government output 
Q*
D1D0D2
Q1Q2
S
Government output
Relative price
Pg/Pp
0
 
Within our eclectic but encompassing model we can explain how certain changes, 
say increase in the relative price of government to private goods, can affect the 
proportion of economic resources absorbed by the government. An increase in the 
relative prices of government to private goods over time is, in fact, a scenario put 
forward by Baumol (1967). Baumol‟s cost disease suggests that because of 
productivity lags in the public sector and real wages equalised across all sectors in 
the economy, the relative price of the government sector will increase over time. 
In Figure 4.2 this effect is depicted as an increase of relative prices of government 
to private goods from (Pg/Pp)0 to (Pg/Pp)1. This implies that, automatically, the 
supply curve of government will shift up from S0 to S1 in Figure 4.2, other things 
being equal. This will, ceteris paribus, result in the decrease of demanded 
quantity, from Q0 to Q1. However, if the demand curve is relatively or perfectly 
price inelastic, as assumed by Baumol (1967), this increase in relative prices, 
implies that, despite the decrease in the real quantity demanded, the proportion of 
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economic resources, by value, absorbed by the government increases (the size of 
the red rectangle is larger than the size of the green rectangle in Figure 4.2). Of 
course, this effect would be at its highest should the demand for publicly provided 
services be perfectly price-inelastic, as illustrated in Figure 4.3 below. In this case 
an increase in relative prices would result in no decrease in the demanded 
quantity, other things equal. Hence, the value of the economic resources absorbed 
by the government would increase by the red-dotted area depicted in Figure 4.3. 
Ceteris paribus, this means that the proportion of GDP accounted for by 
government increases.
.
 The overall effect of increasing relative prices depends, to 
a large extent, on the elasticity of the demand curve, and all other effects taking 
place simultaneously.   
In reality, over time several factors may be at work simultaneously, so that the 
supply and demand curves shift at the same time, with the overall result (the 
observed value of the resources absorbed by the government) depending on the 
magnitude of the shifts. For example, the supply curve may shift up due to an 
increase in relative prices (Baumol‟s cost-disease effect) but at the same time the 
demand curve may be shifted to the right due to an increase in income (Wagner‟s 
law), potentially offsetting the relative price effect
24
. In the case where the 
positive demand effect exceeds the negative supply effect, the observed 
government quantity will increase from Q0 to Q2, irrespective of the price 
elasticity of demand, as shown in Figure 4.2.  
 
 
                                                 
24
 However, in practice, there will - most likely - be second-round effects. The increase in the 
proportion of GDP accounted for by government may have negative, zero or positive effects, 
according to the state of the economy and the theory used to analyse it. Should an increase in 
government expenditure have a long-run negative effect on income, the second-round effects will 
exaggerate the effect of government expenditure increases on the proportion of GDP accounted for 
by government expenditures. Should an increase in government expenditure give rise to a positive 
effect on output, the second-round effects may reduce rather than amplify the effect of government 
expenditure increases on the proportion of GDP accounted for by government expenditures. We 
return to this issue in Chapter 5 when discussing, in the context of our empirical model, the 
problem of reverse causality between the share of government in the economy and GDP per capita.   
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Figure 4.2: Increase in the government output supply and demand curves  
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Figure 4.3: Increase in the supply curve of government with perfectly inelastic demand curve 
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4.3 From the theoretical to the empirical model  
By assuming that the relative prices are exogenously given, hence fixing the 
perfectly elastic supply function, we arrive at a model in which the quantity of 
government is actually demand-driven and which can be operationalised as a 
framework for the subsequent empirical analysis.  
At this point, we believe that some clarification and discussion of the relationship 
between our theoretical and empirical model is needed. The dependent variable in 
our empirical model is the share of government in the economy. Hence, in the 
empirical analysis, we estimate the effects of the variables that influence the size 
of government relative to the size of the economy. In contrast, our theoretical 
model, with the quantity of (i.e. real) government presented on the horizontal axis 
and total government (i.e. real quantity multiplied by [relative] price) graphically 
shown as an area, enables us to make direct inferences about the total spending on 
government deliveries, not the share of government. However, although 
government shares are not represented directly in the theoretical model, the effects 
on these can be inferred indirectly. In theory, we conduct comparative static 
analysis, using the ceteris paribus approach. In our econometric analysis, the 
same effect is achieved by estimating the effects of, say, relative prices while 
controlling for the income of consumers of government goods and services 
(together with other variables included in the model). For example, if demand for 
government services is price inelastic, then - ceteris paribus - as the relative price 
of government services rises so too must the total spending on government 
deliveries. In turn, in the absence of change in income, that is, under the 
assumption of constant income, the share of total income spent on government 
provision must also rise. This implies that econometric estimation of a fully 
specified model - i.e., one not impaired by omitted variables bias - in which the 
dependent variable is the proportion of government spending in national income 
can provide indirect evidence on the price elasticity of government services. If 
estimation reveals a positive coefficient on the relative price of government 
services then an increase in relative price leads to an increase in the share of 
government. In turn, this is evidence consistent with (i.e., indirect evidence for) 
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Baumol‟s assumption that the demand for government services is price inelastic. 
To provide direct evidence on the price elasticity of government services, the 
dependent variable would have to be government spending. Of course, both 
estimation strategies - i.e., for generating either indirect or direct evidence - on the 
price elasticity of government services depend on the assumption of perfectly 
elastic supply to solve the potential identification problem.  
Alternatively, if we hold relative prices (and other variables in the model) 
constant, and focus on the effect of income, then an income expansion path of 
government services in line with Wagner‟s law suggests that, in Figure 4.2, the 
proportionate increase in income should be less than the proportionate rightward 
shift of the demand curve and, hence, less than the increase in the share of the 
resources absorbed by government. 
This suggests that the government share in total income is rising. In our empirical 
model, Wagner‟s Law is tested directly, since the dependent variable in the 
empirical model is the share of government in the economy.  
4.4 Conclusion   
The theoretical literature offers a set of separate explanations but no 
comprehensive, empirically testable model of the size of government. The main 
challenge addressed in this chapter is to “bridge” this gap between theory and 
empirics, by developing a simple eclectic model of the size of government. To 
this end, we make certain assumptions about the nature of demand and supply in 
the government sector, thereby setting the stage for the subsequent empirical 
analysis. Within the conventional microeconomic framework, we develop a 
perfectly elastic supply curve, fixed at the exogenously determined level of 
relative prices. A perfectly elastic supply curve complies with the assumptions 
that in the quasi-market of government delivery there are no equilibrating prices, 
so that adjustment proceeds through changes in quantities, and that governments 
in elective democracies are ultimately responsive to citizens‟ demand. By 
assuming that the supply curve is perfectly elastic and that prices are exogenous 
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(set at the level defined by the relative costs and the current levels of technology 
in the public and private sectors), we solve the potential problem of identification 
in this simple model. In fact, in our model each change in the quantity of 
government stems from changes in demand-side factors. As for the demand 
function, by analogy with standard consumer theory we derive a downwardly 
sloping demand curve. As a theoretical foundation for individual demand 
aggregation, we adopt the median voter model, according to which the demand of 
the median voter is a good approximation for the demand of the entire collective, 
when individual demands are revealed through majority rule voting. The median 
voter model, unfortunately, does not explicitly take account of various interest 
groups and the corresponding unequal weights of voter‟s demand curves. In 
reality, it could be the case that that well-organised interest groups all work to 
increase the relative weight of their members‟ demand curves, and hence the 
location of the demand curve of the median voter, which represents the aggregate 
demand curve.  
In this chapter we discuss and graphically illustrate how certain changes, for 
instance a hypothesised increase in the relative price of government to private 
goods (Baumol‟s cost disease) and/or an increase in income (Wagner‟s Law), can 
affect the proportion of economic resources absorbed by the government. In 
addition to those factors, in the following empirical chapter we estimate also the 
effect of other variables advanced by various theories. A shift in each such 
variable is assumed to shift the demand for government expenditures which, 
ceteris paribus, leads to a corresponding change in the size of government 
expenditure in the economy. Although the dependent variable in our theoretical 
model is the quantity of (i.e. real) government deliveries, in our empirical model 
we modify the dependent variable to account for the share of total income spent 
on government provision (i.e. the ratio of total government expenditure to GPD). 
Section 4.3 shows that such modification is consistent with the implications of our 
theoretical model.  
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5.1 Introduction  
The main goal of this core empirical chapter is to examine the determinants of the 
size of government in developed market economies. A simple, but coherent 
theoretical framework developed in the previous chapter is used as the analytical 
foundation for the empirical specification. The assumption that the government 
sector supply curve is perfectly elastic and that prices are exogenous solves the 
potential problem of identification, with each change in the quantity of 
government now stemming from changes in the demand-side determinants. The 
purpose of this chapter is to test those determinants together in a unified, 
theoretically founded, specification. In fact, this chapter is a natural extension of 
the previous two chapters. Chapter 3 gathers and discusses the leading hypotheses 
on determinants of government expenditures to be found in the theoretical 
literature, while Chapter 4 develops a simple, demand-led model of the size of 
government expenditures. In the absence of a single encompassing model of the 
size of government, previous empirical contributions to this literature have tended 
to investigate the determinants of government size in an ad hoc - hence, a-
theoretical - and piecemeal manner. In contrast, our research strategy is 
distinguished by first developing a theoretical model to inform the specification of 
our empirical model. In so doing, we attempt to “bridge” the analytical gap in the 
examination of the determinants of the size of government sector.  
Before applying our preferred estimation technique to consistently estimate the 
long-term determinants of the size of government in the economy, in what follows 
we first set up the typical context of applied econometric research. Section 5.2 
introduces the dependent variable to be used in the empirical analysis. Section 5.3 
provides a detailed description of the main independent variables. In this section 
we outline the theoretically identified determinants of the size of government in 
the economy and discuss the selection of proxies to be used as their empirical 
counterparts. To familiarise ourselves with the specific data set at hand, in section 
5.4 we inspect the data and present a general examination and main characteristics 
of our panels in terms of dimensions, countries, periods and basic descriptive 
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statistics. This is followed by a general methodological introduction in section 5.5. 
In relation to the main purposes of this research and the nature of the data set at 
hand, this section highlights some fundamental limitations inherent in different 
panel estimators. Building on this, we explain the rationale behind our choice of 
the estimation approach applied in this work. Furthermore, the estimation 
technique is explained in more detail. This section also specifies the econometric 
model, presents and discusses estimation results and includes a series of 
robustness checks of the main findings. Conclusions are summarised in section 
5.6.  
5.2 Choice of a formulation for the dependent variable 
Instead of the quantity of (i.e. real) government deliveries, which is the dependent 
variable in our theoretical model, in our empirical model the effects on the ratio of 
total government expenditure to GPD are analysed. This modification of the 
dependent variable in the empirical model, however, does not change the 
implications of our theoretical model, since inferences with respect to government 
shares can be derived indirectly. In the absence of a change in income, changes in 
total government expenditures must be reflected in changes in the share of total 
income spent on government provision. There are several reasons to guide our 
choice of using the relative measure for the size of government as the dependent 
variable in the model. First and foremost, the aim of this research is to explore the 
behaviour and changes of the size of government in the economy; i.e., the relative 
size of the government sector in the total economy (public plus private sector). In 
appraising the importance of the size of government, most researchers agree that 
the absolute size of the government is a relatively meaningless concept. The size 
of government should be analysed relative to total economic activities, because it 
is the proportion of total economic resources absorbed by the government that 
gives a more informative and realistic measure of the true size of government. In 
addition, relative measures are more convenient for comparative purposes than the 
absolute quantities of governments. For example, two countries might have the 
same real quantities of government deliveries in absolute terms. However, the size 
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of the private sector and consequently total (public plus private) size of the 
economy in each of those two countries could significantly differ. As a result, the 
respective measures of the relative size of government to total economy in those 
two countries would be considerably different (given the same absolute size of the 
government sector in two countries, in a country with a large private sector the 
share of the government would be smaller compared to the share of government in 
a country with a small private sector). Hence, expressing government expenditure 
relative to GDP standardises this measure of the size of government across 
countries and avoids the complications of using different currency units. Finally, 
other studies in this field typically use the data on the share of government in the 
economy. Hence, this choice of the dependent variable makes our study more 
appropriate not only for comparative analysis among countries but also for 
comparing our results with others reported in the literature.  
It has been pointed out throughout this thesis that there is no one single best 
measure of the size of government in the economy. As discussed in Chapter 1, an 
ideal measure of government size would include all aspects of its intervention in 
the economy. However, to our best knowledge, such a measure has not yet been 
constructed. Throughout the empirical work undertaken in this chapter the chosen 
proxy for the size of government, the dependent variable, is the ratio of total 
government expenditure to GDP, in nominal terms. Some general limitations in 
regards to this commonly employed measure of the size of the government are 
discussed in Chapter 1. The aim of our study is not confined to analysis of a 
specific component or particular level of government expenditure, instead it 
builds on the “holistic” view that all government activities recorded under 
government expenditures (including consumption expenditure, investment 
expenditures, interest and transfer payments) accruing at all levels of government 
should be analysed aggregately. Focusing on the aggregate measure of 
government expenditures is in line with our aim to investigate the determinants of 
the total size of government in the economy.  
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Measuring the size of government via its expenditure is a means of estimating 
government influence using an easily observable statistic. Our discussion in 
Chapter 1 on issues related to the conceptualisation and measurement of the 
government sector size suggested that the standard quantitative measures are 
ambiguous and incomplete, at best. Economists are, however, accustomed to 
empirical research in which disagreements arise from the absence of a direct 
measure of a theoretically specified variable (Higgs, 1987). 
In the process of obtaining and constructing our dependent variable, several 
problems are encountered. Alternative international databases offer data on 
government expenditures, but are judged as unsuitable for our study, since the 
measures reported are only for parts of government expenditures. The Penn World 
Table 6.2 database reports the shares of government consumption, which 
represents only a fraction of total government expenditures. On the other hand, the 
IMF‟s GFS database as well as The Word Bank database report total expenditures 
only at the central government level, impairing this measure to a large extent (in 
particular, for federal countries). The EUROSTAT database reports total 
expenditures at all levels of government; however, it is available only for the 
European countries. The OECD‟s database is the only database, to our knowledge, 
that reports the total government expenditures covering all types and levels of 
government expenditure data for a number of developed countries. Unfortunately, 
problems with obtaining the comprehensive measure for government expenditures 
do not stop here.  
The next problem we face is related to the time dimension of the available data. 
OECD (2010) National Accounts Statistics - General Government Accounts, 
reports the data on Total General Government Expenditure, which includes both 
current and capital expenditures and covers the general government sector - 
central government, state government, local government and social security 
funds
25
. As such, it comes closest to the comprehensive measure of government 
expenditures that we hope to employ in our study. However, for the majority of 
                                                 
25
 Data on public enterprises is not included.  
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the OECD countries this series is limited to the period since 1990. This, of course, 
would limit the scope of our study and confine it to analysis of the effects on the 
size of government over the last two decades only. To extend the time coverage of 
the series, the data on Total Government Outlays as a percentage of GDP from the 
OECD (2001) Historical Statistics is retrieved. This database covers the period 
1970-2000 and has been discontinued as of 2001. The government outlays as 
defined in this database are nowadays considered to be the “old” definition and 
have been replaced by the “new” definition of the government expenditure. The 
main difference between the two series is that the government outlays - i.e. the 
“old” definition - consist of, among others, the final consumption expenditures of 
the general government, which do not include the value of sales made by 
government units to other economic agents. Thus, those parts of expenditures that 
are financed by sales are excluded from the concept of total expenditures. The 
“new” definition of total expenditures now reflects all expenditures, including 
those financed by sales. The “new” definition is thus higher than the “old” one by 
the value of sales. This resulted in an underestimation of total outlays of about 2 
percent, on average. A more detailed description of what is included in both the 
government outlay and government expenditure definitions is given in Table 5.1.   
To arrive at a comprehensive measure of total government expenditures in GDP 
for a number of OECD countries over the period 1970-2008, the two OECD 
databases are merged in our study. We “corrected” one of the series to render it 
comparable to the other series. Data on Total General Government Expenditure in 
GDP from the OECD‟s National Accounts Statistics are converted to comply with 
the Total Government Outlays in GDP from the OECD‟s Historical Statistics. In 
particular, to average out the differences between the two series, the average 
conversion factor is calculated over the latest five overlapping observations for 
each country and applied to “correct” the last eight observations in the Total 
General Government Expenditure series, which are then added to the Total 
Government Outlays series. To ensure that merging the two data sets would not 
distort the series to a large extent, we consulted the OECD team of researchers 
who kindly explained that, although the two series were not directly comparable, 
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the outlays were to be used, if expenditures were not available, and vice versa
26
. 
Also, a reassuring consideration is that the discrepancy between the two series 
was small and stable over time. 
5.3 Choice of a formulation for the independent variables  
5.3.1 Wagner’s Law 
One of the oldest hypothesis in the literature on government size, known as 
Wagner‟s Law, presumes that government expenditures increase more that 
proportionally with economic activity. The underlying idea is that the demand for 
goods and services generally provided by the government sector is income-elastic, 
so that as nations grow more complex and wealthy they demand a larger public 
sector. Increasingly complex societies and economic transactions present markets 
with challenges that they can hardly manage without different sorts of government 
intervention. The empirical studies on Wagner‟s Law mainly focus on testing the 
income-elasticity proposition; namely, that as per capita income rises over time, 
citizens actually want to devote a larger share of their available income to 
government goods and services. To that end, researchers generally employ GDP 
per capita on the right-hand side of the testing equation, where the dependent 
variable is some measure of the size of government, to arrive at an estimate of the 
income-elasticity of demand for government expenditures. In addition to GDP per 
capita, some empirical studies include the so-called “Wagnerian” variables to 
capture the phenomenon of “modernisation” or “restructuring” of society and 
economy, such as the degree of industrialisation, the degree of urbanisation, 
population density, etc. In the spirit of Wagner‟s writings, it is argued that 
industrialisation and urbanisation create more complex market and legal 
relationships, additional pressure on public infrastructure, higher social tensions, 
etc. and consequently increase the demand for a larger government sector in the 
economy. 
                                                 
26
 We kindly thank Mrs Jani Heikkinen for clarifying some issues on the main differences between 
the two series and for insightful information and suggestions. 
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In line with the standard empirical practice of testing Wagner‟s Law, we introduce 
the income variable measured by real GDP per capita (GDP) as a proxy of a 
country‟s economic activity in the model. Since the dependent variable in our 
model specification is the size of government relative to the size of the economy, 
the estimated coefficient on the income variable is expected to be statistically 
significant and greater than 0 to lend support to Wagner‟s income-elasticity 
proposition. Our model departs from other studies in that it employs a different 
variable to capture the concept of post-industrial “modernisation”. The above 
mentioned “Wagnerian” variables might have been relevant in the time of 
Wagner‟s writings, when an industrial society was a synonym for a modern 
society. Given that our data set covers developed countries in the post-industrial 
stage of development, over the time period 1970-2008, variables such as the 
degree of industrialisation or the degree of urbanisation can hardly be thought of 
as the relevant proxies for testing the “modernisation-induced” demand 
hypothesis. Instead, in our model a variable for the weight of financial sector and 
business services in the economy (FINC) is introduced. It is measured as the share 
of value added by banks, insurance, real estate and other business services in total 
value added. In so far as this variable captures the socio-economic complexity of 
developed economies, its estimated coefficient is expected to be positive
27
.  
Apart from the variables employed to test the relevance of Wagner‟s Law, in the 
model specification an additional demographic variable is included to account for 
the possibility that the demand for government expenditures, particularly on 
health care and social security, is driven by an increasing share of the population 
accounted for by groups above or below the working age. To this end, the age 
dependency ratio variable (DEP) is added in the model. It is measured as the ratio 
of people under the age of 15 and over the age of 64 to the working-age 
population. It is arguable, however, that this variable is likely to be a weak proxy, 
corresponding poorly to the theoretical concept we want to measure. Dependency 
ratios capture variations in the proportions of children, elderly people, and 
                                                 
27
 On the other hand, the financial sector can be thought of as a special interest group - it may be 
pressuring for smaller government activities, deregulation, open economy, low taxes etc.   
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working-age people in the population, which imply the dependency burden that 
the working-age population bears in relation to children and the elderly. However, 
such ratios show only the age composition of a population, not economic 
dependency. Some children and elderly people are part of the labour force, and 
many working-age people are not. Hence, at best, the dependency ratio is a very 
rough measure of the true, real burden put on workers. Many people do not stop 
being economically active at age 65. Although older persons often require 
economic support from others, in many societies they have economic resources of 
their own and provide support to their adult children. By the same token, it may 
not be true that all persons aged 15-64 are economically active
28
. Furthermore, as 
the period of training for a productive life increases, most adolescents and young 
adults remain in school and out of the labour force, effectively extending the 
period of young-age dependency well beyond age 15. It would be more 
appropriate to have a precise measure of economic dependency. However, to our 
knowledge, age dependency ratios are the best available proxy to serve our 
research purposes
29
.  
Before introducing other regressors, at this point we draw attention to a caveat 
related to a potential problem of reverse causality. Namely, according to 
economic theory, one may suspect a potential causality running from the size of 
government expenditures to technical progress and so to the level of GDP per 
capita. However, the sign of this influence is not clear a priori. An increase in the 
proportion of GDP accounted for by government may have negative, zero or 
positive effects on the level of national output, according to the state of the 
economy and the theory used to analyse it. If a larger government sector is indeed 
a source of macroeconomic stability, as suggested by Rodrik (1998), and if the 
level of output and corresponding pressure of demand is important for 
technological progress, as suggested by Geroski and Walters (1995), then we 
                                                 
28
 This is particularly the case because, since the 1980s until recent years, early retirement has 
been used to reduce official unemployment levels, resulting in a substantial proportion of 50-60 
year old people being economically inactive.  
29
 The World Bank‟s Development Data Group provided us with a detailed explanation of this 
variable. We thank them for resolving some doubts we had regarding this variable.  
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might expect the increase in government expenditure in GDP to give rise to a 
positive effect on the level of GDP per capita. On the other hand, if we assume 
that technical progress arises primarily from the supply side then the increase in 
government expenditure might be hypothesised to exert a long-run negative effect 
on investment, via crowding out, thereby reducing technical progress and the level 
of output over the long run. This potential source of endogeneity is addressed in a 
subsequent part of this chapter and is tackled by an appropriate estimation 
strategy.  
5.3.2 Openness  
The unsettled question of whether more open economies have bigger governments 
has provoked thorough research in this area. The idea that economic openness and 
government sector share in the economy go hand in hand was first put forward by 
Cameron (1978). He argues that small developed open economies tend to have a 
high degree of industrial concentration and, as a result, powerful labour unions 
pressuring for government favours and transfers. Twenty years later, Rodrik 
(1998) demonstrated that this positive relationship between economic openness 
and government share in the economy extends to countries of all income levels 
and is robust to alternative measures of government consumption. This, 
apparently global phenomenon needed a more universal explanation.  
In Chapter 3, we explain that there are two hypotheses of the effect of economic 
openness on the size of government which seem to relate to two different aspects 
of economic openness. Rodrik (1998) and other proponents of the compensation 
hypothesis argue that government expenditures serve as a form of insurance 
against the external risk to which firms, and ultimately citizens, in relatively more 
open economies are subject. Proponents of the efficiency hypothesis, on the other 
hand, argue that more competitive deregulation and greater competition for 
mobile factors, particularly for highly mobile capital, forces governments to scale 
down the extent of their involvement in the economy. It can be argued that the 
external risk, which is at the heart of the compensation hypothesis, is related 
primarily to a country‟s openness to international trade, while the efficiency 
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hypothesis relates more strongly to a country‟s financial openness. It is hard to 
argue that a country‟s trade openness is an appropriate proxy for a country‟s 
efforts to attract mobile international factors, which is at the heart of the efficiency 
hypothesis. This is an important claim, guiding out choice on the appropriate 
proxies to be employed for the empirical test of the two hypotheses. 
To test the relevance of the compensation hypothesis, the trade openness variable 
(OPT) is introduced in the model to test the relevance of the compensation 
hypothesis. It is measured in terms of the value share of exports plus imports in 
relation to the respective country‟s GDP (
GDP
IMEX
OPT

 where EX and IM 
denote the value of all goods and other market services provided to the rest of the 
world and from the rest of the world, respectively, while GDP denotes gross 
domestic product). According to Rodrik (1998) and other proponents of the 
compensation hypothesis, the estimated coefficient on this variable is expected to 
be positive. To allow for the possibility that the relationship between trade 
openness and the size of government is stronger if a country experiences a higher 
external risk, an interaction term between the trade openness variable and the 
variability of the terms-of-trade (OPT×ToT) is added in the model. Terms-of-
trade fluctuation (ToT), or international price volatility, is typically used in the 
literature as a proxy for the external risk - economic risk emanating from 
international markets. In the manner of Rodrik (1998), Garen and Trask (2005) 
and Adserà and Boix (2002), we calculate the variability of the terms-of-trade 
(ToT) as the standard deviation of the changes in the logs of terms-of-trade over 
the previous four years to each observation
30
.  
To test the efficiency hypothesis, we introduce the financial openness variable 
(OPF) in the model. According to this hypothesis, the estimated coefficient on 
this variable is expected to be negative. In the literature, a country‟s financial 
openness is measured by two types of indicators; namely, de facto and de jure 
                                                 
30
 The terms of trade index used in our study, kindly provided by the World Bank, refers to the 
national accounts exports price index divided by the imports price index, with the year 2000 
equalling 100.  
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measures of financial openness. A main distinction between the two is that a de 
facto extent of financial integration is derived from the observable economic 
variables, while a de jure indicator evaluates a country‟s openness to financial 
transactions at the regulatory level. Given that a de facto measure of financial 
openness is the outcome of a large number of underlying forces, such as history, 
geography and international politics, it may not be regarded as the true measure of 
financial openness. Nonetheless, since many of those underlying forces are 
beyond government control, a de facto measure is more exogenously determined 
compared to a de jure measure, which, while reflecting the actual policy decisions 
to make an economy more or less open, could be influenced by different interest 
groups (Baltagi et al., 2009). Because it is assumed to be more exogenously 
determined, a de facto measure is used as a proxy for financial openness in our 
model. Frequently cited and used in the empirical research as an appropriate de 
facto measure of a country‟s financial openness is the Lane and Milesi-Ferretti 
(2007) indicator of financial openness. Their measure of international financial 
integration is defined as the share of the volume of a country‟s external assets and 
liabilities in GDP (
GDP
FLFA
OPF

 ; where FA and FL denote stocks of external 
assets and liabilities, and GDP denotes gross domestic product). The Lane and 
Milesi-Ferretti (2007) comprehensive database covers advanced, emerging and 
developing countries for the period 1970-2004. As a robustness check, this de 
facto measure of financial openness constructed by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti 
(2006) is replaced by a de jure indicator (OPFQ). Dennis Quinn (1997) was 
among the first to construct and employ a de jure indicator of financial openness. 
His indicator measures the degree to which countries restrict inward and outward 
financial transaction, relying foremost on the IMF‟s Annual Report on Exchange 
Restrictions. It is based on the author‟s assessment of inward and outward capital 
account transactions, current account transactions and the international legal 
agreements that constrain a country‟s ability to restrict exchange and capital 
flows. It is a categorical variable, ranging from 0 to 14, with 14 representing the 
least regulated and financially most open regimes. The database compiled by 
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Quinn (1997) and Quinn and Toyoda (1997), was kindly provided by the authors. 
It covers a large number of countries, over the period 1950 to 2000.  
Some alternative de jure indicators of financial openness constructed by Chin and 
Ito (2008), Abiad and Mody (2005), Kaminsky and Schmukler (2008) were also 
considered. Chin and Ito (2008) use the IMF‟s four binary variables that codify 
restrictions on cross-border financial transactions to derive the first principal 
component as their summary measure of financial openness
31
. Their index, 
however, criticised by Baltagi et al. (2009), is not picking up some of the variation 
in the underlying dummy variables. The Abiad and Mody (2005) index measures 
the degree of policy liberalisation along six dimensions: credit controls, interest 
rate controls, entry barriers, regulations, privatisation and international 
transactions
32
. Unfortunately, despite its respectable cross-country coverage, their 
database is available only for the period 1980 - 1996. Kaminsky and Schmukler 
(2008) compile an index of financial openness that captures the three main aspects 
of liberalisation; namely, the removal of controls on international capital flows, 
the liberalisation of the domestic financial sector and stock market and 
deregulation of the domestic banking industry
33
. Although it covers a relatively 
long period, this index not is available for a number of countries in our sample. 
Hence, for its consistency and availability, the Quinn indicator was preferred over 
the above mentioned alternatives. 
In passing, in the literature on international finance, as an indicator of a country‟s 
financial openness, some authors employ data on the black-market premium; that 
is, the difference between official and black-market exchange rates for the 
currency of a given country. Countries whose financial markets are more open 
tend to exhibit a lower black-market premium. However, its value for most 
                                                 
31
 The Chin and Ito (2008) index is obtained from: 
http://www.ssc.wisc.edu/~mchinn/research.html.    
32
 The Abiad and Mody (2005) index is obtained from http://www.amody.com. 
33
 The Kaminsky and Schmukler (2008) database is obtained from Sergio Schmukler‟s webpage: 
http://econ.worldbank.org/staff/sschmukler. 
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developed countries is, most of the time, zero, which poses analytical problems 
because of small variance (Bernauer and Achini, 2000).  
5.3.3 Baumol’s Cost Disease 
According to Baumol‟s cost disease approach to explaining the size of 
government in the economy, the share of the productivity-lagging government 
services in the economy is expected to increase. This increase is a result of 
unbalanced productivity growth in the economy, which, assuming perfect labour 
mobility and homogeneous wage setting, leads to increased costs of government 
services. With price-inelastic demand for government goods and services, 
Baumol‟s cost disease is assumed to increase the share of economic resources 
absorbed by the government sector.  
Given that the dependent variable in our empirical model is the government share 
in the economy, we expect a positive sign if all of Baumol‟s fundamental 
assumptions are justified. Baumol‟s fundamental assumptions include:  
 slower productivity growth in the government sector compared to the 
private sector;  
 wage equalisation across all sectors in the economy; and  
 price inelastic demand for government deliveries.  
In fact, econometric estimation of the relative price effect is a joint test of all of 
Baumol‟s assumptions. Hence, the expected positive estimated coefficient on the 
relative price variable (RP) is an indication that all of those assumptions hold 
jointly. In line with the previous empirical studies, the ratio of the deflator for 
government final consumption expenditure to the deflator for private final 
consumption expenditure is used as a proxy for the relative price variable. 
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5.3.4 Unemployment 
Although the effect of unemployment is not discussed in the previous chapter as a 
distinctive, theoretically founded explanation for the size of government, we 
believe that the omission of this variable might, at best, leave our model 
incomplete and, at worst, might bias our results; thus, we include it among other 
regressors in the model and explain the rationale for this in the following section.  
Assuming that full employment, low inflation and external balance - i.e. 
stabilisation of the economy - are among the most important targets of 
government policies, one may expect high unemployment to induce a counter-
cyclical behaviour of governments in the short run. If government uses public 
expenditures as an instrument to stabilise the economy, during periods of high and 
rising unemployment it may respond by increasing its share in the economy. 
Likewise, in periods of high unemployment, government may take over the role of 
“employer of last resort”, by hiring people in the public sector. However, in our 
model, a main interest is the demand-side influence of unemployment on the size 
of government in the economy over the long run. In the longer run too, a positive 
effect could be assumed through a kind of hysteresis effect, whereby episodes of 
high unemployment lead to successively higher levels of unemployment benefits 
and more government expenditure in the economy, other things equal
34
. To 
examine whether this hypothesised positive effect is supported by the data at 
hand, the unemployment variable (UNEMP), proxied by the share of the labour 
force that is without work but available for and seeking employment, is included 
in the model.  
5.3.5 Interest groups 
Special interest groups benefit from particular government actions, at the cost of 
the overall taxpayer population. In return for such favours, governments expect 
                                                 
34
 However, unemployment is not a trended variable; at least, not over sufficiently long periods. In 
this case, we would expect to see a short-run effect but not a long-effect of unemployment on the 
government share. 
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political support from the groups‟ members. The benefits for each individual of a 
small lobbying special interest group can be huge, whereas the costs of such 
political „transactions‟ are typically spread out through higher taxes (or debt) over 
the entire population of taxpayers. Consequently, the costs to the average taxpayer 
seem small and, hence, are likely to be tolerated. As a result, it creates little cost to 
government to satisfy the demands of interest groups, while the political benefits 
may be considerable. Special interest groups, as rational agents with limited 
resources aiming at maximising the impact of their actions, will organise and 
lobby to protect and promote their interests before government; either directly or 
indirectly via influencing the views of the general public, or in both ways. In this 
manner, interest groups can ultimately influence government activity and its share 
in the economy. However, not all interest groups are equally efficient in pursuing 
their goals. The strength of an interest group‟s influence may not be a simple 
positive function of its size. Presumably, interest groups with intensely engaged 
members that employ more suitable tactic and/or are equipped with more 
resources probably have a better chance of realising their goals. Further, 
according to Mahoney (2004) those types of groups that are traditionally resource 
rich will comprise a larger proportion of the interest group community and 
therefore have stronger influence on policy-making in general. This, of course, 
complicates the operationalisation of this effect, since data on the strength of 
interest groups is, to our best knowledge, not available. Not only the data on the 
strength of interest groups, but also the data on the mere number of interest 
groups in a country is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to acquire, 
particularly for a set of different countries over a relatively long period. The 
features, resources and activities of various interest groups have not been 
consistently tracked in national statistics due to the fact that there is no 
comprehensive definition of an interest group. As a result of such difficulties in 
defining and quantifying this concept, empirical studies within this field typically 
employ a case study approach, focusing on a small number of countries and on 
certain types of interest groups. Murrell (1984) and Mueller and Murrell (1986) 
are the first, to our knowledge, to employ the absolute number of interest groups - 
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a sum of the number of industry and trade association, labour unions and 
chambers of commerce - formally operating in a country as the measure of 
interest group strength. As for the data source, they use a variety of specialised 
compilations, the foremost being the Internationales Verzeichnis der 
Wirtschaftsverbände (engl. The World Guide to Trade Associations). Coates, 
Heckelman and Wilson (2007), use the same data source to analyse the process of 
interest groups formation
35
. The data used in this study was kindly provided by 
the authors. It covers a large number of countries. However, its time coverage is 
limited to the publication dates of The World Guide to Trade Associations. 
Namely, it is available for the years 1973, 1985, 1995, 1999 and 2002, rendering 
this data of little use for our study. Relying on a point made by Lybeck (1986) that 
the theory of interest groups should be tested on variables such as membership in 
unions, number of interest groups, share of population involved in at least one 
interest organisation, etc., we settle for the less satisfactory practice of employing 
trade union density (UNION), measured as the percentage of employees who are 
members of a trade union, as a proxy for the interest group influence. Although 
trade unions can be thought of as a reasonable example of an interest group 
appealing for and influencing certain government actions, this indicator may not 
be capturing adequately the strength of the interest groups whose effect on the 
size of government is to be tested. The trade union proxy may not be completely 
satisfactory to capture the effect of interest groups, especially for instance in the 
US or the UK, where trade union membership has been falling since the 1960s 
and the 1980s, respectively. Yet interest groups are assumed to have proliferated. 
We tried to make the most of the data from The World Guide to Trade 
Associations, so that it could be used for the purposes of this study. Unfortunately, 
our attempts to increase the number of observations on this variable seemed 
unreasonable. We tried interpolating values and so transforming it into annual 
data for each country from a best fit curve, but plotting the series revealed no 
                                                 
35
 In correspondence with Bonnie Wilson and Christine Mahoney (who is working on the 
compilation of the interest groups database at the EU level), it was ascertained that there are still 
no centralized registries or institutions compiling systematic cross-country information on the 
number or strength of interest groups over time.  
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discernable pattern in the data. Instead, the observations appeared to “wander up 
and down”. Given that there are only 128 observations available (i.e, around 87 
percent of the needed observations are missing) and that data plots indicate no 
well-behaved function or even a clear direction of movement in the available data, 
any approach to interpolate or impute the missing values seems unfounded. As an 
alternative proxy, we also considered employing the collective bargaining 
coverage variable, measured as the percentage of employees covered by collective 
agreement
36
. It could be argued that this variable is likely to be a good proxy in 
only some countries (e.g., the German-speaking countries), but not in others (e.g., 
the USA and UK). Another problem related to this variable is that nearly half of 
the observations on this variable for our data sample are missing. In sum, we 
decide to use the trade union density variable (UNION) as an imperfect, but 
available proxy for the interest group effect.  
It is assumed that the net result of interest groups‟ activities is to increase the size 
of government expenditures; hence, the sign on the estimated coefficient on the 
union variable is expected to be positive. Interest groups generally seek favours 
from governments that result in an expansion of government expenditures, 
programs, subsidies, grants, public works, or in the case of the variable used in 
our model - trade unions - social protection, retraining etc. However, this is not to 
say that, theoretically, some interest groups can pressure for smaller government 
expenditure
37
.  
It is arguable that the strength of trade unions in a country could be fostered by the 
larger shares of government in the economy, especially given the traditionally 
higher level of union membership in the public sector. Trade union membership 
seem largely to be a public sector phenomenon (Smith, 2006), given that public 
employees are more likely to be unionised than private sector employees, and 
strategically better positioned to bargain for higher wages and pension benefits 
                                                 
36
 The data on Union Coverage is obtained from The CEP-OECD Institutions Data Set 1960-2004 
(Nickell, 2006), downloadable from: http://www.cesifo-group.de/portal/page/portal/ifoHome/a-
winfo/d3iiv/_DICE_division?_id=1&_div=6746433&_cat=c&_action=all&_row=1&_count=52  
37
 For instance, small and medium entrepreneurs may lobby for lower taxes or tax allowance. 
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(Rose, 1981). Consequently, on econometric grounds, a potential problem of 
endogeneity due to reverse causality may arise.  
5.3.6 Bureaucracy 
The effect of bureaucracy on its own growth is best described by Niskanen (1971) 
who hypothesises that bureaucrats have a desire for larger budgets, because these 
are the source of higher wages, prestige and power, more subordinates etc.. As 
explained in Chapter 3, public officials are expected to abuse the natural 
information asymmetry and “line their own pockets”, which leads to a larger 
government sector than the general public would prefer. They are assumed to be 
successful in their demands for larger budgets because they have the monopoly 
power over the supply of their outputs, and because legislatures that supervise 
them are relatively passive and ignorant. In our integrative model developed in the 
previous chapter, this effect is reflected in a right-hand side shift along the supply 
curve of government expenditures. According to the assumptions of our model, 
unless there is an increase in the demand to absorb this excessive supply, this 
effect will be only transitory. Namely, we might expect politicians to make cuts 
since this overprovision might result in revolt on the part of some taxpayers. In 
order to stay in power, politicians adjust to the preferences of the median voter. 
This process of political-economy adjustment, however, may take many years to 
be completed and for equilibrium to be restored
38
. Government expenditures are 
likely to change only slowly over time which, in turn, informs our decision to use 
dynamic panel data techniques. In our integrative model, which posits that the size 
of government in the economy is determined by the demand-led factors, 
bureaucrats are included as an important factor on the grounds that they act as a 
special interest group. It can be argued that they act both as voters and as a 
pressure group to achieve and defend a larger public sector that provides their 
living. Like any other special interest group, aiming at maximising the impact of 
its actions, public bureaucrats will protect and promote their interests in big 
                                                 
38
 Likewise, underprovision of government goods and services will have a similar long-term 
corrective mechanism through the elective process. 
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governments. In our model, the effect of this interest group is captured by the 
general government employment variable (GEMP), measured by the share of 
general government employment in total employment
39
. The general government 
employment variable is treated as an endogenous variable in our model, given that 
it is inevitably influenced by the dependent variable. 
5.3.7 Fiscal Decentralisation 
Within the public choice literature, the institutional set-up of the country is 
discussed as a potential explanatory factor for the size of government. Brennan 
and Buchanan (1980) depict government as a monolithic Leviathan, which seeks 
to maximise its dimension and influence in the economy. Greater centralisation, 
i.e. “monopolisation” of government, accompanied by a weak intergovernmental 
competition, is argued to lead to a larger government size in the economy. Since 
centralised governments are believed to be somewhat detached, less visible and 
less influenced by the average citizen, they can more easily increase citizens‟ 
fiscal illusion and, consequently, make them less aware of their true tax burden. 
On the other hand, decentralised countries are assumed to be associated with 
smaller total governments, since the competition between the sub-national 
governments for people and firms keeps their taxes and expenditures relatively 
small.  
In line with our model, the demand-side explanations for the relationship between 
fiscal decentralisation and the size of government can be easily motivated. The 
Leviathan hypothesis, adapted to comply with our theoretical model, predicts a 
negative effect of fiscal decentralisation on the demand for government 
expenditures. Assuming that fiscal decentralisation brings about competition 
among sub-national governments and results in more transparent decentralised 
                                                 
39
 The data on General Government Employment include government units - core ministries, 
departments and agencies, non-market publicly-owned hospitals, public schools, social security 
organizations, private non-market non-profit institutions financed and controlled by government 
units. It includes units at all levels of governments. Recently, OECD (together with the ILO-
International Labour Organisation) researchers are making an effort to extend this indicator to 
include the data on employment in publicly owned or controlled enterprises (Pilichowski and 
Turkisch, 2008). 
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budgets, it reduces the fiscal illusion of some consumers-voters making them 
more aware of their true tax burden. Resulting in a clearer tax-benefit link, fiscal 
decentralisation will also limit the scope for interest groups‟ manoeuvre and 
influence. In a genuinely decentralised structure of governance, consumers-voters 
in adjacent jurisdictions can relatively easily compare their relative positions and 
penalize their sub-national government for the overprovision of government 
goods and services - either by not re-electing it or by moving out to another 
jurisdiction. To minimise the probability of such an outcome, governments are 
assumed to adjust to the preferences of their consumers-voters and so reduce the 
size of expenditures. Consequently, one can expect the government share in the 
economy to vary inversely with the extent of fiscal decentralization. Alternatively, 
some other demand-side effects of fiscal decentralisation are hypothesised to have 
the opposite - i.e. positive - effect on the size of government. Fiscal 
decentralisation may increase the efficiency and quality of government services 
by tailoring them more consistently to the needs of taxpayers. It can be argued 
that greater decentralisation enhances citizens‟ trust in government, increasing the 
demand for publicly provided goods and services, hence leading to a greater size 
of government in the economy. Additionally, many tiers of government imply 
more access points and politicians willing to answer to special interest groups 
demanding more government expenditures
40
. To summarize, from the demand-
side perspective one can envisage two diverging effects of fiscal decentralisation 
on the total size of government, rendering the sign of the estimated coefficient on 
this variable a priori indecisive. Given these different possible channels of 
influence, it is not quite certain what differences in the size of government might 
be caused by more decentralisation.   
At this point, it is important to emphasise that the above discussion about the 
relationship between fiscal decentralisation and the size of government assumes 
that sub-national governments are granted both spending and, more importantly, 
taxing power. This point is emphasised since, as already mentioned in Chapter 3, 
                                                 
40
 Conversely, low voter participation in local elections may minimise resistance to the demands of 
interest groups in some countries; for instance, in the UK.  
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there are very few countries in the world that are genuinely decentralised, i.e. 
countries in which citizens are represented at each level of government and their 
representatives can decide on both the expenditures and taxes at each respective 
level (Muller, 2003). In reality, even those countries that are mostly praised for 
being federalist cannot be credited for having absolutely limited central and self-
financing sub-national governments
41
. Instead, as pointed by Rodden (2003), the 
sub-national governments cede taxing powers to the central government and 
receive intergovernmental grants in return. In other words, sub-national 
governments collude with central governments and their expenditures get funded 
primarily by intergovernmental grants, revenue-sharing programs, or other 
centrally controlled funds. This type of decentralisation, that is, expenditure 
decentralisation without corresponding tax decentralisation, is not expected to 
increase the accountability of governments. This point informs our decision about 
the appropriate proxy for the fiscal decentralisation variable. A reliable indicator 
of fiscal decentralisation should effectively quantify the autonomy that different 
levels of government are given in making both expenditure and revenue decisions. 
Given the complexity of vertical government structures and relationships between 
different levels of government, it is not surprising that such a comprehensive 
measure of fiscal decentralisation does not exist. In Chapter 3, we discussed and 
compared alternative sources of fiscal decentralisation data; in particular the 
IMF‟s Government Finance Statistics (GFS), the OECD‟s and Stegarescu‟s 
(2005) data. Taken all the evidence on data construction, we argued in favour of 
Stegarescu‟s (2005) “purified” sub-national own-source revenues data. 
Our study is one of the few to employ the Stegarescu (2005) indicator of revenue 
decentralisation. We were kindly provided with the data by the author himself and 
Jon Fiva who used it in his own research (Fiva, 2006). The variable on revenue 
decentralisation (DEC=
revenues government general
revenues autonomous nationalsub
) is measured as the 
                                                 
41
 In Europe, for instance, Switzerland seems to be the only country where citizens have direct 
influence on both expenditures and taxes at each level of government (Feld, Kirchgässner and 
Schaltegger, 2003). 
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revenue share of sub-national government relative to general government, but 
only includes revenues where the sub-national government has discretion over tax 
rate, tax base or both, that is, the share of sub-national government autonomous 
own revenue in the total revenue of general government. For this reason, it is 
assumed to be an appropriate proxy for the true degree of fiscal decentralisation.  
5.3.8 Financial crisis   
The ongoing global financial crisis that is now turning into a world-wide 
economic crisis (Andersen, 2009) has recently provoked a vivid debate on the 
possible means to confront it and to accelerate recovery from it. Whatever the 
(financial) causes of this crisis, it has implications for consumption, investment 
and aggregate demand, which are all adversely affected. Consequently, it has led 
to monetary and fiscal stimulus efforts worldwide. However, the conventional 
monetary policy measures seemed to perform poorly, since they appear to have 
reached their limits in many countries. Policy interest rates in many countries, 
including the US, the UK and Japan, are close to the zero nominal interest rate 
floor (Prasad and Sorkin, 2009). In such circumstances, monetary policies tend to 
“lose traction” as the zero interest rate bound is approached or attained, while the 
fiscal stance tends to be expansive, arguably to support the financial and real 
sectors (Laeven and Valencia, 2008). Accordingly, a fiscal expansion though 
various fiscal stimulus packages has been a common policy reaction across 
different countries not only to this current global crisis, but such policy reactions 
typically pertain to all financial crisis since World War II. Fiscal stimulus 
packages frequently include a portfolio of different instruments to engineer a 
bailout of the banking sector and to speed up the process of economic recovery. 
Reinhart and Rogoff (2008), Dell‟Arricia et al (2008), Laeven and Valencia 
(2008), Honohan and Klingebiel (2003) and Andersen (2009) document different 
policy instruments employed by governments across countries. These stimulus 
measures commonly include substantial liquidity support, explicit government 
guarantee on financial institutions‟ liabilities and forbearance from prudential 
regulations, debtor support schemes, purchases of bad assets, mergers of bad 
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banks with relatively sound institutions, direct government takeovers, use of 
infrastructure government expenditures, tax relief, direct support to economic 
sectors particularly affected, etc. This inevitable increase in government 
expenditures accompanied by decrease in government revenues (due to the 
depressing effects of crisis on economic activities) results in, among others, 
massive increase in government debt. Higher public indebtedness and budget 
deficits and are undoubtedly, as Reinhart and Rogoff (2008) put it, the true legacy 
of banking crises. 
The fiscal consequences of financial crisis may be temporary, although spread 
over many years, or may be associated with a kind of ratchet effect. The idea that 
there is a ratchet effect both after major wars and serious economic crises, so that 
instead of re-setting to its pre-crisis level government expenditures tend to persist 
and develop from a higher level than before the onset of the crisis, has been put 
forward by Peacock and Wiseman (1961). Temporary crises cause government 
spending to rise and to remain permanently higher than if the crises had not 
occurred, implying that the effect of crisis might also have longer term effects. 
Major social and economic disturbances typically considered to have produced 
ratchet effects in the growth path of government expenditures are World War I, 
the Great Depression and World War II. Despite this conventional wisdom, our 
statistical examination of the long time series of government expenditures for a 
selected number of countries in Chapter 2 suggested that the turning points (i.e., 
major changes in the underlying growth rate of government expenditures), if 
indeed there were any within our sample periods, occurred around the turn of the 
19
th
 century. Admittedly, non-availability of data prevented a wider investigation 
of the very long-term evolution of government expenditures for a broader sample 
of countries, but our results seem to indicate that a major change with a long 
lasting effect on the growth path of government expenditures occurred before the 
onset of World War I and the Great Depression.  
Given that the dataset employed in this part of the thesis pertains to the period 
from the 1970s onwards, and given that the number of countries having financial 
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difficulties with major economic effects began to expand since the 1970s 
(Reinhart and Rogoff, 2008 and Dell‟Arricia et al., 2008), the omission of a 
variable to indicate the presence of crisis might at best leave our model 
incomplete and, at worst, if the omitted crisis variable is correlated with one or 
more explanatory variables, might bias our results. Therefore, the idea that 
financial crisis increases the share of government in the economy - immediately 
through the increased government spending and then through the joint action of 
increased interest payments on debt (which will increase the numerator of our 
dependent variable) and depressed GDP growth (which will reduce the 
denominator) is incorporated in our model. Both in the short and long run, such an 
increase of the government shares is assumed to be supported by taxpayers. 
Namely, in times of major crises, taxpayers adapt to new unfavourable economic 
circumstances and demand more government intervention to stabilise the 
economy. According to advocates of the ratchet theory, this idea that people are 
willing to accept higher shares of government in the economy during the period of 
crisis, enables governments to maintain expenditure at high levels even once the 
period of crisis has passed, since taxpayers become more accepting of such new 
arrangements. 
To allow for the effect of financial crisis, we introduce a dummy variable (DCR) 
in the specification of our model. This dummy variable takes the value of one for 
the crisis inception year onwards, and zero for the period before the inception of 
crisis. In fact, this is a conventional dummy variable measuring shifts in the 
constant; that is, it allows changes in the intercept in every period after the 
inception of crisis. Anticipating a ratchet effect of financial crisis, a positive and 
statistically significant coefficient on this dummy variable is expected.  
Several issues, though, are encountered in the construction of the crisis dummy 
variable. Foremost, there is no universally agreed upon definition of a financial 
crisis. Different authors use somewhat different criteria and a lot of qualitative 
evidence and subjective judgement to define the onset date of a financial crisis. 
Our crisis dummies are confined to systemic banking crisis and are based on the 
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Laeven and Valencia (2008) database - “the most complete and detailed database 
on banking crises to date” (Laeven and Valencia, 2008). It covers all systemically 
important banking crises for the period 1970 to 2007 for a large set of countries. 
In a systemic banking crisis, according to these two authors, a country‟s corporate 
and financial sectors experience a large number of defaults while financial 
institutions and corporations face great difficulties repaying contracts on time
42
. 
This database is compared to the one complied by Reinhart and Rogoff (2008) 
and Dell‟Ariccia et al. (2008), respectively. These two build largely on the Caprio 
and Klingebiel (2003) database where a systemic banking crisis is defined as a 
situation in which “much or all of bank capital is being exhausted”43. The dates 
attached to systemic banking crises are generally approved by finance experts 
familiar with economic and financial conditions in the particular country, which 
adds to the reliability of this database. To define the duration period of a particular 
crisis, the Cecchetti et al. (2009) study is employed with the length of each 
particular crisis being calculated as the number of quarters it takes for output to 
recover its pre-crisis level.  
5.3.9 The political character of government  
In Chapter 1 it is argued that the actual political decisions made by governments 
are pretty much in line with what the voting public demands. Some authors, such 
as Mullard (1993), Smith (2006) and Shaviro (2007) argue that different parties, 
despite their “crowd-pleasing-vote-winning” rhetorical statements, tend to share 
similar policies and almost identical views on the level of government spending 
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 Consequently, non-performing loans increase and all or most of the aggregate banking system is 
exhausted. Additionally, a systemic banking crisis is typically accompanied by depressed asset 
prices, sharp increases in the real interest rates, and a slowdown or reversal in capital inflows 
(Laeven and Valencia, 2008).   
43
 A close examination and comparison of different databases reveals that the inception year and 
duration period of most systemic banking crises is the same across different databases. There are, 
though, some discrepancies, mainly due to definitions of financial crisis used by different authors. 
In such cases, conflict between different sources has been reconciled by more thorough 
investigation of country‟s economic and financial conditions related to dates suggested by 
different authors, and the decision on the inception year was determined by our own judgement.  
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once they form the government. In Chapter 2 no evidence was found of a major 
break in the long time-series of government expenditures that could be related 
straightforwardly to major changes in the political system. Our eclectic model, 
built in Chapter 4, resides on the assumption that the supply of government goods 
and services is perfectly elastic, while the actual changes in the quantity of 
government are the result of demand-led factors.  
At this point, however, a politics variable - as a control variable - is introduced in 
the model. It is introduced for two main reasons. Firstly, it accounts for the 
possibility that differences in government expenditure in the economy can be 
explained in terms of which political party has been the incumbent government. 
Secondly and more importantly, it eliminates a possible source of endogeneity. 
Namely, should some of the regressors be related to the political character of 
government, a failure to include this variable in the testing model could result in 
the regression disturbance term being correlated with those independent variables; 
hence, the results being biased and the conclusions misleading.  
The politics variable (POL) denotes the cabinet composition of central 
governments across countries. Taken from the Comparative Political Data Set 
1960 - 2007 (Armingeon et al., 2009), this variable ranges from 1 (dominant right-
wing government) to 5 (dominant leftwing government). On the surface, this 
variable could be predicted to be positively correlated with government spending 
on the presumption that left-oriented governments are more likely to resort to 
higher levels of expenditure than more conservative, right-oriented governments 
often defined by hostility to big government. However, for reasons that have 
already been put forward in Chapter 1, a statistically insignificant coefficient on 
this variable would come as no surprise.   
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5.4 An introduction to the data set, data sources and descriptive 
statistics 
Having introduced the main variables to be used in the empirical analysis, in what 
follows we present the data set in more detail. Table 5.1 below describes the 
variables used in terms of definition, construction and data source. Data are 
obtained from various data sources, and in some instances were kindly provided 
by the authors. The available data is annual and the time period covered is from 
1970 to 2008. As for the cross-sectional dimension of the panel, it includes the 
twenty-six OECD countries, namely: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, the 
Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, 
Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, the 
Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK and the USA
44
. The 
specific choice of countries included in our panel is mainly driven by the 
constraints imposed by data availability. Were our panel balanced, 1040 (26 
countries × 39 years) observations would be at our disposal for each variable. 
However, since observations for some of the countries and/or time periods are 
missing due to data non availability, our panel is unbalanced. 
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 The data on government expenditures in GDP are not available for the following OECD 
countries: Hungary, Mexico, New Zealand and Turkey, hence, these countries are not included in 
our data set.   
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Table 5.1: Data Documentation: Definition, Construction and Sources 
Variable Definition and Construction Source 
Government expenditure in 
GDP (G) 
Total nominal general government expenditure as a ratio of 
GDP. It consists of the two series: the government outlays in 
GDP for 1970-2000 and the government expenditures in 
GDP for 2001-2008. The two series are merged so that the 
average conversion factor is calculated over the latest five 
overlapping observations for each country and applied to 
“correct” the last eight observations in the government 
expenditure series which are then added to the government 
outlays series. The government outlay include: the final 
consumption expenditures of the general government, 
interest paid, subsidies paid, social benefits other than in 
kind paid, other current transfers paid, net capital transfers 
paid, gross capital formation and net acquisitions of non-
produced non financial assets, minus consumption of fixed 
capital. The government expenditure include: intermediate 
consumption  + compensation of employees + other taxes on 
production payable instead of  the final consumption 
expenditures. Other categories remain as in the government 
outlays. The data cover the general government sector 
(central government, state government, local government 
and social security funds).  
OECD (2001), Total Government Outlays, Historical Statistics, 
available at: 
http://www.oecdilibrary.org/oecd/content/serial/19962061, 
supplemented for the period 2000-2008 by OECD (2010) Total 
General Government Expenditure, General Government 
Accounts - Volume IV, OECD National Accounts Statistics 
(database), available at: 
http://www.oecdilibrary.org/oecd/content/datacollection/na-gga-
data-en.  
GDP per capita (GDP) GDP per capita in constant prices, 2000 US $ OECD (2010), Gross domestic product, Aggregate national 
accounts, OECD National Accounts Statistics (database), 
available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/data-00001-en. 
Age dependency ratio (DEP) 
  
Ratio of people under the age of 15 and over the age of 64 to 
the working-age population 
 
World Bank (2009), World Development Indicators (WDI) 
Online 
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Financial sector (FINC) Value added in banks, insurance, real estate and other 
business services as a share of  total value added 
OECD (2009), Value Added by Activity, OECD Factbook 
2009: Economic, Environmental and Social Statistics 
(database), available at: 
http://www.oecdilibrary.org/oecd/content/chapter/factbook-
2009-21-en. 
Trade openness (OPT) Value of exports plus imports as a share of GDP  World Bank (2009), World Development Indicators (WDI) 
Online  
Financial Openness: Lane 
and Milesi-Ferretti (OPF)  
Ratio of the volume of external assets and liabilities to GDP. 
External assets and liabilities are claims between a country‟s 
residents and non-residents and comprise portfolio equity 
assets and liabilities, foreign direct investments assets and 
liabilities, portfolio debt assets and liabilities, financial 
derivatives assets and liabilities, and total reserves minus 
gold. 
Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007), downloadable from: 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2006/data/wp0669.zip  
Financial Openness: Quinn 
(OPFQ) 
Indicator ranging from 0 to 14, with 14 representing the least 
regulated and financially most open regimes. It is based on 
the author‟s assessment of inward and outward capital 
account transactions (scored on a 0-4 scale), current account 
transactions (scored on a 0-8 scale) and the international 
legal agreements that constrain a country‟s ability to restrict 
exchange and capital flows (scored on a 0-2 scale).  
Kindly provided by the authors: Quinn (1997) and Quinn and 
Toyoda (1997)  
Relative prices (RP) Ratio of the deflator for government final consumption 
expenditure to the deflator for private final consumption 
expenditure 
OECD (2010), Deflators and Prices, OECD Economic Outlook 
No. 86 (database), available at: 
http://www.oecdilibrary.org/oecd/content/data/data-00370-
en?isPartOf=/content/datacollection/eo-data-en. 
Unemployment rate 
(UNEMP) 
Share of the labour force that is without work but available 
for and seeking employment 
World Bank (2009), World Development Indicators (WDI) 
Online, supplemented by The International Monetary Fund‟s 
World Economic Outlook Database (for Germany (1980-1991) 
and Czech Republic (1990-1992)  
Trade union density 
(UNION)   
Ratio of active wage and salary earners trade union members 
to total number of wage and salary earners (OECD Labour 
Force Statistics methodology).  
OECD (2010), Trade Unions, OECD Employment and Labour 
Market Statistics (database), available at: 
http://www.oecdilibrary.org/oecd/content/datacollection/lfs-tu-
data-en.  
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General government 
employment (GEMP) 
General government employment as a share of total 
employment. The data on General Government Employment 
include government units - core ministries, departments and 
agencies, non-market publicly-owned hospitals, public 
schools, social security organizations, private non-market 
non-profit institutions financed and controlled by 
government units. It includes units at all levels of 
governments.  
OECD (2010), General Government Employment, Labour 
Market, OECD Economic Outlook No. 86 (database), available 
at: http://www.oecdilibrary.org/oecd/content/data/data-00370-
en?isPartOf=/content/datacollection/eo-data-en. 
Revenue decentralisation 
(DEC) 
Sub-national government autonomous own revenues (with 
discretion over tax rate, tax base or both) as a share in total 
revenue of general government 
Kindly provided by the author: Stegarescu (2005) and Jon Fiva 
(2006)  
Crisis dummy (DCR) Dummy variable taking the value of one for the crisis 
inception year onwards, and zero for the period before crisis 
Laeven and Valencia (2008), Reinhart and Rogoff (2008) and 
Dell‟Ariccia et al. (2008) 
Political orientation (POL)  Indicator ranging from 1 to 5: 1 - hegemony of right-wing 
parties, 2 - dominance of right-wing (and centre) parties, 3 - 
balance of power between left and right, 4 - dominance of 
social-democratic and other left parties, 5 - hegemony of 
social-democratic and other left parties  
Armingeon, K., Potolidis, P. Gerber, M. and Leimgruber, P. 
(2009): Comparative Political Data Set 1960-2007, Institute of 
Political Science, University of Berne, available at: 
http://www.ipw.unibe.ch/content/team/klaus_armingeon/compa
rative_political_data_sets/index_ger.html. 
        Note: Data are on an annual basis.
154 
 
While Table A.2.1 in Appendix 2.1 reports summary statistics for all variables 
used in the model, we find it useful to present separately the main descriptive 
statistics - the number of observations, a measure of central tendency, a measure 
of variability and the highest and lowest observations - for the dependent variable 
across countries in our sample in Table 5.2. The total number of observations of 
government expenditure in GDP in the sample is 904, since a country is observed, 
on average, over 34.77 years. The overall average share of government 
expenditures in GDP in our sample is 42 percent, reaching its lowest level at 
16.15 percent in Korea in 1987, and its highest value at 67.47 percent in Sweden 
in 1993. Government shares in GDP, of course, vary both within and between 
countries. Korea is the country with the smallest shares of government 
expenditure in GDP, the average being 18.85 percent (over the period 1975-1999). 
On the other end, 55.92 per cent of GDP has been absorbed, on average, by the 
government sector in Sweden (over the period 1970-2008). The “between” and 
“within” standard deviations - 8.15 and 5.53, respectively - indicate that the 
variation in government shares across countries is somewhat more profound than 
that observed within a country over time. That is, if we were to draw two 
countries randomly from our data, the difference in government shares is expected 
to be somewhat greater than the difference for the same country in two randomly 
selected years. This finding could be interpreted as an indication of heterogeneity 
across countries in our sample. To illustrate the extent to which the share of 
government in GDP varies across countries over time, Figure A.2.1 in Appendix 2 
depicts government shares on a country-by-country basis (for a more distinctive 
presentation of the data, the range of scale on the Y-axis is country-specific). In 
what follows, we briefly discuss the general trends visible from these charts.  
For most countries, the charts presented in Figure A.2.1 in Appendix 2.3 
demonstrate a generally increasing size of the government sector, at least for the 
period up to the 1990s. Percentage changes in government shares from the 
beginning to the end of the period, given in Table 5.2, reveal that all countries, 
except for the Czech Republic, Poland, the Slovak Republic, Ireland, the 
Netherlands and Norway, experienced an increase in the share of national output 
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absorbed by the government. For some countries, such as Greece, Japan, Portugal 
and Spain, this increase was as high as 133.22, 78.98, 97.85 and 79.71 percent, 
respectively.
 
 
Table 5.2: Descriptive statistics for the dependent variable (G):    
Country Obs Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Min Max 
Percentage 
change from the 
beginning to the 
end of the period 
Australia 38 32.90 3.15 24.49 37.68 29.89 
Austria 39 47.59 3.81 38.49 53.26 17.63 
Belgium 39 50.95 5.18 40.34 62.16 20.50 
Canada 35 41.98 4.55 34.33 51.26 9.96 
Czech Republic 17 46.33 6.71 41.37 66.52 -25.66 
Denmark 39 50.72 5.39 38.41 58.08 24.73 
Finland 39 43.15 7.52 29.76 59.16 50.18 
France 39 46.78 4.56 37.09 51.83 32.12 
Germany 39 45.55 2.80 38.14 52.93 9.98 
Greece 31 38.91 10.82 21.11 54.62 133.22 
Iceland 37 36.58 3.55 29.77 42.02 31.07 
Ireland 38 40.98 7.75 29.33 55.12 -13.49 
Italy 39 46.45 5.08 33.91 55.55 39.30 
Japan 38 31.42 4.81 18.97 40.06 78.98 
Korea 25 18.85 2.07 16.15 24.15 36.90 
Luxembourg 28 44.79 6.89 32.19 57.31 18.46 
Netherlands 39 51.18 7.54 41.59 62.64 -0.79 
Norway 39 44.88 3.58 37.88 51.98 -5.94 
Poland 18 44.85 4.70 39.99 54.93 -21.17 
Portugal 39 38.18 7.38 21.25 47.89 97.85 
Slovak Republic 15 51.19 7.29 40.29 61.10 -25.29 
Spain 39 35.69 7.15 21.85 47.64 79.71 
Sweden 39 55.92 6.66 42.23 67.47 18.72 
Switzerland 39 31.33 4.06 21.28 36.39 49.59 
United Kingdom 39 41.72 2.68 37.33 46.19 20.93 
United States 38 33.40 2.03 29.18 36.67 15.51 
Overall 904 41.99 9.52 16.15 67.47 - 
Note: The total number of countries is 26, and the average number of years per country 34.77. 
The reported “between” and “within” standard deviations are equal to 8.15 and 5.53, 
respectively. The beginning and the end of the period is not the same for all the countries. The 
period covered for Australia is 1970-2007, for Canada 1970-2004, for the Czech Republic 
1992-2008, for Greece 1970-2000, for Iceland 1970-2006, for Ireland 1970-2007, for Japan 
1970-2007, for Korea 1975-1999, for Luxembourg 1970-2000 (observations 1987-1989 
missing),  for Poland 1991-2008, for the Slovak Republic 1994-2008 and for the USA 1970-
2008. For all other countries in the sample, the period covered is 1970-2008. 
The transition countries - the Czech Republic, Poland and the Slovak Republic - 
display a falling trend in government shares. However, for those countries the 
available data starts as of 1992, 1991 and 1994, respectively, and hence, no 
inference on the trend in government shares for the period before the 1990s can be 
made. Of all other counters, only Ireland, the Netherlands and Norway had a 
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government share lower at the end of the period than at the beginning. A closer 
examination reveals that the downward trending behaviour started from around 
1985 in Ireland and the Netherlands. In Norway, this downward trend seems to be 
less evident, with government shares remaining relatively stable throughout the 
whole period, fluctuating around 45 percent of GDP. In line with a more detailed 
commentary on trends in government shares for a selected number of 
representative countries in Chapter 1, we conclude that in general, despite some 
differences, the observable increase in the government expenditure ratio seems to 
be a common feature for the majority of other countries in our sample, certainly 
for the period up to the 1990s. For some countries, such as France, Greece, 
Iceland, Japan, Korea, Portugal, this upward trend has been quite pronounced 
throughout the whole period.  
5.5 Methodological Issues 
Our data set introduced in the previous section consists of annual observations 
spanning 26 developed countries from 1970 to 2008. The number of time series 
observations, T, is relatively large compared to the number of countries, N. Such 
dimensions of the data set allows us to address some important methodological 
issues, while aiming to consistently estimate the long-run relationship between the 
size of government in the economy and various explanatory variables. By now, it 
has become quite common to have panels in which both N and T are relatively 
large and roughly of the same order of magnitude. In fact, recent years have seen 
a surge of interest in “large N, large T” panels, primarily due to the availability of 
data with greater frequency
45. To distinguish this setup from the typical “large N, 
small T” panel context, some authors use different terms, such as “macro” panels 
or “country” panels. Quah (1993), for instance, refers to panels with both large (or 
quite large) N and T as “data fields”. Not only do such panels provide larger 
samples which may improve efficiency and mitigate multicollinearity, they can 
                                                 
45
 As a general rule, it is difficult to specify exactly how large a “large T and large N” dimension 
should be in practice, but at some point Pesaran et al. (1996) note that such data sets typically have 
the time-series and cross-sectional dimensions of roughly the same order of magnitude, with a 
reasonable time dimension being T>25. 
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also allow for more explicit treatment of parameter heterogeneity and allow for 
more complex dynamic models than “large N, small T” panels (Smith and 
Fuertes, 2010).  
In what follows, we discuss several different panel estimation approaches and 
assess their suitability for our research question and the nature of the data at hand. 
In particular, we decide on an appropriate estimation technique based on different 
estimators‟ suitability for panel dimensions, treatment of non-stationarity, 
endogeneity, and heterogeneity of parameters across countries. The search for a 
preferred estimator has been quite challenging. Partly, this is because the 
assumptions under which econometric theory delivers an optimal solution are 
almost never satisfied in practice. This is a general problem faced by applied 
economists while trying to find a definitive methodology. Another reason is that 
estimation techniques developed for “large N, large T” panels are currently an 
expanding area of research with some questions still waiting to be answered.  
5.5.1 Dynamic panel estimators  
In a static regression setting, effects embodied in coefficients are assumed to take 
place at once (Greene, 2003, p.605). When dealing with macroeconomic 
variables, however, this assumption is unrealistic. Whether the research task is 
forecasting or understanding relations among variables, as in our case, adding 
dynamics to a model can be very important. Estimating a static model in the 
presence of dynamic relationships leads to model misspecification, and is likely to 
cause biased and inconsistent estimates (Frees, 2004; Bond, 2002; Greene, 2003). 
Accordingly, there are already a number of dynamic panel estimators developed 
and applied in the empirical literature.  
Dynamic features are typically introduced by adding the lagged dependent 
variable as a regressor in the model. By now, it is well established that in such 
autoregressive panel data models, the traditional fixed and random effects 
estimators are biased and inconsistent, particularly for panels with a small time-
series dimension. The “small T” downward bias stems from correlation of that 
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lagged dependent variable with the individual specific effects, either fixed or 
random
46
. As a result, a number of alternative estimators have been proposed in 
the “large N, small T” dynamic panel literature to solve this problem. Deriving an 
approximation for the bias of the fixed effects estimator, Kiviet (1995) suggests 
subtracting this bias from the original fixed effects estimator to arrive at a 
corrected fixed effects estimator. Alternatively, a number of Instrumental variable 
(IV) methods have been proposed. For instance, Anderson and Hsiao (1982) 
suggest an IV estimator which, upon transforming the model into first differences 
to eliminate the individual effects, uses lagged levels of the series as instruments 
for the predetermined and endogenous variables in first-differences. Arellano and 
Bond (1991) propose a Generalised method of moments (GMM) estimator for the 
first-differenced model, which uses, for each year, all available lags of the 
variables in levels to instrument differenced variables. However, in the empirical 
experience with dynamic estimation on relatively short panels with highly 
persistent data, first-differenced IV or GMM estimators may suffer of a severe 
small-sample bias due to weak instruments for first-differenced variables. As a 
solution, Blundell and Bond (1998) propose the System GMM estimator to 
improve on the poor performance of the Difference GMM estimator for highly 
autoregressive panel series. The System GMM estimator uses lagged first-
differenced instruments for the equation in levels, in addition to lagged levels 
instruments in the first-differenced equation. Baltagi and Kao (2000) show that 
this extended GMM estimator, by additionally exploiting instruments available for 
the equations in levels, can greatly improve the efficiency and reduce the finite 
sample bias when these additional moment conditions are valid. In recent years, 
GMM techniques have become quite popular among applied economists. A great 
advantage of all GMM dynamic panel models is that the procedure for handling 
the endogeneity of the lagged dependent variable may be applied to all potentially 
endogenous or predetermined variables in the model (Pugh, 2009). Though 
                                                 
46
 This problem, as explained by Greene (2003, p.308), is more transparent in the random effects 
model. Since in the random effects model the compound error term has a time invariant cross-
sectional component it influences the dependent variable in each period and, hence, must be 
correlated with the lagged dependent variable too.  
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attractive, particularly as a response to endogeneity, this approach has some 
serious limitations. Roodman (2009a) cautions against the automatic 
implementation of these estimators in popular software packages, since it can by 
default generate results that simultaneously are invalid, yet appear valid. He 
explicitly warns applied economists that both GMM estimators are designed for 
“small T, large N” panels and suggests not to apply GMM estimators if T is large. 
As the number of time series observations rises, the number of instruments in 
GMM estimators tends to explode. This creates the problem of “too many 
instruments” - simply by being numerous, instruments can over-fit instrumented 
variables, failing to expunge their endogenous components and biasing coefficient 
estimates (Roodman, 2009a). At the same time, they can make tests for validity of 
those instruments misleading, which is a particular concern for the System GMM 
estimator. The fundamental problem for present purposes, however, is that system 
GMM estimators are designed for panels with a wide cross-section and short time-
series dimensions (Roodman, 2009b), which by definition makes this estimation 
technique not suitable for our panel data set. 
For panels with a larger time-series dimension, Monte Carlo studies have not been 
favourable to GMM estimators (Kennedy, 2008; Verbeek, 2008). Judson and 
Owen (1999), for instance, investigate four competing dynamic panel estimators 
and recommend the Kiviet corrected fixed effects estimator as the best choice. 
Although the bias in the traditional fixed effects estimator decreases with T, it can 
be sizeable even for T=30. However, the computational difficulties render the 
Kiviet (1995) corrected FE estimator impractical for unbalanced panels, in which 
case Judson and Owen (1999) recommend the usual fixed effects estimator when 
T is greater than 30. A general conclusion by Judson and Owen (1999) is that for 
T greater than 30, the bias created by using the FE estimator is more than offset 
by its greater precision compared to IV and GMM estimators.  
However, the suggested fixed effects estimator, like all other estimators 
mentioned so far, will be inconsistent if the true model parameters are different 
across countries, particularly in panels with a larger time-series dimension.  
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5.5.2 Parameter heterogeneity and panel estimators  
Key to the understanding of the recent econometric literature on dynamic panels 
with larger T dimension is the result by Pesaran and Smith (1995) that if the true 
parameters in a model vary across countries, then those parameters cannot be 
estimated consistently using a model which imposes cross-country parameter 
homogeneity. In other words, the traditional procedures for estimation of dynamic 
panel models, such as the fixed or random effects estimators, can produce 
inconsistent and potentially very misleading estimates of the average values of the 
parameters unless, as assumed by those models, the slope coefficients are truly 
identical across countries (Pesaran and Smith, 1995)
47
. In practice, this 
assumption of slope homogeneity seems to be unrealistic since, as pointed out by 
Pesaran et al. (1996), most of the evidence from “large N, large T” panels suggest 
that slope heterogeneity is pervasive. To obtain consistent estimators of the means 
of the slope coefficients, Pesaran and Smith (1995) proposed the Mean Group 
(MG) estimator based on the idea of averaging the estimates obtained from N 
separate time-series regressions. This “averaging” approach is diametrically 
opposite to the “pooling” approach inherent in traditional panel estimators. These 
two extreme assumptions of the complete homogeneity of the traditional panel 
models and of the complete heterogeneity of the separate estimation of cross-
sections might be too restrictive in practice. While it might be reasonable to 
assume that parameters vary across countries in the short run, it is less likely that 
there are no common features in the long-run relationships. After all, if the 
examined long-run relationship is completely idiosyncratic across countries then 
one might question the meaningfulness of the results from an economic or policy 
perspective. An important disadvantage of the Pesaran and Smith (1995) MG 
estimator is that it does not allow for the efficiency gains that could arise if some 
                                                 
47
 In dealing with cross-section parameter heterogeneity, the widely used fixed effects approach 
allows only for the intercepts to differ across groups, while all other coefficients are constrained to 
be the same. That is, in the fixed effects model all individual differences are assumed to be 
captured by differences in the intercept parameter. In the random effects model, all individual 
differences are again assumed to be captured by differences in the intercept parameters, bur these 
individual differences are treated as random. In the simple pooled model, all parameters are 
assumed to be the same across cross-sections.  
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coefficients are common across countries. This insight is exploited by the Pooled 
Mean Group (PMG) estimator proposed by Pesaran et al. (1999) as an 
intermediate estimator which combines both pooling and averaging. It imposes 
homogeneity of the slope coefficients entering the long-run relationships (similar 
to a fixed effects estimator), but allows for heterogeneity of the coefficients 
characterizing the short-run dynamics (similar to the MG estimator). Hence, the 
advantages of such a procedure are that the similarity between groups can be used 
to improve the precision of the estimates for each group, without having to make 
the strong assumption that each group is identical.  
As a brief digression, we point to an estimator which also allows for a high degree 
of parameter heterogeneity; namely, the seemingly unrelated regression estimator 
(SURE). It is rarely used in practice (Maddala, 1997) since it requires the cross-
sectional dimension of a panel data set to be substantially smaller than its time-
series dimension for it to be feasible. Instead of assuming that all countries in a 
sample act completely independently one from another (as in a separate country-
by-country approach), this method assumes that there are some unobservable 
factors which affect all the countries at the same time, inducing a non-zero 
contemporaneous covariance between the disturbances of different countries. This 
error correlation is used as additional information to improve the efficiency of 
estimates, so that joint estimation by SURE is in general more efficient than 
separate estimation by ordinary least squares (OLS). The main attraction of the 
SURE procedure is it allows for contemporaneous error covariences to be freely 
estimated. However, this is possible only when N, the number of countries - 
therefore, equations - is substantially smaller than T, the number of time series 
observations available to estimate each equation. When N is of the same order of 
magnitude as T, as in our case, there will be a serious lack of degrees of freedom 
necessary for its implementation, rendering it unfeasible (Pesaran et al., 1999). 
Breitung and Pesaran (2005) as well as Cameron and Trivedi (2009) suggest that 
the SURE can be used in cases where N is small (less than 10) and T is relatively 
large. For large N, Beck and Katz (1995) and Fiebig and Kim (2000) warn that 
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this technique might result in biased estimators and standard errors
48
. Obviously, 
the SURE model is designed for long and narrow panel data sets, hence is not 
suitable for our research purposes. Additionally, Greene (2003, p.361) notes that 
relatively little work has been done with dynamic SUR models.  
5.5.3 Estimator of choice: the Pooled Mean Group estimator 
Following this general methodological introduction, it becomes apparent that 
consistent estimation of the long-run relationship between the size of government 
in the economy and our various explanatory variables requires that both dynamics 
and parameter heterogeneity are allowed for in the model. This is particularly 
relevant for our case, since we employ a data set of a relatively large time-series 
dimension. Since the evolution of the government expenditures is likely to be a 
dynamic process, necessity to introduce dynamics in the model of the size of 
government is apparent. Static models are unlikely to capture the effects on the 
size of government expenditures, which are assumed to persist over time. 
Accordingly, a static model is unlikely to be suitable, possibly leading to biased 
and inconsistent estimates. Assuming a degree of inertia in the share of 
government expenditures, we expect it to be a function of both current and past 
values of explanatory variables, as well as of its own past values.  
In such a dynamic context, from an econometric point of view, allowing for 
parameter heterogeneity is a crucial requirement for an estimator to be consistent. 
From an economic point of view, the heterogeneity in the relationships between 
the examined variables and the size of government among countries in our sample 
stems from each country‟s unique institutional, political and cultural history. It 
can be argued that such idiosyncratic features bring about differences in the short-
run responses of the shares of governments to changes in each explanatory 
variable across countries. It is less reasonable, however, to assume as well that the 
long-run responses will be entirely heterogeneous, especially given that we focus 
on a set of developed OECD countries. In these circumstances a sensible 
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 Beck and Katz (1995) suggest that this technique should not be used unless the ratio of the T to 
N is well above three. 
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procedure would seem to be to follow the PMG approach proposed by Pesaran et 
al. (1999). This method is particularly suited to the analysis of panels with a long 
time series of similar size to the cross-section dimension. As already explained, 
under heterogeneity of both short- and long-run coefficients, the MG is consistent 
and obtained by averaging the country-specific time-series parameter estimates. 
This estimator, however, does not take into account that some economic 
conditions may be common across countries in the long run. If this is the case, the 
PMG estimator will bring about efficiency gains, since it facilitates a more 
accurate estimate of long-run effects, while exploiting country-specific 
information on short-run coefficients. It allows for country-specific dynamics and 
significantly more heterogeneity than do traditional dynamic panel data 
estimators.  
The Pesaran et al. (1999) approach is, essentially, a panel equivalent to the time-
series error correction re-parameterisation of an autoregressive distributed lag 
(ARDL) model, which appears to be a useful platform for addressing a number of 
methodological issues. The error correction model (ECM) has the advantage of 
accounting for both the short-run fluctuations and the long-run equilibrium 
relationship between the variables, even if they appear to be nonstationary. This 
particular advantage of the ECM rendered it quite appealing, once economists 
realised that most macroeconomic variables were not stationary. Namely, in the 
time-series econometric literature it is well established that estimating a model 
using non-stationary variables may result in a spurious regression. A simple, but 
unsatisfactory approach to circumvent this problem is to render the data stationary 
by differencing them and then to work with the differenced data. However, once 
we difference a variable, in general we render it stationary but unfortunately also 
remove the long-run component from that variable. What is left is the short-run 
value of that variable. This approach, therefore, focuses purely on examining the 
short-term relationship between the variables. This is not only econometrically 
more demanding (Blundell et al., 1995, p.342) but also valuable information from 
economic theory concerning the long-run relationship between the levels of the 
variables is lost. This approach is unacceptable if a long-term relationship exists, 
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from both an econometric and an economic point of view. As economists, we like 
to retain and use valuable information about the long-run relationship, while as 
econometricians we like to ensure that we use the best technique to take into 
account the properties of the time-series data. A major advantage of error-
correction models is that they result in equations with first-differenced and, hence, 
stationary variables but avoid the above mentioned problems, since they also 
make use of long-run information in the data. Although most of the work 
associated with the ECM approach is developed for single time-series rather than 
for panel data, currently this is an expanding area of research in the panel 
econometrics literature.  
Following the theoretical background, we assume that the long-run relationship 
between the size of the government in the economy and a set of explanatory 
variables is given by: 
ititkkiiit uXy  )(0    (5.1) 
where the number of countries is i=1, 2, …, N; the number of periods is t=1, 2, 
…, Ti; the number of explanatory variables is k=1, 2,…, K; yit, is the dependent 
variable, (Xk)it is a set of K explanatory variables, i0 is a country-specific 
intercept, ki are the parameters on the set of explanatory variables and uit is the 
error term. To introduce dynamics, we transform this long-run equation into an 
ARDL (p,q1,..,qk) model. The model now includes a lag structure on all the 
explanatory variables (q1,..,qk being the number of lags on each of the K 
explanatory variables) and lagged values of the dependent variable (p being the 
number of lags on the dependent variable), which takes the following form: 
it
q
j
jitkijkitkik
p
j
jitiiit
k
XXyy   




1
0
1
)()()()(       (5.2) 
For notational convenience, we henceforth present only the first-order ARDL (i.e., 
p= q1=…= qk=1) dynamic panel specification: 
ititkikitkikitiiit XXyy    1101 )()()()(                (5.3) 
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where the number of countries is i=1, 2, …, N; the number of periods is t=1, 2, …, 
T; the number of explanatory variables is k=1, 2,…, K; yit is the dependent 
variable, i is a country-specific intercept, 1ity  is the lagged dependent variable, 
i is the parameter on the lagged dependent variable, (Xk)it is a set of K 
explanatory variables in period t, 1,)( tikX  is a set of K explanatory variables in 
period (t-1), ik 0)( and ik 1)( are parameters on the current and lagged values of 
the set of K explanatory variables, respectively and it is the error term. 
We re-parameterise equation (5.3) so as to derive a formulation in which the long-
run equilibrium appears explicitly as a so-called error correction term (Box  5.1 
provides the algebra to support the derivation of this equation):  
  ititkikitkkiiitiit XXyy    )()()( 0101           (5.4) 
where ity  is the first difference of the dependent variable, )1( ii   is the 
error-correction parameter, 1ity  is the lagged dependent variable, 
i
i
i
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0
is a 
country-specific constant, 
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)()( 10  are parameters on the K lagged 
explanatory variables, 0)( ik  are parameters on the differenced explanatory 
variables, (Xk)it-1 is a set of K lagged explanatory variables, while Δ(Xk)it is a set of 
differenced explanatory variables and it  
is the error term assumed to be 
independently and identically distributed across countries and time and 
uncorrelated with the regressors.  
The first part of this EC specification,  101 )(   itkkiiiti Xy  , is typically 
referred to as the error correction term or mechanism. It consists of both the term 
in squared brackets,  101 )(   itkkiiit Xy  , which measures disequilibrium from 
the long-run relationship, and the above defined error correction 
parameter, i ,which measures the extent to which any such disequilibrium in the 
previous period gives rise to equilibrating adjustment in Yit via current-period 
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changes in ity . One would expect i  to be statistically significant and negative, 
if the variables exhibit a return to the long-run equilibrium, i.e. if they are 
cointegrated. In our case this would mean that any deviation of actual government 
expenditure from the value predicted by the long-run relationship with the 
hypothesised explanatory variables triggers a change in the opposite direction. By 
definition, if Yit and (Xk)it are cointegrated then their linear combination in the 
square brackets is stationary. Hence, in this case, all the terms in equation (5.4) 
are stationary, and the problem of spurious regression is avoided. The parameters 
on the differenced explanatory variables, 0)( ik  
are impact multipliers (short-run 
effects) that measure the immediate impact that a change in (Xk)it will have on a 
change in Yit. Since we are primarily interested in the nature of the long-run 
relationship between the size of government and a set of explanatory variables, 
the estimated long-run parameters,

ki , and the estimated speed of adjustment 
towards the long-run relation, 

i , constitute the main coefficients of interest.  
The dependent variable in our model is the share of government expenditure in 
GDP (Git), while the set of explanatory variables includes: GDP per capita 
(GDPit), age dependency ratio (DEPit), share of financial sector (FINCit), trade 
openness (OPTit), financial openness (OPFit), relative prices (RPit), rate of 
unemployment (UNEMPit), trade union density (UNIONit), share of general 
government employment (GEMPit), revenue decentralisation (DECit), a shift 
dummy for financial crisis (DCRit), and political orientation (POLit). All the 
explanatory variables, except for the crisis dummy, are measured in logarithms. 
They are all discussed in detail in the previous section and presented in Table 5.1. 
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Box  5.1: EC-reparameterisation of the first-order ARDL model  
The first-order ARDL dynamic panel specification takes the following form:   
ititkikitkikitiiit XXyy    1101 )()()()(  
(5.3) 
In order to derive a more useful formulation of this ARDL model, namely, the error 
correction form, we rearrange Equation (5.3) through the following steps:  
First, we subtract yit-1 from both the left- and right-hand side of equation (5.3):  
ititkikitkikitiiitit XXyyy    11011 )()()()()1(  
(5.3a) 
Second, we simultaneously subtract and add 10 )()( itkik X from the right-hand side of 
equation (5.3a): 
ititkikitkikitkikitkikitiiit XXXXyy    11101001 )()()()()()()()()1(  
    ititkikikitkitkikitiiit XXXyy    110101 )()()()()()()1(    (5.3b) 
Next, we factor out )1( i , i.e., )1( i  and rearrange (5.3b), so that: 
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In what follows we substitute:  
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in equation (5.3c), to finally obtain the error correction form of (5.3): 
  ititkikitkkiiitiit XXyy    )()()( 0101   (5.4) 
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The idea underlying the Pesaran et al. (1999) PMG estimation is that the long-run 
parameters are common across countries ( kki   , i=1, 2,…, N), while the error 
correction coefficients (the speed of adjustment) and the short-run parameters are 
free to vary. To estimate the parameters consistently using the PMG estimation 
process, Pesaran et al. (1999) suggest a maximum likelihood estimator. In this 
approach, as intuitively explained by Fayad (2010), the parameters of interest 
(long-run coefficients and speed of adjustment) are obtained by maximizing a 
concentrated log-likelihood function of the panel data model (defined as the 
product of the likelihoods of each group). Starting with an initial estimate of the 
long-run homogenous parameters (such as static fixed effects), estimates of the 
error-correction coefficients i  and the short-run coefficients are computed (also 
through maximum likelihood) as the averages of the estimated i  and short-run 
parameters for each country. These average estimates can then be used to obtain 
an updated estimate of the long-run parameters. The same process is repeated 
until convergence is achieved.  
To implement the PMG technique on the data set at hand, we use the Stata user-
written xtpmg command (Blackburne and Frank, 2007).  
At this point, we refer to the issue of potential endogeneity bias affecting some of 
the right-hand side variables. As already pointed out, it could be argued that GDP 
per capita, the degree of unionisation and the share of public sector employment 
might be endogenous. However, the presence of endogenous regressors seems not 
to be a cause for concern in estimation of the long-run parameters in the context 
of ARDL modelling. Pesaran et al. (1999) and Pesaran and Shin (1997) point out 
that augmenting the ARDL specification with an adequate number of lags makes 
the estimation of the long-run coefficients immune to endogeneity problems, 
irrespective of whether the regressors are stationary or not. Appropriate 
modification of the orders of the ARDL model seems to be sufficient to 
simultaneously correct for residual serial correlation and the problem of 
potentially endogenous regressors. Following these references, in applied work 
researchers tend to handle the problem of endogeneity of an independent variable 
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by adding sufficiently many lags of that independent variable; for instance, Fayad 
(2010) and Loayza and Ranciere (2005). Our intuitive interpretation as to how 
adding a sufficient number of lags of potentially endogenous variables could 
overcome the problem of endogeneity, is quite straightforward. If, for example, 
the potentially endogenous relationship between two variables reflected 
simultaneity - as might be suspected between, say, the share of government 
expenditures and the share of public sector employment - then, using annual data, 
it is most likely that current values of the share of public sector employment 
depend on the current values of the share of government. If we take one lag of the 
share of public sector employment, it is still plausible to argue that lagged share of 
public sector employment is causing the current value of the share of government 
expenditures, while it is less plausible to argue that current shares of government 
expenditures are driving lagged values of the share of public sector employment. 
Indeed, the deeper the lag, the more attenuated is any possible connection. Hence, 
in our investigation the current government expenditure shares are not assumed to 
influence lags - especially deeper lags - of the potentially endogenous variables.  
Apart from dealing with the problem of potential endogeneity, another major 
advantage of the estimator developed by Pesaran et al. (1999) is that it yields 
consistent and asymptotically normal estimates of the parameters defining a long-
run relationship between both stationary and integrated variables; hence, there is 
no requirement for the order of integration to be the same for all the variables 
(Pesaran and Shin, 1997). Accordingly, this estimator does not necessarily require 
preliminary tests for the presence of unit roots in the variables. Whether 
regressors are stationary or follow a unit root process, Pesaran et al. (1999) 
demonstrates the consistency of the PMG estimator in each case. Nonetheless, for 
a better appreciation of the variables used in the model, in Appendix 2.2 we test 
the variables for the presence of a unit root. In general, the results suggest that 
most variables are nonstationary or, more precisely, integrated of order one.  
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5.5.4 Results 
When deciding on the appropriate order of the ARDL model in practice, a 
researcher has to balance between allowing for a sufficiently long lag length on 
explanatory variables (particularly those assumed to be potentially endogenous) 
while preserving sufficient degrees of freedom. In general, the Pesaran et al. 
(1999) estimation technique is quite demanding with respect to degrees of 
freedom, and this can be problematic when the number of explanatory variables is 
large compared to the time-series dimension, as in our case.  
As a starting point, we estimate the first-order ARDL model, as specified in 
equation (5.3), with all the variables included. This specification includes no 
additional lags for the potentially endogenous variables, and as such it is not the 
preferred one. Nonetheless, we report the findings in Table A.2.3 in Appendix 2.4, 
and briefly comment on those coefficients which appear to be statistically 
significant at conventional levels of statistical significance. In line with our a 
priori expectations are the estimated long-run coefficients on the financial sector 
shares (lnFINC), trade openness (lnOPT), financial openness (lnOPF), 
unemployment (lnUNEMP), government sector employment (lnGEMP) and 
financial crisis (DCR) variable. The negative sign on the age dependency ratio 
(lnDEP), relative prices (lnRP) and trade union density (lnUNION) variables are 
opposite to our expectations. Those short-run coefficients which turn out to be 
statistically significant are also economically sensible, suggesting a negative 
effect of GDP and a positive effect of government sector employment in the short-
run. In addition to the fact that this specification does not adequately address the 
problem of endogenity, a finding that the two most prominent theories of the size 
of government in the economy - Wagner‟s Law and Baumol‟s cost disease - either 
have no significant effect (Wagner‟s Law) or have an effect of the opposite sign to 
a priori expectations (Baumol‟s cost disease) casts doubt on the tested 
specification.  
In an attempt to reach a preferred specification, we add an additional lag for each 
of the three potentially endogenous variables; namely, for the income variable 
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(lnGDP), trade union density (lnUNION) and government sector employment 
shares (lnGEMP). Given that our data is annual and that the number of regressors 
is relatively large compared to the time-series dimension, our judgement was that 
one additional lag for the potentially endogeneous variables is a fair compromise 
to reconcile the problem of loss of degrees of freedom when including too many 
lags and loss of consistency when including insufficient lags. Unfortunately, our 
attempt to obtain the PMG estimates of this specification rendered the estimator 
unable to iterate to a solution
49
. Apparently, having a relatively large number of 
regressors on the right-hand side makes the model difficult to estimate by PMG. 
To overcome such estimation constraints, we closely examine which of the 
included variables is most “incompatible” with PMG estimation. To support our 
choice on a variable to be excluded from the model, at the same time we also re-
estimate the model by the less precise, but more simple and flexible, dynamic 
fixed effects (DFE) estimation technique
50
. It turns out that, unlike the DFE 
results, the PMG results are quite sensitive sensible to inclusion/exclusion of the 
age dependency ratio (lnDEP) variable. Apart from being unsatisfactory on the 
theoretical level, as discussed in section 5.2.1, this variable seems to be 
problematic in practice as well. Hence, in the preferred model, we exclude the age 
dependency ratio variable. Upon the exclusion of the dependency ratio variable, 
the statistical significance of the remaining variables improved substantially, and 
we also gained more opportunity to experiment with deeper lags of the potentially 
endogenous variables, which is important in terms of addressing the problem of 
endogeneity.  
Table 5.3 presents the PMG estimates of our preferred specification. This 
specification addresses the problem of endogeneity by including an additional lag 
                                                 
49
 After a large number of iterations, the software used for estimation, Stata10, would issue a 
notification that the Hessian Matrix has become unstable or asymmetric, suggesting that we have 
issued a matrix command attempting a matrix operation that, were it carried out, would result in a 
matrix with missing values. 
50
 We do not report the DFE results here, since reporting all these auxiliary results would lead us 
too far off track. We report the DFE estimation results in the subsequent section on robustness 
checks. Here, we want to emphasise that, in the context of DFE results, exclusion of the 
(statistically insignificant) dependency ratio variable generally left the results unaffected. 
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for the potentially endogenous variables. For the above explained reasons, it does 
not include the age dependency ratio variable.  
Table 5.3: The PMG estimates of the preferred specification (dependent variable ΔlnG)  
 
Variable 
 
Preferred specification 
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lnGDP -0.253*** (0.000) 
lnFINC 1.148*** (0.000) 
lnOPT 0.541*** (0.000) 
lnOPF -0.278*** (0.000) 
lnRP 0.853*** (0.000) 
lnUNEMP -0.051*** (0.000) 
lnUNION -0.007 (0.827) 
lnGEMP 0.522*** (0.000) 
lnDEC 0.091*** (0.000) 
lnPOL 0.005*** (0.002) 
DCR -0.006 (0.146) 
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ΔlnGDP -0.391 (0.133) 
ΔlnGDP (-1) -0.192 (0.695) 
ΔlnFINC -0.047 (0.743) 
ΔlnOPT -0.096** (0.049) 
ΔlnOPF 0.039 (0.281) 
ΔlnRP -0.242 (0.589) 
ΔlnUNEMP 0.084* (0.073) 
ΔlnUNION -0.587 (0.315) 
ΔlnUNION (-1) -0.059 (0.693) 
ΔlnGEMP 0.704*** (0.002) 
ΔlnGEMP (-1) -0.061 (0.712) 
ΔlnDEC 0.017 (0.712) 
ΔlnPOL -0.011 (0.170) 
ΔDCR -0.002 (0.381) 
 Constant -0.165** (0.015) 
 EC coefficient -0.202** (0.018) 
 No of obs 435 
Notes: A country-specific constant term is included. Numbers reported in parentheses are p-values. 
*, ** and *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent, respectively. Δ denotes first 
differences, while (-1) denotes the first lag. LnGDP is the logarithm of GDP per capita; lnFINC is 
the logarithm of value added in banks, insurance, real estate and other business services as a share 
of  total value added; lnOPT is the logarithm of trade openness; lnOPF is the logarithm of de facto 
financial openness; lnRP is the logarithm of relative prices;  lnUNEMP is the logarithm of 
unemployment rates; lnGEMP is the logarithm of general government employment shares in total 
employment; lnDEC is the logarithm of revenue decentralisation; lnUNION is the logarithm of 
trade union density; lnPOL is the logarithm of the political character of government; and DCR is a 
dummy variable for financial crisis. 
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The results indicate firstly that, as expected, the error correction coefficient is 
negative and statistically significant. This important finding suggests that there is 
a strong, statistically highly significant, cointegrating relationship between the 
size of government in the economy and the determinants identified in the model. 
The evidence that there exists an adjustment mechanism implies, by definition, 
that there must be a long-run equilibrium relationship between the variables
51
. 
Quantitatively, the estimated error correction coefficient implies that 
approximately 20 percent of any discrepancy from the value predicted by the 
long-run relationship with the hypothesised explanatory variables is corrected 
each year. This is a long adjustment process; and thus consistent with our 
assumption of a high degree of persistence in government expenditures. A simple 
calculation reveals that it takes, ceteris paribus, around 6 years, 8 years and 10 
years to accomplish 50 percent, 75 percent and 100 percent of total adjustment, 
respectively.  
The coefficient on the income variable (lnGDP) is statistically significant and 
negative, suggesting that, ceteris paribus, as GDP per capita rises so the share of 
government in GDP declines. As such, this finding does not lend support to 
Wagner‟s income-elasticity proposition for the increasing shares of government in 
the economy. It could be the case that Wagner‟s Law was indeed operative 
throughout the late 19
th
 and early 20
th
 century when most countries were in the 
process of transforming their economies from rural agricultural to urban industrial 
and when state involvement in the economy was in its infancy, only just 
beginning to take off. At that time, the state was already spending on “traditional” 
public goods and services such as defence, law and order etc., but with their basic 
needs met, people started to demand “newer” functions such as a good education 
system, pensions and comfortable retirement for the elderly, infrastructure, health 
care, social security net etc. In Wagner‟s time, the marginal benefit of increase in 
government expenditures would have been very high, as it started from low initial 
                                                 
51
 In the literature this argument is known as Granger‟s Representation Theorem: Engle and 
Granger (1987) show that if the variables are cointegrated then there must exist an ECM; and, 
conversely, that an ECM generates a cointegrated series (Harris and Sollis, 2003).  
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levels. It could be argued that, following the law of diminishing marginal utility, 
at a later stage of development, an additional “unit” of government-provided 
goods and services may have started adding less and less additional utility. In 
section 5.5.5 we use our empirical estimates to demonstrate that, ceteris paribus, 
in our sample period, government-provided goods and services are normal rather 
than luxury goods. It should also be emphasised that for Wagner the growing role 
of the state in the late nineteenth century was a desirable course of action, a view 
he shared with a number of other German and European intellectuals of the time. 
It could be the case that an explanation for the estimated negative relationship 
between the national income per capita and the size of government fits with 
supply-side ideology that the size of government in the economy is “too large”, a 
view which was prevalent during much of our sample period.  
As for another “Wagnerian” variable, a positive and statistically significant 
coefficient on the share of value added in banks, insurance, real estate and other 
business services in total value added (lnFINC) indicates that people demand 
larger public sectors as market and legal relationships become more complex, 
which is in line with Wagner‟s modernisation hypothesis.  
The results suggest that both aspects of a country‟s openness - the trade openness 
(lnOPT) and financial openness (lnOPF) - exert a statistically significant effect on 
the size of government in the economy. The positive coefficient on the trade 
openness variable is in accordance with Rodrik (1998) and other proponents of the 
compensation hypothesis, confirming that people rely on the government to 
stabilise the economy and offset external risk. We also tried to test whether this 
effect is stronger if a country experiences a higher external risk by introducing an 
interaction term between the trade openness variable and the variability of the 
terms-of-trade, but this proved to be computationally burdensome within the PMG 
estimation framework. Somewhat smaller, but also statistically significant is the 
negative effect of a country‟s financial openness. This finding is in accordance 
with arguments made by proponents of the efficiency hypothesis. They argue that 
more competitive deregulation and greater competition for mobile international 
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factors shrinks the size of government in the economy. Alternatively, to check the 
robustness of this negative effect of financial openness, we replaced the Lane and 
Milesi-Ferretti (2007) de facto indicator of financial openness by the Dennis 
Quinn (1997) de jure indicator, but yet again the software issued a warning that 
the computations are inoperable.    
A positive and statistically significant coefficient on the relative price variable 
(lnRP) is an indication that Baumol‟s “cost disease” is an empirically valid 
explanation for the increasing size of government in the economy. Indirectly, this 
result confirms that productivity growth in the government sector is inherently 
slower compared to the private sector. The unbalanced productivity growth 
between technologically progressive industries and the productivity-lagging 
government sector, accompanied by homogenous wage setting across all sectors 
in the economy, results in increased costs and prices of government services. 
Given the price-inelastic nature of demand for government services, an increase in 
relative prices of government services, ceteris paribus, increases the relative size 
of government in the economy. In section 5.5.5, we demonstrate that our results 
are consistent with Baumol‟s assumption that demand for government services is 
price inelastic. 
The long-run effect of unemployment (lnUNEMP) is statistically significant but 
negative, thus not in line with our a priori expectations. Intuitively, we 
hypothesised that, in the longer run, a positive effect of unemployment on the size 
of government could be assumed through a kind of hysteresis effect, whereby 
episodes of high unemployment lead to successively higher levels of 
unemployment benefits and more government expenditure in the economy, other 
things equal. This hypothesised positive effect is not supported by the data at 
hand. The data do support, however, that the short-run effect of unemployment is, 
as hypothesised, positive and statistically significant at the 10 percent level of 
significance. This suggests that unemployment induces a counter-cyclical reaction 
by governments in the short run.  
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From a statistical point of view, trade union density (lnUNION) has no significant 
effect on the size of government in the economy. We note that the coefficient on 
this variable is not estimated with much precision: the standard errors are rather 
large in relation to the coefficient estimates; hence, it makes little sense to 
comment on the sign of the effect of this variable.   
In line with our expectations, a statistically significant and positive coefficient on 
government sector employment (lnGEMP) suggests that government sector 
employees exert a positive effect on the size of government in the economy. 
Aiming at maximising the impact of their actions, government sector employees 
will protect and promote their interests in big government. 
As for the effect of revenue decentralisation (lnDEC) on the total size of 
government in the economy, the results suggest that this effect is positive and 
statistically significant. Accordingly, one could expect a country‟s revenue 
decentralisation to increase the total government size in the economy. This finding 
contradicts the Leviathan hypothesis that fiscal decentralization is a viable means 
of lowering, or controlling, the extent of total governmental activity. Instead, our 
finding lends support to alternative channels of influence suggesting that in 
fiscally decentralised systems people demand more publicly provided goods and 
services since, on the sub-central level, these can better be tailored to their needs. 
It is also possible that many tiers of government imply more access points and 
politicians willing to answer to special interest groups demanding more 
government expenditures. 
For the reasons explained previously in Chapter 1, we would not be surprised to 
find that the effect of the government political orientation on the size of 
government is insignificant. Nonetheless, the results indicate that this effect is 
relatively small but still statistically significant. A positive sign of the coefficient 
on this variable (lnPOL) suggest that left-oriented governments are more likely to 
resort to higher levels of expenditure than are more conservative, right-oriented 
governments.  
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Finally, the findings suggest that the long-run effect of financial crises (DCR) on 
the size of government is negative, thus, opposite to our a priori expectations. 
However, from a statistical point of view, this effect is insignificant. 
5.5.5 Robustness checks  
Although we presented and discussed the preferred results in the previous section,    
in this section we check whether the obtained results are robust with regard to 
different specifications and to an alternative estimation technique. The main 
purpose of this part of the research is to confirm the consistency of the sign, size 
and statistical significance of the core determinants of the size of government in 
the economy using a battery of robustness checks. In addition, we check the 
consistency of our empirical results with the implications of our theoretical 
reasoning set out in Chapter 4.  
As already pointed out, our preferred specification both delivers economically 
sensible results and accounts for the problem of endogeneity by including an 
additional lag for each of the three potentially endogenous variables. Without 
clear theoretical or statistical guidance on the appropriate lag length for the three 
potentially endogenous variables, we believe that including a one extra lag for 
each such variable is a reasonable choice. To make sure that the results are not an 
artefact of our judgement, we test whether imposing different lag lengths for 
potentially endogenous variables significantly changes the preferred results.  
We first re-estimate the preferred model by excluding all of the originally added 
lags for the potentially endogenous variables (results reported in panel A of Table 
A.2.4 in Appendix 2.4). Long-run coefficients which remain consistent with the 
preferred specification in terms of the sign and statistical significance are: the 
share of financial sector services (lnFINC), financial openness (lnOPF), relative 
prices (lnRP) and government sector employment (lnGEMP). Coefficients on the 
income variable (lnGDP), trade openness variable (lnOPT) and unemployment 
(lnUNEMP), retain the same sign, but lose their statistical significance, while 
coefficients on trade union density (lnUNION), fiscal decentralisation (lnDEC), 
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the political character of governments (lnPOL) and the crisis dummy (DCR) 
change both sign and statistical significance. We emphasis, however, that the 
results of this specification should be treated cautiously, since this specification 
does not address appropriately the potential problem of endogeneity (given that it 
does not include any additional lags for the potentially endogenous variables).     
To further check the robustness of our findings, we again re-estimate the preferred 
model by including an additional lag for the income variable in the preferred 
specification. The results are reported in panel B of Table A.2.4 in Appendix 2.4. 
Upon the inclusion of this additional lag, most of the results remained consistent 
with the results of the preferred specification. The difference is that the coefficient 
on the unemployment (lnUNEMP) changed its sign, while remaining statistically 
significant. Also, in this particular specification, the effect of the trade union 
density (lnUNION) and of the financial crisis (DCR) variables gain statistical 
significance. In a further robustness check, we re-estimate the preferred model 
without the originally added lag for the government sector employment variable 
and report the results in panel C of Table A.2.4 in Appendix 2.4. Again, this 
alternative specification generally left the results unaffected, except for the effect 
of trade unions (lnUNION) which turned positive, but remained statistically 
insignificant. Finally, we re-estimate the preferred model in such way that we add 
an extra lag for the income variable and exclude the originally added lags for both 
trade union density and government sector employment shares. The results are 
given in panel D of Table A.2.4 in Appendix 2.4. In this specification, the 
unemployment (lnUNEMP) variable lost its statistical significance, while the 
effect of trade union density (lnUNION) variable changed its sign to positive. The 
other results remained the same as in the preferred specification.  
In general, sensitivity checks with regard to different lag lengths of the potentially 
endogenous variables suggest that some preferred results are more robust than 
others. Some inconsistencies between the results of the preferred specification and 
alternative ones are found for the unemployment (lnUNEMP), trade union density 
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(lnUNION), fiscal decentralisation (lnDEC), the political character of 
governments (lnPOL) and fiscal crisis (DCR) variables.  
A further set of robustness tests aims at checking the consistency of the preferred 
results with respect to inclusion/exclusion of some variables. In fact, in what 
follows, through a “testing down” procedure, we hope to define a set of core 
determinants of the size of government that remain stable in terms of sign and size 
and that are generally statistically significant throughout various specifications.  
On the grounds that it is statistically (highly) insignificant as well as economically 
dubious, from the preferred model we first take out the trade union density 
variable (lnUNION) and instead include the age dependency ratio variable 
(lnDEP). We briefly remind readers that the age dependency ratio variable proved 
to be problematic when we wanted to estimate the preferred specification (the one 
which addresses the problem of endogeneity), thus we excluded it from the 
preferred specification. However, unless we encounter some computational 
difficulties again, we do not exclude the age dependency ratio variable from this 
set of robustness checks. The estimation results, given in panel A of Table A.2.5 
in Appendix 2.4, are pretty much in line with the results of the preferred 
specification. However, fiscal decentralisation (lnDEC) changes sign and remains 
statistically significant. The coefficient on the political character of government 
(lnPOL) remains of the same size, but changes both its sign and statistical 
significance. Finally, the coefficient on the financial crisis dummy (DCR) remains 
statistically insignificant. We note that, in this specification, the coefficient on the 
age dependency ration (lnDEP) is negative, thus the opposite of our a priori 
expectations, and statistically significant. Yet, in a further step, on the basis of its 
repeated statistical insignificance, we take out the crisis dummy variable (DCR), 
re-estimate the model and present the results in panel B of Table A.2.5 in 
Appendix 2.4. The findings are encouraging in the sense that most variables 
remain robust compared to the results of the preferred specification. However, the 
fiscal decentralisation (lnDEC) remains of the sign opposite to the one it had in 
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the preferred model, while the effect of the political character of the government 
(lnPOL) remains statistically insignificant.  
In general, taking into consideration robustness checks in relation to both different 
lag lengths of the potentially endogenous variables and the testing down 
procedure, we conclude that the estimated effects of some variables are more 
robust than others. The robustness checks suggest that the core determinants 
which robustly determine the government expenditure shares are: real GDP per 
capita (lnGDP); the share of value added in banks, insurance, real estate and other 
business services in total value added (lnFINC); trade openness (lnOPT); financial 
openness (lnOPF); relative prices (lnRP); and general government employment 
shares in total employment (lnGEMP). Quantitatively, the effect of those variables 
of the size of government can be summarised as follows.  
Focusing on the preferred set of results presented in Table 5.3, we find that the 
coefficient on the income variable is statistically significant and negative, 
suggesting that, ceteris paribus, a doubling of GDP per capita reduces the share of 
government in GDP by 25.3 percent in the long run
52
. The coefficient on the 
financial sector variable suggests that the complexity of economic system has a 
positive and highly significant effect on the size of government. This coefficient is 
larger in magnitude compared to the income coefficient (in fact, compared to all 
other coefficients), and suggests that a 10 percent increase in the shares of value 
added in banks, insurance, real estate and other business services in total value 
added increases, ceteris paribus, increases the share of government in GDP by 
11.5 percent in the long run. Coefficients on both the trade and financial openness 
are highly statistically significant. The size of the effect of trade openness is 
somewhat larger, suggesting that a 10 percent increase in a country‟s share of 
imports and exports in GDP, ceteris paribus, leads to an increase in the size of 
government in the economy by 5.41 percent. The same increase in a country‟s de 
                                                 
52
 We note that regression coefficients are partial derivatives; hence, strictly speaking, they apply 
to the effect of small changes only. However, when used to illustrate the quantitative or economic 
significance of regression results, they are often used to indicate orders of magnitude of the effects 
of larger changes. 
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facto financial openness, ceteris paribus, reduces the share of government in GDP 
by 2.78 percent in the long run. As assumed by Baumol (1967), an increase in the 
relative prices of government to private goods increases the size of government in 
the economy in the long run. Quantitatively, the results suggest that a 10 percent 
increase in the relative prices, ceteris paribus, leads to an increase in the share of 
government in GDP by 8.53 percent in the long run. Finally, the estimated 
coefficient on the share of government sector employment in total employment 
indicates that a doubling of this share would increase, ceteris paribus, the total 
government expenditures in GDP by 52.2 percent in the long run. 
At this point, we demonstrate that the estimated coefficients on the income and 
price variables are economically sensible and wholly consistent with the 
downwardly sloping demand function developed in Chapter 4. Given that the 
dependent variable in our empirical model is the share of government 
expenditures in GDP, we cannot interpret the estimated coefficients on income 
and price variables directly as income and price elasticities of demand for (real) 
government services, which is the dependent variable in our theoretical model. 
Instead, to arrive at such elasticities, we transform a stylised version of our 
estimated model. We start from our equation (5.5), which is the equation we 
estimate in this chapter (for convenience, we focus only on the income and 
relative price variables and time subscripts are omitted). 
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where G denotes (nominal) government expenditures, GDP denotes gross 
domestic product, RP denotes the relative price of government goods and 
services, S denotes the quantity of government goods and services,   is a 
constant,  is the estimated coefficient on the relative price variable,   is the 
estimated coefficient on the income variable and u is the error term. We rearrange 
equation (5.5) into the final equation (5.7), and demonstrate that the income 
elasticity of demand for government services is our estimated coefficient on the 
income variable ( ) plus one. Hence, the income elasticity of demand in our case, 
using the estimated coefficient in income reported in Table 5.3, is calculated to be 
(-0.253 + 1) = 0.75 (rounded). In other words, government services are a normal 
good for which demand is income inelastic (i.e., increases in demand for 
government goods and services are positive but less than proportionate with 
respect to increases in income). Following equation (5.7), the price elasticity of 
demand is the estimated coefficient on the relative price variable (  ) minus one. 
Hence, following our reported estimates, the price elasticity of demand is (0.853 - 
1) = - 0.15 (rounded). This negative price elasticity of demand for government 
goods and services is consistent both with our theoretical model in Chapter 4 and 
with Baumol‟s assumption that demand for government services is price-inelastic. 
As hypothesised in our theoretical model, our empirical results implicitly indicate 
that the demanded quantity of government goods and services falls as their 
relative price rises, while the demand curve shifts to the right as income increases. 
Interpreted directly, the coefficients estimated in our empirical model suggest that 
- ceteris paribus - the share of government in the economy, as a consequence of 
Baumol‟s cost disease, rises along with the relative price of government services. 
On the other hand, the weight of government in the economy is expected to 
decline as a country gets wealthier.  
As a part of the robustness check results, it is important to note that the error 
correction coefficient is consistent throughout all specifications - it remains 
negative, roughly of the same size and statistically highly significant. This 
confirms that the model consistently captures the presence of a long-run 
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cointegrating relationship between the government share and the various 
explanatory variables.  
As a final robustness check, we also estimate the preferred specification by a 
simpler estimation technique; namely, we estimate the preferred model by the 
dynamic fixed effects (DFE) technique. As already pointed out, with well over 30 
time series observations, a DFE model might also give reasonable results. The 
fixed effects estimator, compared to the PMG estimator, is more restrictive since 
it assumes that all the coefficients are the same across countries. This, according 
to Pesaran and Smith (1995) and Pesaran et al. (1999), is its main drawback. The 
main advantage of this approach, on the other hand, lies in its simplicity. Unlike 
the PMG estimation technique, the DFE technique is widely used in practice and 
its characteristics are much better understood. In what follows, we estimate the 
preferred model using the DFE approach. In addition, drawing on the flexibility of 
this approach we make some changes to the model which, due to computational 
difficulties, proved to be inoperable within the PMG framework.  
Table 5.4 presents the DFE results for our preferred specification, both with and 
without the age dependency variable. To retrieve the DFE estimates, we used the 
Stata user-written xtpmg command (Blackburne and Frank, 2007), which 
incorporates also the dynamic fixed effects estimators
53
. 
According to the DFE results of the preferred model (without the age dependency 
variable), reported in the first panel of Table 5.4, the effects of GDP per capita 
(lnGDP), share of financial sector services (lnFINC), relative prices (lnRP) and 
shares of government sector employment (lnGEMP) remain consistent with the 
preferred PMG results. Contrary to the PMG results, the effect of both trade 
(lnOPT) and financial openness (lnOPF) now lose their statistical significance. 
Since the DFE estimation technique is computationally less demanding than the 
PMG estimation, the software reported no obstacles when we wanted to replace 
                                                 
53
 In fact, a closer examination revealed that the xtmpg(dfe) command is simply a wrapper for 
Stata‟s fe and nlcom command. Stata‟s user written nlcom command computes straightforwardly 
the long-run effects as nonlinear functions of the coefficients on the explanatory variables and the 
lagged dependent variable along with their standard errors.  
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the Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007) de facto indicator of financial openness by the 
Dennis Quinn (1997) de jure indicator. 
Table 5.4: Dynamic fixed effects (DFE) estimates (dependent variable ΔlnG)   
 Variable 
Preferred specification 
(without the age dependency 
variable) 
Preferred specification 
(with the age dependency 
variable) 
L
o
n
g
-r
u
n
 c
o
ef
fi
ci
en
ts
 
lnGDP -0.361** (0.012) -0.394** (0.028) 
lnDEP - - -0.077 (0.780) 
lnFINC 0.246* (0.095) 0.214 (0.180) 
lnOPT -0.047 (0.592) -0.037 (0.671) 
lnOPF -0.045 (0.327) -0.037 (0.421) 
lnRP 0.368** (0.033) 0.397** (0.024) 
lnUNEMP 0.001 (0.970) 0.002 (0.964) 
lnUNION -0.075 (0.292) -0.077 (0.274) 
lnGEMP 0.414*** (0.000) 0.436*** (0.000) 
lnDEC -0.031 (0.156) -0.039 (0.101) 
lnPOL -0.027 (0.176) -0.025 (0.199) 
DCR 0.043 (0.392) 0.049 (0.387) 
S
h
o
t-
ru
n
 c
o
ef
fi
ci
en
ts
 
ΔlnGDP -1.101*** (0.000)  -1.078*** (0.000) 
ΔlnGDP (-1) -0.041 (0.750) -0.023 (0.857) 
ΔlnDEP - - 0.223 (0.447) 
ΔlnFINC 0.119** (0.054) 0.122* (0.051) 
ΔlnOPT -0.066*** (0.046) -0.069** (0.040) 
ΔlnOPF 0.069*** (0.001) 0.070*** (0.001) 
ΔlnRP 0.104 (0.311) 0.099 (0.338) 
ΔlnUNEMP -0.029 (0.102) -0.027 (0.139) 
ΔlnUNION 0.069 (0.388) 0.064 (0.426) 
ΔlnUNION (-1) -0.024 (0.758) -0.024 (0.764) 
ΔlnGEMP 0.375*** (0.000) 0.379*** (0.000) 
ΔlnGEMP (-1) -0.066 (0.512) -0.060 (0.554) 
ΔlnDEC -0.011 (0.300) -0.010 (0.350) 
ΔlnPOL 0.002 (0.709) 0.002 (0.728) 
ΔDCR 0.008 (0.726) 0.007 (0.753) 
 Constant 1.337*** (0.000) 1.496*** (0.006) 
 EC coefficient -0.218*** (0.000) -0.220*** (0.000) 
 No of obs 456 454 
 Notes: A country-specific constant term is included. Numbers reported in parentheses are p-
values. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent, respectively. Δ denote first 
differences, (-1) and (-2) denote the first and second lag, respectively. LnGDP is the logarithm of 
GDP per capita; lnDEP is the logarithm of the age dependency ratio; lnFINC is the logarithm of 
value added in banks, insurance, real estate and other business services as a share of  total value 
added; lnOPT is the logarithm of trade openness; lnOPF is the logarithm of de facto financial 
openness; lnRP is the logarithm of relative prices;  lnUNEMP is the logarithm of unemployment 
rates; lnGEMP is the logarithm of general government employment shares in total employment; 
lnDEC is the logarithm of revenue decentralisation; lnUNION is the logarithm of trade union 
density; lnPOL is the logarithm of the political character of government; and DCR is a dummy 
variable for financial crisis. 
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The obtained results (not reported) suggest that even when measured by the de 
jure indicator (lnOPFQ), the effect of financial openness remains negative but 
statistically insignificant. We made use of the computational flexibility of the 
DFE estimation technique also to test the relevance of an interaction term between 
the trade openness variable and the variability of the terms-of-trade, but it proved 
to be statistically insignificant (not reported). As for the remaining DFE results, 
the long-run effect of unemployment (lnUNEMP), decentralisation (lnDEC) and 
political orientation (lnPOL) lose statistical significance compared to their PMG 
counterparts. Finally, the long-run effect of financial crisis (DCR) remains 
statistically insignificant.  
Upon the inclusion of the age dependency variable (lnDEP), the results reported 
in Table 5.4 remain almost unchanged. The estimated coefficients preserve the 
same signs and virtually the same sizes. This is an encouraging finding, 
supporting our decision to exclude the age dependency variable from the preferred 
specification when estimated by the computationally more demanding PMG 
approach. Apparently, in the DFE framework, it makes little difference to the 
results whether this variable is included or not. At conventional levels of 
significance, the only variable that loses its statistical significance is the share of 
financial sector services (lnFINC), but this variable displayed only borderline 
significant even in the specification without the age dependency variable. The 
effect of GDP per capita (lnGDP) remains negative and statistically significant. 
Statistically significant and positive remain also the effects of relative prices 
(lnRP) and government employment (lnGEMP). The effect of the age dependency 
variable is statistically insignificant. Finally, the error correction coefficient 
remains almost identical when compared to the specification without the age 
dependency variable, whether estimated by DFE or PMG.  
As a final robustness check, we want to make sure that our results remain 
consistent if we change the sample size, in particular, if we include the transitional 
countries from the list of the examined counties.  
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In order to do this, we first exclude the two variables for which we have the most 
missing observations (those two are fiscal decentralisation (lnDEC) and share of 
government sector employment in total employment (lnGEMP)). This results in a 
model with the maximum possible number of observations and maximum number 
of countries. In other words, by dropping those two variables, we manage to 
retrieve the observations for the transitional and some other countries, which 
were, due to missing observations for lnDEC and lnGEMP, automatically 
excluded from the sample
54
. The results are reported in panel A of Table A.2.6 in 
Appendix 2.4. Compared to the DFE results from our preferred model (without 
the age dependency ratio), the long-run estimated coefficients on the share of 
financial sector services (lnFINC) and unemployment (lnUNEMP) change 
statistical significance, so that the former becomes statistically insignificant while 
the effect of the letter becomes significant. Also, the long-run effects of crisis 
(DCR) and the political orientation of government (lnPOL) change their signs. In 
this model with the maximum number of observations, we also included the age 
dependency ratio variable, to check the consistency of the estimated results in 
relation to inclusion/exclusion of this variable. Again, the results (not reported) 
suggested that this (statistically insignificant) variable makes little difference for 
the remaining results. Next, from the model with the maximum number of 
observations, we drop the Czech Republic, Poland and the Slovak Republic from 
the sample to check whether the results have significantly changed. The results of 
estimates without the transitional countries are shown in panel B of Table A.2.6 in 
Appendix 2.4. With the exception of the long-run estimated coefficients on trade 
openness (lnOPT) and the political orientation of government (lnPOL) variables, 
which change sign but remain statistically insignificant, the estimates of the other 
parameters are quite comparable to the results obtained in the model with the 
maximum number of observations. We do note that, unfortunately, due to the 
                                                 
54
 Excluding the fiscal decentralisation and government employment shares variables, however, 
did not help in retrieving Korea in the sample. The data for this country is missing also for the 
trade openness and political orientation of the government. Accordingly, inclusion of these 
variables in our model means that the software automatically omits this country from the sample.   
187 
 
reported computational difficulties in the PMG procedure, this type of robustness 
check was possible only within the DFE approach.  
As already pointed out, Pesaran and Smith (1995) and Pesaran et al. (1999) warn 
against the use of DFE since this estimator does not allow for parameter 
heterogeneity, which, from an econometric point of view, is an important 
requirement for an estimator to be consistent. As already explained, we expect at 
least the short-run responses of the size of government to differ across the 
investigated countries. Consequently, for our research purposes, the PMG 
technique, which does not restrict the short-run coefficients to be the same across 
countries, is the preferred approach. At the other extreme is the MG estimator 
which allows for heterogeneity of both short- and long-run coefficients. As 
already explained, the MG estimator is obtained by averaging the country- 
specific time-series parameter estimates. This estimator, however, does not take 
into account that some economic conditions tend to be common across countries 
in the long run. In reality, according to Pesaran et al. (1999), there are often good 
reasons to expect that the long-run equilibrium relationships between variables are 
similar across countries. If so, the PMG estimator will bring about efficiency 
gains, since it facilitates a more accurate estimate of long-run effects while 
exploiting country-specific information on short-run coefficients. Compared to the 
PMG, the MG estimator is less restrictive, since it allows for long-run as well as 
short-run parameter heterogeneity. However, running an MG model requires 
many more degrees of freedom. The PMG estimator has the additional advantage 
over the MG estimator in that it performs well even with samples of smaller size. 
Being a simple un-weighted average of individual estimates, the MG estimates are 
likely to be less efficient and strongly affected by the presence of outliers, 
especially in samples with a small number of countries. Pesaran et al. (1999) 
actually propose a Hausman test, which reveals whether the PMG estimator 
provides a consistent and efficient estimation for the coefficients across countries. 
In essence, it tests the assumption of long-run parameter homogeneity. If this 
assumption holds, both estimators are consistent, but the PMG is more efficient 
since it exploits the common economic features across the countries. If the 
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poolability assumption is rejected by the data, the PMG, unlike the MG estimates 
are no longer consistent
55
. The test statistic is calculated as the difference between 
the two estimators and follows the 2k  distribution. Under the null that the two 
estimators are consistent but that one is efficient (i.e. the null of long-run 
parameter homogeneity) the difference between the two estimators is expected to 
be small. In our case, the long-run homogeneity restrictions are supported by the 
Hausman test results (p=0.999). In other words, the Hausman test results report 
efficiency gains from using PMG over MG estimation. This is consistent with our 
assumption that the long-run responses of the size of government to its 
determinants are not entirely heterogeneous across countries, especially given that 
we focus on a set of developed OECD countries. Again, for our research purposes, 
the PMG approach seems to be the most appropriate estimation technique. 
5.6 Conclusion  
The goal of this chapter is to test empirically the determinants of the government 
sector size in a unified specification. Analytical foundations for the testing 
specification were developed in the previous chapter and the choice of the 
determinants is guided by the relevant theoretical considerations. After deciding 
on proxies, which are assumed to correspond appropriately to their theoretical 
counterparts, and compiling a rich data set, we undertook the task of defining an 
appropriate estimation approach. Deciding on which estimation technique to use 
ultimately depends on the nature of the analysis and characteristics of the data set 
at hand. As already pointed out, the search for a preferred estimator has been quite 
challenging, partly because there is no single definitive methodology and partly 
because the estimation techniques developed for “large N, large T” panels are 
currently a developing area of research.  
                                                 
55
 Nonetheless, even if the poolability assumption is rejected by this test, Pesaran et al. (1999) and 
Arpaia and Turrini (2008) suggest that the PMG estimates may still be preferable to the MG 
estimates on the grounds of their better precision and the fact that they are less sensitive to the 
effects of outliers. 
189 
 
We estimate the preferred model specification using a dynamic panel estimation 
approach developed by Pesaran et al. (1999), which can be summarised as a panel 
error correction re-parameterisation of an autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) 
model. First and foremost, the method is chosen to be compatible with our panel 
dimensions and to provide a solution to accommodating the joint occurrence of 
dynamics and parameter heterogeneity, which are two essential issues in 
examining the long-run determinants of the size of the government sector in a 
multi-country sample. By maintaining the homogeneity restriction on the long-run 
coefficients, while at the same time allowing for heterogeneity of error-correction 
coefficients and the short-run parameters, the PMG approach combines the 
precision of pooled estimates, while attenuating the risk of inconsistency of the 
estimates associated with possible parameter heterogeneity. Also, in a 
straightforward way, it overcomes the problem of endogeneity, which otherwise 
could bias the coefficients on some of our independent variables. Another major 
advantage of the PMG estimator is that it does not require the order of integration 
to be the same for all the variables, since it yields consistent estimates of 
parameters in a long-run relationship between both stationary and integrated 
variables.  
Upon obtaining the preferred results, we undertook a series of robustness tests to 
check the consistency of those results. The results from robustness checks point to 
a final group of core variables, which seem to be consistently estimated regardless 
of modifications made to the preferred model. The findings of our research 
suggest that the core determinants of the size of government in developed market 
economies are: real GDP per capita (lnGDP); the share of value added in banks, 
insurance, real estate and other business services in total value added (lnFINC); 
trade openness (lnOPT); financial openness (lnOPF); relative prices (lnRP); and 
general government employment shares in total employment (lnGEMP).  
Qualitatively, our findings suggest that the size of government in the economy 
decreases, ceteris paribus, as a country gets wealthier and financially more open. 
Government expenditure shares, on the other hand, tend to increase, ceteris 
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paribus, as a country‟s economic system gets more complex, as a country 
increases its involvement in international trade, as a country increases the share of 
government sector employees, and as the relative prices of government to private 
goods increases.  
Another important finding is a statistically highly significant and robust error 
correction coefficient, which consistently suggests that there exists a long-run 
equilibrium relationship between government expenditures and the hypothesised 
determinants. Any deviation from the equilibrium relationship would trigger an 
adjustment process taking place over a long period, reflecting a high degree of 
inertia in government expenditure shares.  
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6.1 Introduction  
The relevant figures suggest that the government sector in some of the world‟s 
leading economies today absorbs a significant portion of economic resources and 
that, in general, this portion has been increasing throughout the 20
th
 century. As 
government grew, public finance economists became increasingly interested in 
analysing government expenditures. They have been examining the phenomenon 
of government involvement in the economy from two broad perspectives, 
generating, as Higgs (1987) remarks, two “big research families” in the literature. 
On the one side, those undertaking a “positive” approach have been aiming to 
explain the nature and causes of government size, while those pursuing a 
“normative” approach concentrated on the optimal government size. Our research 
takes the former perspective. It contributes to the literature on government size by, 
first, investigating the evolution of long, historical time-series of government 
expenditures for four developed market economies and, second, by integrating the 
various theoretical explanations into an eclectic model of government size and 
testing it on a sample of developed market economies for the period from 1970 to 
2008. As a result, this research provides useful insights into the determinants of 
the size of government in developed market economies; thereby providing 
additional evidence and making a contribution to the body of knowledge in the 
field of public economics.  
Research of any kind is unlikely to answer all the questions it addresses. More 
often, it raises new and more interesting questions. Our research is no exception.  
The purpose of this chapter is to pick out those parts of the work that we believe 
are fundamental and to point out the significance of our findings. What will it add 
to our understanding of the determinants of government size and its growth and 
how will it influence further research in this area? Who might benefit and what 
difference, if any, will it make to actual practice in the real world? 
This final chapter is organised as follows: in section 6.2 we gather the evidence 
from previous chapters and explain how we tackled and answered our research 
questions. The main contributions to knowledge are identified in section 6.3. In 
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section 6.4 we draw attention to the main limitations of our research and identify 
possible avenues of research to address similar issues in the future. We make 
recommendations about how our work can be improved and about other areas that 
our research suggests deserve further investigation. Section 6.5 conveys some 
final comments. 
6.2 The main findings  
Even in an economy that is assumed to be highly market-oriented, such as that of 
the US, the government absorbs more than one-third of the economic resources. 
The evidence presented in our thesis suggests that some of the most developed 
world economies have devoted a relatively high proportion of their GDP to 
government expenditures for many years. This fact alone, as remarked by 
Holcombe (2006), should be reason enough to analyse government spending 
activities. Given the importance of the phenomenon of government involvement 
in the economy, we were surprised to find out how little is known about why 
government involvement grows or declines.  
Even though our thesis takes on a positivistic approach to analysing government 
size, we introduced it with a general discussion about some normative issues 
regarding the optimal government size. The overviewed literature on ideological 
and political views, as well as the empirical literature on the growth effects of 
government expenditures left an impression that the issues about the desirable 
government size are genuinely intricate and unresolved. The best we can conclude 
is that there is little dispute among economists that the government should play a 
certain role in the economy. There is no consensus, however, on how big or small 
this role should be in practice. While reviewing the literature on optimal 
government size, we paid particular attention to studies that focused on the growth 
effects of the size of government. However, both the theoretical and even more 
the empirical literature on this topic proved to be utterly inconclusive. Economists 
still have not got a clear-cut answer to a question of whether or not a large 
government sector hinders economic performance, as measured by the growth 
rate. Moreover, briefly but indicatively, we pointed out that the rate of GDP 
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growth might not be an ideal measure of a country‟s welfare. It has been typically 
assumed that economic growth is important because it raises the quantity of goods 
and services consumed and that increased consumption makes people happier. 
This conventional view has been challenged, to some extent, by the recent 
development of the economics of happiness. This topic presents itself as a 
promising avenue for the future research. 
As for the political views about the desirable size of government, the reviewed 
literature indicates that the relationship between political parties, their ideologies 
and the actual government size is not as straightforward as one might (naively) 
expect. There seems to be a discrepancy between political rhetoric and actual 
political choices over the size of government expenditures. One would expect 
right-leaning, that is conservative, parties to believe in private enterprise and less 
government and to advocate lower tax rates. Parties of the left, on the other hand, 
would be expected to advocate government committed to social justice. In 
practice, however, each political party generally avoids political unpopularity and 
confrontation with strong interest groups, regardless of political orientation. This 
narrows their ideological differences and makes them more inclined to tailor their 
actual political decisions closer to what the voting public demands. Many 
examples from the political scene support the view that there is a discrepancy 
between what political parties claim they would do and what they actually do 
when they form the government. When building an integrative model of the size 
of government, this proposition informed our assumption that the supply of 
government goods and services is perfectly elastic, while the actual changes in the 
quantity of government are the result of demand-led factors. We did not, however, 
completely disregard the political dimension. On the contrary, we have sought to 
evaluate empirically the impact of political parties on government expenditures, 
introducing this variable among the explanatory variables in our model. The 
obtained results, however, lead us to conclude that political parties do not have 
much success either in their attempts to control or stimulate government 
expenditures. In addition, in our search for possible structural breaks in 
195 
 
government growth, we found no breaks that could be related straightforwardly to 
major changes in the political system. 
Upon setting the conceptual background, we compiled a unique database covering 
all four countries for which the data on government expenditures dated back to the 
19
th
 century, aiming to describe the historical profile of government growth. A 
thorough investigation, supported by a newly developed econometric technique, 
revealed some interesting features in the secular behaviour of government 
expenditures in four developed market economies (the US, the UK, Italy and 
Sweden). Our main aim was to identify exactly when the size of government 
started to grow and to determine whether the identified dates coincided with the 
conventionally hypothesised dates - WWI, the Great Depression and WWII. The 
obtained results suggested that the rise of government expenditures, at least in the 
US and the UK, gathered momentum around the turn of the 19
th
 century and 
continued for one hundred years. No statistical evidence for major breaks in the 
trend of government expenditures were found in the case of Italy and Sweden. 
Our results, contrary to popular perceptions, indicate that governments started to 
grow before the onset of WWI and that the two world wars and the Great 
Depression had only transitory effects on the relative size of government. We do 
re-emphasise, however, that drawing any kind of general conclusion on this issue 
requires the analysis to be carried out on a much broader sample of countries than 
the one we had at hand. We broadly pointed out some factors in the economic 
history of the UK and US which we believed could contribute to explaining why 
this initial outbreak of government expenditures occurred at the identified years. 
In short, we argued that government involvement in the American and British 
economy started to increase massively at the end of the 19
th
 century due to 
substantial economic, social, political and ideological changes that set the stage 
for larger state activism throughout the 20
th
 century. However, only by detailed 
historical study can one hope to understand the complexities of the growth of both 
British and American governments.  
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We next focused on the heart of the thesis - a thorough analysis of the factors that 
determine the size of government in the economy. The theoretical literature 
suggests there is no comprehensive, explicitly formulated and testable theoretical 
model of the size of government in the economy. Instead, there are a number of 
“monocausal” theoretical approaches towards explaining the extent of government 
involvement in the economy. We focused on what we believed were the major 
strands of the directly relevant literature and overviewed the most prominent 
theoretical approaches. Given the absence of a formal structural model of the size 
of government in the economy, researchers have generally tested one theory at a 
time with no regard to different factors acting simultaneously; or have simply “put 
together”, in an ad hoc manner, various explanatory factors into one large a-
theoretical testing specification. Although some of the proposed theoretical 
explanations differ in their assumptions about the benevolence of government, 
they all contain valid insights, and they are not mutually exclusive. Before 
proceeding with multivariate empirical investigation, we proposed a simple, but 
coherent theoretical framework. We argue that the observed government 
expenditures are the outcomes of the interaction between demands of consumers-
voters, various interest groups, including bureaucrats and politicians, and the 
supply responses of the government, under their respective constraints. By making 
certain simplifying assumption about the nature of supply and demand in the 
government sector, we develop an integrative model. In our theoretical model we 
assume that the supply function is perfectly elastic and fixed at the exogenously 
determined level of the relative price of government services. To motivate a 
downwardly sloped demand function we use the median voter model. By 
assuming that the relative prices are exogenously given, hence fixing the perfectly 
elastic supply function, we solve the problem of identification, arriving at a model 
in which the quantity of government is demand-driven and which could then be 
operationalised as a framework for the empirical analysis.  
Once we set in place the analytical foundations, we proceeded with the empirical 
analysis of the main determinants of government size in developed market 
economies. We consider this part of the thesis to be the central one, since it 
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provides answers to our main research question. Before applying the preferred 
estimation technique to arrive at consistently estimated long-term determinants of 
government size, we provided a detailed discussion about the observed proxies 
chosen as counterparts to the theoretical concepts under investigation. All 
limitations and doubts in relation to defining appropriate proxy variables, as well 
as problems encountered while compiling the database, were documented and 
discussed. Once we compiled a rich data base covering 26 developed OECD 
countries over the period 1970-2008, we applied what we believe to be the most 
appropriate estimation technique. The search for a preferred estimator was quite 
challenging, partly because there is no single definitive methodology and partly 
because the estimation techniques developed for “large N, large T” panels are 
currently a developing area of research. Using a panel-equivalent error correction 
methodology, we have arrived at the core determinants of the size of government 
in developed economies. Our findings indicate that the extent of government 
involvement in the economy is driven by: the level of economic activity; the 
complexity of the economic system; the degree of both trade and financial 
openness; the relative prices of government to private goods; and by the share of 
government employment in total employment.  
Contrary to Wagner‟s income-elasticity proposition for the increasing shares of 
government in the economy, our results suggest the extent of government 
involvement in the economy decreases, ceteris paribus, as a country gets 
wealthier. Precisely, our results suggest that government-provided goods and 
services are “normal”, at least in the time period under investigation. To explain 
this finding, we argue that Wagner‟s Law was valid only in the late 19th and early 
20
th
 century, when people demanded larger governments, since government 
functions, by that time, were new or non-existent. We hypothesise that, over time, 
upon reaching a certain threshold, an additional “unit” of government-provided 
good and services may have started adding less and less additional utility. Our 
findings, on the other hand, indicate that the extent of government seems to 
increase, ceteris paribus, as a country‟s economic system gets more complex, 
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which is in line with Wagner‟s modernisation hypothesis that people demand 
larger public sectors as market and legal relationships become more complex.  
Our estimates suggest that a country‟s openness does affect the size of 
government and, moreover, that the effect depends on the type of economic 
openness. According to our findings, one could expect the size of government to 
decrease, ceteris paribus, as a country gets financially more open. On the other 
hand, increase in a country‟s international trade intensity is expected, ceteris 
paribus, to increase the pressure for more government expenditures. The positive 
effect of the trade openness variable is in line with Rodrik (1998) and other 
proponents of the compensation hypothesis, suggesting that people rely on 
government to stabilise the economy and offset external risk. The finding of a 
somewhat smaller, but also statistically significant negative effect of a country‟s 
financial openness implies that more competitive deregulation and greater 
competition for mobile international factors shrinks the size of government in the 
economy. This finding is in accordance with proponents of the efficiency 
hypothesis.  
Probably most disturbing, at least for the proponents of limited government, is the 
finding that the government sector suffers from Baumol‟s “cost disease”. This 
finding implies that the productivity lag of the government sector is continuously 
working to increase the relative size of government in the economy. The 
unbalanced productivity growth between technologically progressive industries 
and the productivity-lagging government sector, accompanied by homogenous 
wage setting across all sectors in the economy, results in increased prices of 
government services. Given the price-inelastic nature of demand for government 
services, an increase in relative prices of government services, ceteris paribus, 
increases the relative size of government in the economy.  
Finally, as expected, the results suggest that government sector employees exert a 
positive effect on the size of government in the economy, which is a rather self-
explanatory result.  
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An important finding of a statistically highly significant and robust error 
correction coefficient implies that there exists a long-run equilibrium relationship 
between government size and the determinants included in our model. Any 
deviation from the equilibrium relationship would trigger an adjustment process 
taking place over a long period, reflecting a high degree of inertia in government 
expenditure shares.  
As a final note on our main results, we emphasise that our empirical findings of 
income-inelastic and (almost completely) price-inelastic demand for government 
goods and services are consistent with our theoretical model. Interpreted directly, 
the coefficients estimated in our empirical model suggest that - ceteris paribus -
the share of government in the economy, as a consequence of Baumol‟s cost 
disease, rises along with the relative price of government goods and services; and, 
on the other hand, tends to decline with increase in income. In Chapter 5 we 
demonstrated, using some simple algebra, that income-inelastic and price-inelastic 
demand for government goods and services are implicit within our estimated 
results.  
6.3 Contribution to knowledge  
As outlined above, our research, in the tradition of mainstream economics, 
extends and contributes to the existing literature on the causes of the generally 
increasing size of the government sector in developed market economies by 
providing new insights and a number of important and interesting results. In what 
follows, we concisely point out three main areas in which we believe our study 
has made a contribution to knowledge.  
Firstly, employing a newly developed statistical technique, we provide evidence 
that the rise of government expenditures gathered momentum around the turn of 
the 19
th
 century; thus, implying that it may not be related primarily to world wars 
or the Great Depression, as conventionally assumed. Exceptionally valuable 
historical data on government expenditures dating back to the 19
th
 century offers a 
unique opportunity to observe and investigate the secular behaviour of 
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government size. Since studies with such long, historical series of government 
expenditures are quite rare, little research of this type existed before.  
Secondly, we “bridge” the gap the between theory and empirics by developing a 
simple, but coherent integrative theoretical framework for studying and testing the 
main determinants of government size, proposed by different theoretical 
approaches. In this regard, our study differs from most of the existing empirical 
contributions to this literature, which tend to investigate the determinants of 
government size in an ad hoc - hence, a-theoretical and piecemeal - manner. 
Finally, the originality of our approach lies not only in the developed underlying 
theoretical framework, but also in the empirical methodology applied to estimate 
the long-run determinants of government size. Namely, we estimate the preferred 
model specification using a newly developed panel-equivalent error correction 
methodology. This technique offers an opportunity to address some important 
methodological issues, rarely discussed in other empirical studies in this field. For 
the purposes of our research, we argue that this is the most appropriate technique, 
since it meets our research aims and is compatible with the dimensions of our data 
set. Moreover, it provides a solution to accommodating the joint occurrence of 
dynamics and parameter heterogeneity, two essential issues in examining the 
long-run determinants of government size in a multi-country dataset. Also, in a 
straightforward way, it addresses the problem of endogeneity, which otherwise 
could bias the obtained results. Such methodological improvements achieved 
through the econometric technique applied increase confidence in the reliability of 
our findings and, to a large extent, contribute to the originality of our study.  
Apart from the above outlined contributions to the existing body of knowledge, 
we believe that an additional strength of our thesis lies in a rich data set that we 
have compiled from numerous sources. Our work required a great effort at data 
collection, since obtaining consistent data series for a large sample of countries 
over a long span of years for a relatively large number of variables was not an 
easy task. To the best of our knowledge, such a comprehensive data set has not 
been used in any other study. We were greatly advantaged by the willingness of 
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some eminent researchers in this field to provide us with access to data, which 
would otherwise have been very hard, if not impossible, for us to obtain. We are 
indebted to them since the provided data improved the quality of our research 
substantially.  
6.4 Limitations and further research avenues 
The studies on the size of government suffer, as do many other studies in the field 
of economic and social science, from difficulties related to measurement of the 
concept they aim to describe and explain. Economists are accustomed to empirical 
research in which they cannot measure what they want to measure directly and 
therefore must resort to proxies. The problem is that those proxies sometimes do 
not correspond appropriately to their theoretical counterparts, or their availability 
is limited to only a restricted number of countries and time periods. Economists 
attempting to undertake an analysis of the nature, causes and consequences of 
government size encounter the same difficulties. As already pointed out 
throughout the thesis, measurement difficulties in regards to quantification of 
government size are a result of the fact that governments take on various different 
activities, some of which defy precise measurement. As a result, there is no single 
comprehensive measure that could embrace the multidimensionality of the 
government sector in practice. In a variety of measures proposed in the literature, 
government expenditure as a proportion of GDP is the most widely used indicator 
of the extent of government involvement in the economy. There are, however, a 
number of conceptual issues related to this commonly employed measure of 
government size which, in effect, all boil down to the fact that government 
expenditures do not capture the overall significance of government in many 
countries. While acknowledging those conceptual issues, we nonetheless focused 
on the data on government expenditures that were available through official 
international databases and through previous works by economic historians. Our 
aim was to obtain the data on total general government expenditures - i.e., the 
aggregate data on all types of government expenditures (consumption 
expenditure, investment expenditures, interest and transfer payments), accruing at 
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all levels of government (central, state and local) - covering a relatively long time 
span that would enable us to analyse the long-run relationships between 
government size in the economy and its various, theoretically hypothesised 
determinants. We were somewhat surprised to find out that such data was quite 
difficult to obtain. While we managed to compile the data on the total general 
government expenditures in GDP for the 26 developed countries covering the 
time period from 1970 to 2008, our aim to obtain comparable data for earlier 
years proved unattainable. Inclusion of the pre-WWI period, however, was 
essential in Chapter 2. The main aim of that chapter was to identify time points at 
which government size started to grow and to determine whether the identified 
dates coincided with the conventionally hypothesised ones. Those research aims, 
coupled with the (non)availability of the historical data, left us no other choice but 
to employ data on government expenditures accruing only at the central level, 
covering only four developed countries. Admittedly, analysing solely the shares of 
central government expenditures in the economy could provide misleading results, 
especially for federal countries where sub-central levels of government amount to 
a significant share of total general government. Also, the number of investigated 
countries was too limited to draw any kind of general conclusions about the exact 
period at which governments started to grow.  
In every research project, it is very important to have a clear conception of the 
phenomena to be described and explained. The previous discussion suggests that, 
in the field of public sector economics, there are some unresolved conceptual 
issues and disagreements among economists over the question of what the size of 
government actually is. It is arguable that the conventional budgetary measure of 
government size becomes a less useful indicator of the magnitude of 
government‟s influence over the economy as regulation and other non-budgetary 
aspects of government increase. Hence, the daunting task of constructing an 
encompassing measure of government size still remains to be accomplished. 
Smith (2006) remarks, and we concur, that there is a strong need for well-
documented and internally consistent data on government sector activity. A more 
systematic collection of the existing data is also much needed in this area.  
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In what follows, we propose some potential avenues for future research. Given the 
main aim of exploring the nature and determinants of the total size of government 
in the economy, this thesis builds on the so-called  “holistic” or “macro” view that 
all types of government expenditures accruing at all levels of government should 
be included in the definition of government expenditures
56
. A possible extension 
of our research is to undertake an alternative, “micro” perspective concentrating 
on specific types of government expenditures or levels of government. It could be 
sound to break up aggregate government expenditures into different categories 
and programs and different levels of government to get a clearer picture of what 
governments actually do and a better understanding of how they do it. Since it is 
quite reasonable to expect that the effect of different explanatory variables differs 
across different structural components of the composite measure of government as 
well as across different levels of government, disaggregating this measure would 
allow us to formulate a more nuanced test of the leading theoretical approaches. 
There are many interesting disaggregate, country-specific studies. However, we 
do not review these as they are not directly consisted with our research aim.  
While this research investigates the phenomenon of government involvement in 
developed economies, it would be interesting to examine whether the identified 
determinants bear importance also for the size of government in transitional 
economies. This is where we envisage another potential extension of our research. 
We do foresee, however, some practical problems related to non availability and 
poor quality of the data for transitional countries. In the best-case scenario, one 
could hope to obtain data starting from the beginning of 1990s. This was the 
period when the majority of transitional countries, at least, the more developed 
ones in Central and Eastern Europe, gained their independence and established 
their official bureaus of statistics. From the statistical point of view, such a 
relatively short time span implies that there would not be enough time 
                                                 
56
 We did follow this approach, except in Chapter 2 where we were constrained to employ the data 
on government expenditures accruing only at the central level due to nonavailability of data on 
historical general government expenditures.  
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observations to capture the long-run relationship between government size and its 
potential determinants.  
Despite the specificities of transitional economies, we believe that the main 
findings of our study may convey implications for rolling back the extent of 
government involvement in the economy which has been, and still is, the main 
issue in many transitional economies. Compared to the pre-transition period when 
the government owned almost all means of production, the extent of government 
involvement has been reduced; however, many of those countries still have high 
shares of government expenditures in their economies. While policy makers in 
transitional economies are advised to drastically cut the size of government, little 
has been said about the appropriate role and extent to which government 
involvement should be reduced. To an extent, this could be explained by the fact 
that those issues are still unresolved and unclear even for the case of developed 
market economies, as we have demonstrated throughout the thesis. 
6.5 Final comments 
The findings of our research may be viewed as important also from the 
perspective of informing policy processes. We introduced this thesis with a brief 
discussion of public concern over the alleged large size of government. 
Government expenditures are, according to Afonso and Furceri (2008), a key 
variable that influences the (non)sustainability of public finances via effects on 
fiscal balances and government debt. Concerned with increasing deficits and 
government debts, as well as with the possible adverse effects of government on 
economic growth, many economists and policy makers vigorously insist on 
downsizing the government sector. They insist on rigorous checks of government 
programs, strict lending proposals, balanced budgets, and even suggest imposing 
ceilings of government expenditure shares in GDP. The widespread international 
concern about the sustainability of “big government” policies, according to Smith 
(2006), means that there is a growing literature that analyses the factors that 
determine the success of official attempts to stabilise the public finances, in other 
words, to reduce government expenditures. We believe that the results of our 
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research in this regard play an important role. Our thesis has demonstrated that the 
observed levels of government expenditures are a consequence of many 
underlying factors. This implies that any direct attempts to reduce government 
expenditures advocated by the proponents of limited governments are not likely to 
be effective in the long run. Those who attempt to stabilise the public finances and 
curb the size of government should have a clear understanding of the causes of 
government expenditures. In order actually to change the extent of government 
involvement in the economy, it would seem necessary somehow to manipulate the 
forces identified in our study as important determinants of government. The main 
results of our research suggest that the inherent productivity lag of government-
provided goods and services, the increasing complexity of the economic system, 
increasing involvement in international trade and the increasing number of 
government sector employees will all continuously work to increase the pressure 
for more government expenditures in future years.  
By contributing to a better understanding of the main determinants of government 
size, we also hope to inform debate on the appropriate size and role of the 
government sector in a mixed economy. The literature concerned with the effects 
of government expenditures on a country‟s economic performance clearly 
represents an important area in public sector economics; however, we do not 
discuss it directly in our work. Our work is primarily concerned with a detailed 
analysis of government expenditures per se.  
Our investigation is primarily of an exploratory kind, aiming at identifying 
empirical regularities through econometric analysis. The main aim of this thesis is 
to assess empirically the contribution and respective relevance of each of the 
independent theoretical explanations of the size of government in the economy 
identified in the literature; thus offering additional insights into the size of 
government in mixed economies. The research is undertaken in the tradition of 
positive mainstream economics, which indeed limits the scope of the research. 
Our decision to limit the context of our research only to literature with 
econometrics evidence, has to do with our aim to limit the scope of the research 
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while, at the same time, maintaining the coherence of this essentially applied 
economic research.  
We do follow the tradition of mainstream economics, but acknowledge that the 
rationale of actual practices in economics in general and in the study of 
government expenditures in particular is indeed open to question. Critics of the 
mainstream tradition could argue that the undertaken approach is stripped of 
political, institutional and historical context. There are other potentially fruitful 
perspectives and disciplines feasible to approach this subject matter. To 
understand fully the determinants of the size of government, one should ideally 
become familiar with the relevant literature and findings of several disciplines, 
including history, philosophy, political science, and other social sciences. The 
political dimension is an important element in the study of government 
expenditures, since decisions on public policy and expenditure outcomes 
continuously involve political judgement, political calculation and political 
choice. Also, we would need to turn to economic and political history to provide a 
comprehensive background for answering some of the questions as to how and 
why government grew. In addition, bearing in mind that government is, in fact, 
the collectivity of many coexisting human institutions of varying function, scope, 
and authority (Higgs, 1987), at this point we emphasise also the importance of 
institutions, laws and customs of society in a comprehensive study of the 
government sector. Indeed, a comprehensive analysis of the size of government 
involves venturing outside economics and calls for the use of concepts and models 
that are interdisciplinary in nature. This presents an interesting agenda for future 
research.  
In the light of the above discussion, the findings of this research - undertaken in 
the tradition of positive mainstream economics - necessarily will leave a part of 
the story about the determinants of government size untold. Building on our 
discussion of the methodological issues involved in modern economics advanced 
in Chapter 1, we recognise that the employed formal econometric methods might 
not be perfectly suited for the investigation of a phenomenon as complex as the 
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size of government. We do not uncritically accept the reigning orthodoxies, but 
we do reject complete scepticism about economic theory and formal econometric 
methods. Indeed, philosophers of sciences are still not clear on what it means to 
be scientific in economics and how an economic inquiry can be best carried out 
(Boumans and Davis, 2010). Being constrained by both the available econometric 
techniques, underlying assumptions and the available data, this type of empirical 
work always runs the risk of incompleteness. However, the approach followed in 
this thesis justifies the claim to be scientific. We used the tools of economic 
theory to articulate the questions to be answered and to derive a rigorously tested 
model, and also to ensure that arguments are conducted coherently with a rigorous 
logical basis. We have followed what David Henry (1980) calls the “three golden 
rules of econometrics” - test, test and test - to ensure that our findings are not an 
artefact of statistical “alchemy”. Nonetheless, throughout the thesis we remain 
cautious with respect to the limitations of our approach. 
As a field, according to Auerbach and Feldstein (2002), public economics is 
defined by its objectives rather than its techniques. In fact, the methodological 
perspective undertaken in this thesis, that is the application of modern methods of 
economic theory and econometrics to public sector problems, according to the 
same authors, has, more than anything else, distinguished the research in the field 
of public economics of the past 30 years from all that had been done before. The 
newly available data coupled with sophisticated econometric techniques provided 
an opportunity to undertake an empirical approach to public finance that had not 
been done before and to address some of the key questions of public finance in a 
new and rigorous empirical manner. 
Finally, given that our research approach reflects the principles of positivism, 
throughout the thesis we adopt the philosophical stance of judgement-neutrality. 
Nonetheless, in so far as we make this “methodological judgment” with respect to 
the preferred methods of investigation, methodological purists may argue that we 
do bring in our own value judgement about how the investigation ought to be 
developed. In this light, all research in economics is condemned to be 
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“methodology-biased”, given that, as pointed out by Boumans and Davis (2010), 
philosophers of sciences are still not clear on how an economic inquiry can be 
best carried out. We do believe that our research approach provides a legitimate 
opportunity to address the key research questions of this thesis in a scientifically 
founded and rigorous empirical manner. 
Despite the recent advances in the field of public sector economics, there is still 
much more to be learnt and much more work to be done to improve our 
understanding of the nature and causes of the size of government in the economy. 
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APPENDIX 1 
APPENDIX 1.1: HISTORICAL DATA ISSUES 
Table A.1.1: Data description for the USA, the UK, Italy and Sweden, respectively 
USA 
For the period 1789-1975 data on government expenditure is taken from Mitchell 
(1998, p.664-669), Table G5, Total Central Government Expenditure. All types of 
central government budgetary expenditures and in many cases, extra-budgetary 
expenditures, are included. For the same period, 1789-1975, data on national 
economy‟s production is taken from the same source; National Accounts Totals, Table 
J1: National Accounts Totals, GNP (Mitchell, 1998, p.761-774). For the rest of the 
period, 1975-2005, data on government expenditure is extracted from the IFS.   
 
UK 
 
For the period 1830-1975 data on government expenditure is taken from Mitchell 
(1981, p.733-739), Table H4, Total Central Government Expenditure. For the same 
period, 1830-1975, the data on the national economy‟s production is taken from 
Mitchell (1988, p.831-835); National Accounts: GDP. For the rest of the period, 1975-
1999, data on government expenditure is extracted from IFS (Expenditure) as well as 
on the national production (GDP). A close examination of the overlapping period 
(1945-1975) showed that the IFS figures are persistently higher compared to the 
Mitchell figure for 21.3 percent, on average. This overestimation of the IFS figures of 
about 21 percent was constant throughout the overlapping period. Hence, we have 
scaled the IFS share figures (1975-1999) down by 21.3 percent, to arrive to a coherent 
series.   
Italy 
For the period 1862-1975 data on government expenditure is taken from Mitchell 
(1981, p.733-739), Table H4, Total Central Government Expenditure. For the same 
period, 1862-1975, data on national economy‟s production is taken from Mitchell 
(1981, p.817-835); National Accounts, Table K1: GNP. For the rest of the period, 
1975-1998, data is extracted from the IFS.  
Sweden 
For the period 1881-1975 data on government expenditure is taken from Mitchell 
(1981, p.733-739), Table H4, Total Central Government Expenditure. For the same 
period, 1881-1975, data on national economy‟s production is taken from Mitchell 
(1981, p.817-835); National Accounts, Table K1: GDP. For the rest of the period, 
1975-2005, data is extracted from the IFS. The 2001 figure for the government 
expenditure was missing. Hence, we impute it as an average of the one-year-before and 
one-year-after figures. 
Notes: GDP denotes gross domestic product, GNI denotes gross national income. Figures are 
expressed in current national currency. The government expenditure figures from the IFS cover 
operations of the consolidated central government (budgetary central government and, where these 
exist, operations of extrabudgetary units and social security funds). The data on government 
expenditures is calculated on the cash basis; comprises all nonrepayable payments by the 
government, whether requited or unrequited and whether for current or capital purposes, and 
includes purchases of nonfinancial assets. GDP is the sum of final expenditures: export and import 
of goods and services, private consumption, government consumption, gross fixed capital 
formation and change in stocks. GNI is derived by adding Net Primary Income from Abroad to 
GDP (IFS, data base on CD ROM - edition 2006) 
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Table A.1.2: Problems encountered while constructing a long time series of government 
expenditure in economy for some European countries 
France 
We encountered non-conformity of the Mitchell (1981) and IFS figures during 
the overlapping period, which has led us to conclusion that there has been a 
change in methodology or that different aspects of government expenditures 
have been included in the figures retrieved from the two sources. Moreover, the 
data on the national production is problematic for the period prior to 1940. 
Germany 
Germany underwent many changes in its territorial boundaries and socio-
political systems throughout the history. As for the data on central government 
expenditure, it is available from 1871, but the figures are missing in the period 
1935-1949. The data on national production is available in terms of Net national 
product (NNP) with figures for the periods 1915-1925 and 1939-1949 missing. 
For period 1950-1975, figures are given in terms of Gross National Product 
(GNP).    
Netherlands 
The data on the central government expenditure exist from 1845. However, the 
data on the size of the national economy are not available for the period prior to 
1900. Up to 1936 figures are for NNP. Subsequently, they are for GNP. Figures 
for the period 1940-1948 are missing. 
Norway 
The data on the central government expenditure exists from 1850. However, 
there is a minor problem with non-overlapping figures in the period 1945-1975. 
The data on GDP is available from 1865, with the 1940-1946 period missing.  
Switzerland 
The data on the central government expenditure exists from 1850. However, the 
data on the size of the national economy is not available for the period prior to 
1929. Figures on national production are if NNP up to 1950, and of GDP 
subsequently.  
Denmark 
The data on the central government expenditure exists from 1900 and on the 
national production from 1870. Data on GNP for 1915-1921 is missing. We 
encountered a degree of non-conformity of the Mitchell (1981) and IFS figures 
during the overlapping period, which has led us to conclusion that there has been 
a change in methodology or that different aspects of government expenditures 
have been included in the figures retrieved from the two sources. 
Spain 
The data on the central government expenditure and Net national product (NNP) 
are available from 1906, with figures for the period 1936-1939 missing. Hence, 
the problem is non-availability of the pre-1906 data, as well as replacement of 
NNP with GDP for the period after 1975.  
Greece 
The data on the central government expenditure exists from 1783. However, the 
data on the size of the national economy is not available for the period prior to 
1927. Up to 1948 figures are of NNP. Subsequently, they are of GDP. Figures 
for the period 1940-1945 are missing. 
Finland 
The data on the central government expenditure exists from 1882. The data on 
the size of the national economy, however, is not available for the period prior to 
1927. Up to 1950 figures are for NNP. Subsequently, they are for GDP. 
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APPENDIX 1.2: GROWTH RATES OF THE SHARE OF GOVERNMENT 
EXPENDITURES IN THE ECONOMY; THE US, THE UK, ITALY AND SWEDEN - 
PLOTS   
Figure A.1.1: Plots of the growth rates of the US central government expenditure shares in 
GDP  
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Figure A.1.2: Plots of the growth rates of the UK central government expenditure shares in 
GNI  
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Figure A.1.3: Plots of the growth rates of the Italian central government expenditure shares 
in GDP 
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Figure A.1.4: Plots of the growth rates of the Swedish central government expenditure 
shares in GNI 
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APPENDIX 1.3: PERRON’S UNIT ROOT TESTS (MODEL A, MODEL B AND MODEL C) 
The following three regressions correspond to the three types of break discussed 
by Perron (1989):  
Model A: titi
k
i
ttt uycyTBDtDUty  


1
1)(               (1) 
Model B: 
~
*
ttt yDTty    (2)     t
k
i
titt
uxcyy  


1
~
1
~
1
~
    (2) 
Model C: titi
k
i
tttt uycyTBDDTtDUty  


1
1)(   (3) 
where TB refers to the hypothesised break in the series. Additional variables to 
the typical ADF equation for yt ( ty  is a time-series;   is constant;   is the 
coefficient on the time trend; t  is the time trend; 1ty the first lag of ty ; is the 
coefficient on 1ty ; and ity   are i=1,…,k lagged differences of the dependent 
variable; ic are coefficients on ity  and tu is error term) are defined as:   
DT t = t if t > TB; otherwise=0. This variable picks up changes in the slope of the 
series, i.e. it allows for a sudden change in the slope of the trend function; 
DUt = 1 if t > TB; otherwise=0. This is a conventional dummy variable measuring 
shifts in the constant, i.e. allows changes in the drift parameter in every period 
after the break;  
D(TB)t = 1 if t = TB + 1; otherwise=0.  This term can be understood as a control 
variable that captures the potential “outlier” character of the break. It effectively 
treats the break as a short-run possibility.  
Tests for the unit root are thus based on hypothesis  = 1 with reference to 
modified critical values, for example, presented in Perron (1989). Model C is the 
most general one, allowing for changes both in the level and in the rate of growth 
of the series. Model B is a more specific model, analogous to the additive outlier 
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(AO) model that allows for the possibility that the shift in the slope of the trend in 
our series happened abruptly, without significant change in the level of the series. 
The AO test is performed in two steps. The first step is to detrend data using the 
following equation:
~
*
ttt yDTty   , where
*
tDT is a dummy variable 
equal to the difference between the time trend and the time point of the structural 
break (TB) for all periods after the break (if TBt  ) and 0 otherwise;   is the 
coefficient on 
*
tDT  and  ty
~
 are residuals. The next step is to employ the 
regression equation in which the dependent variable is the residual from the 
equation estimated in the first step: t
k
i
titt
uxcyy  


1
~
1
~
1
~
 , where ty
~
 are 
residuals from the regression of ty  on a constant, a time trend and 
*
tDT ;   is the 
coefficient on 
~
1ty  and 
~
1ty  is the first lag of ty
~
; ic  is coefficient on 
~
1 tx  and 
~
1 tx  are ( ki ,..,1 ) lagged differences of the dependent variable and tu  is white-
noise error term. A researcher tests the null hypothesis of a difference stationary 
process with a break in the growth rate: 1 ; 0 ; against an alternative of a 
trend stationary process with a break: 1 ;  0 ; 0 . Perron (1989, Table 
V.B, p.1377) provides critical values against which we compare the test values of 
the coefficient on
~
1ty , i.e. critical values for the t-statistic of the null that 1 . 
His critical values are different from those proposed by Dickey and Fuller, 
because Perron‟s test for unit root (1989, 1990) permits the structural change 
under both the null and alternative hypothesis at a given point of time using a full 
sample. The critical values are subject to lambda - the ratio of the pre-break 
sample size to total sample size, namely
T
TB , since Perron (1989) assumes that 
the break point increases at the same rate as the total sample size. The critical 
values get larger as the break point coincides closer to the middle of the time-
series sample, after which, for 5.0 , these values tail off.  
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APPENDIX 1.4: GROWTH RATES OF THE SHARE OF GOVERNMENT 
EXPENDITURES IN THE ECONOMY; THE US, THE UK, ITALY AND SWEDEN - 
MODEL SPECIFICATIONS  
Table A.1.3: Estimation results for different autoregressive (AR) specifications of the growth 
rates for the US, the UK, Italy and Sweden  
 Model specification 
AR (1) AR(2) AR(3) 
T
h
e 
U
S
 const 0.002 (0.545) 0.009 (0.679) 0.679 (0.684) 
dlnG (-1) 0.217*** (0.000) 0.151***  (0.004) 0.145*** (0.005) 
dlnG (-2)  -0.146 *** (0.000) -0.139*** (0.002) 
dlnG (-3)   -0.038 (0.526) 
T
h
e 
U
K
 
const 0.006 (0.311) 0.006 (0.336)  
dlnG (-1) 0.424***  (0.000) 0.470*** (0.000)  
dlnG (-2)  -0.110 (0.165)  
It
al
y
 const 0.007 (0.564) 0.007 (0.555)  
dlnG (-1) -0.208** (0.129) -0.218** (0.011)  
dlnG (-2)  -0.049 (0.566)  
S
w
ed
en
 const 0.013  (0.279) 0.013 (0.119) 0.012 (0.166) 
dlnG (-1) -0.142  (0.117) -0.191** (0.028) -0.159* (0.086)  
dlnG (-2)  -0.346*** (0.000) -0.329 *** (0.000) 
dlnG (-3)   0.089(0.332) 
Notes: ***,**,* Numbers in the table are OLS estimators of the intercept (const), first 
(dlnG(-1)), the second (dlnG(-2)) and the third (dlnG(-3)) autoregressive coefficients, 
respectively. Numbers shown in parentheses are p-values. Dependent variable is rate of 
growth of the share of government expenditure in the economy (dlnG). ***, ** and * 
denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent significance level, respectively. Growth rates 
are computed as the first differences of the logarithm of the share of government 
expenditure in GDP.  
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APPENDIX 2 
APPENDIX 2.1: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS - ALL VARIABLES  
Table A.2.1:  Descriptive statistics for the employed variables 
Variable Obs Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Min Max 
G 904 41.99 9.52 16.15 67.47 
GDP 952 21350.25 8108.43 2981.34 65308.75 
DEP 1013 51.93 5.71 38.15 73.47 
FINC 893 19.97 5.87 6.49 48.53 
OPT 897 71.94 44.32 11.25 326.60 
OPF 827 2.78 14.03 0.19 206.44 
OPFQ 634 10.91 2.81 3.00 14.00 
RP 926 0.93 0.12 0.38 1.37 
UNEMP 931 6.16 3.85 0.00 19.93 
UNION 861 40.91 20.69 7.80 96.40 
GEMP 731 18.03 6.54 4.80 34.58 
DEC 649 19.82 16.77 0.05 61.50 
DCR 988 0.11 - 0.00 1.00 
POL 864 2.40 1.46 1.00 5.00 
G denotes government expenditure shares in GDP; GDP denotes  
gross domestic product per capita; DEP is the age dependency ratio; 
FINC denotes value added in banks, insurance, real estate and other 
business services as a share of total value added; OPT denotes trade 
openness; OPF denotes the Lane and Milesi-Ferretti de facto indicator 
of financial openness; OPFQ denotes the Quinn‟s de jure indicator of 
financial openness; RP denotes relative prices; UNEMP denotes 
unemployment rates; UNION denotes trade union density; GEMP 
denotes general government employment shares in total employment; 
DEC denotes revenue decentralisation; DCR denotes a dummy 
variable for financial crisis; and POL denotes the political character of 
government. 
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APPENDIX 2.2: PANEL UNIT ROOT TESTS 
As already pointed out, the PMG estimator developed by Pesaran et al. (1999) 
does not necessarily require preliminary tests for the presence of unit root in the 
variables. Nonetheless, for a better appreciation of the variables used in the 
model, we test the variables for the presence of a unit root.  
The analysis of unit roots in a panel context is a currently active area of research. 
During the last decade several approaches to panel unit root analysis have been 
developed, mainly as an extension of methods developed for single time series. 
The idea behind those methods is to exploit the panel dimension to improve the 
power of single-country unit root tests. In fact, as pointed out by Breitung and 
Pesaran (2005), one of the primary reasons behind the application of unit root 
tests to a panel of cross section units was to gain statistical power and to improve 
on the poor power of their univariate counterparts. The cross-sectional dimension 
of panel data acts as repeated draws from the same distribution and hence 
increases the power of standard ADF-type tests, which are known to lack power in 
distinguishing the unit root null from stationary alternatives (Harris and Sollis, 
2003).  
Panel data unit root tests - the Levin, Lin and Chu test (2002) test, the Im, Pesaran 
and Shin test (2003) and the Madalla and Wu (1999) test being the most 
prominent ones - are basically directed at testing the null hypothesis that the 
observed series has a unit root against the alternative of stationarity. Essentially, 
they are a generalisation of the standard ADF test. All these tests share a common 
assumption of cross-sectional independence, i.e. the assumption that disturbances 
to one unit are not diffused to other units. They all allow country-specific fixed 
effects and time trends to be included in the testing equations. The difference 
between them is in their assumptions about homogeneity/heterogeneity in the 
parameter of interest, i.e. autoregressive coefficients, across cross-sections. These 
tests also differ in whether or not they require the data set to be balanced.  
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Levin, Lin and Chu (2002) test the null of a unit root against the homogeneous 
alternative of stationarity. The main assumption of this test is that the 
autoregressive coefficients are the same across units. This implies that the tested 
variable in all countries converges towards its average at the same speed. It is 
arguable that this assumption of a homogenous unit root process is quite 
unrealistic and restrictive for practical purposes, particularly for variables with a 
time path strongly influenced by country-specific factors. Another limitation of 
the Levin, Lin and Chu (2002) test is that it requires the number of time periods to 
be the same across countries. Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003) and Maddala and Wu 
(1999) in their approach to panel unit root do not „force‟ the degree of persistence 
of the tested variable to be the same but instead allow the autoregressive 
coefficients to differ across countries. Under the heterogeneous alternative 
hypothesis they assume that at least some of the individual series are stationary. 
Instead of pooling the data, like in Levin, Lin and Chu (2002), the Im, Pesaran 
and Shin (2003) and Maddala and Wu (1999) tests perform N separate unit root 
tests on each cross-sectional series. In fact, Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003) base the 
test on the averages of country-specific test statistics obtained when estimating the 
ADF regression for each cross-sectional series, while Maddala and Wu (1999) use 
a test that combines p-values, also obtained from country-specific ADF 
regressions. Although the Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003) test with accommodations 
for serial correlation is appropriate for a sample of our size, since it works best 
with data set of “large T and at least moderate N” dimension, unfortunately it 
requires that there be no gaps in any of the cross-sectional series (StataCorp, 
2009). Since in our data set gaps in individual series are quite frequent, this 
requirement has informed our decision to use the Maddala and Wu (1999) 
approach to test the unit root properties of our variables. In the literature, the 
Maddala and Wu (1999) test is often presented together with the Choi (2001) test. 
Typically, these two tests are referred to as Fisher-type tests, because Maddala 
and Wu (1999) and Choi (2001) independently suggested a test that combines the 
p-values obtained when estimating a unit root test for each cross-sectional series. 
Fisher-type tests share the same null and alternative hypothesis with the Im, 
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Pesaran and Shin (2003) test; namely, the null that the individual series in the 
panel are jointly non-stationary against the alternative that a fraction of the series 
in the panel is stationary. In short, Fisher-type tests are performed on each cross-
section series separately, and then p-values (pi), i.e. the significance levels for 
rejecting the null of a unit root, are combined to obtain an overall test of whether 
the panel series contains a unit root (StataCorp, 2009). The Maddala and Wu 
(1999) P test, where 


N
i
ipP
1
ln2 , has a χ
2 
- distribution with 2N degrees of 
freedom. The Fisher-type tests are often used in practice because they are simple 
to implement, do not require balanced data sets, and can also be performed in the 
manner of the Phillips-Perron type of test
57
. Moreover, Maddala and Wu (1999) 
find that, for the heterogeneous alternative, in most cases the Fisher-type test 
performs similar or slightly better than the Im, Pesaran and Shin statistic with 
respect to size and power. One must be cautious, however, in attempting to infer 
the (non)stationary nature of a variable from panel unit root tests, including the 
Fisher-type test which we employ. As pointed by Smith and Fuertes (2010), there 
is a serious question about the interpretation of such tests. Namely, if the null of 
the unit root is rejected the panel test outcomes are difficult to interpret. Rejection 
of the null hypothesis does not indicate that all the series are stationary. It 
suggests that a fraction of the cross section units is stationary, but does not 
indicate how many and which particular cross section units are stationary. 
Another problem is related to the assumption of no cross-sectional correlation 
which underlies those tests. Pesaran (2007) warns that cross sectional dependence, 
if sufficiently large, can bias the results of panel unit root tests. To deal with this 
cross dependence problem, a simple common approach is to cross-sectionally de-
                                                 
57
 The main difference between the ADF and Phillips-Perron approach to unit root testing is in the 
way they deal with serial correlation in the errors. While the ADF test uses a parametric correction 
for serial correlation (i.e., uses additional lags of the first-differenced variable), the Phillips-Perron 
test sticks to original Dickey-Fuller regressions (i.e., the one with no additional lags of the first-
differenced variable) but by using nonparametric statistical methods adjusts the test statistics to 
take into account (potential) autocorrelation pattern in the errors. Monte Carlo studies do not show 
a clear ranking of the two tests regarding their power in finite sample (Verbeek, 2008). 
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mean the series before application of the panel unit root test which could partly 
deal with the problem. Accordingly, the tests are applied to de-meaned data
58
.  
A simple starting point to check for stationarity is to plot the data and look for 
evidence of (non)stationarity. The plots of government shares in GDP (G) are 
given in Figure A.2.1 in this Appendix, while Figure A.2.2 - Figure A.2.12  
present, on a country-by-country basis, the plots of the log of GDP per capita 
(lnGDP), log of financial sector share (lnFINC), log of age dependency ratio 
(lnDEP), log of trade openness (lnOPT), log of financial openness (lnOPF), log of 
relative prices (lnRP), log of rate of unemployment (lnUNEMP), log of general 
log of trade union density (lnUNION), log of government employment share 
(lnGEMP), log of revenue decentralisation (lnDEC) and log of political 
orientation (lnPOL). It would be a daunting task to comment on each such data 
plot separately. The main purpose of plotting the individual series is to provide 
some informal evidence of a non-constant mean and/or variance in the series. In 
other words, we “eye-ball” the plots to check if there are any sustained upward or 
downward sloping patterns, and/or if vertical fluctuations of the series differ 
greatly from one portion of the series to the other. In general, a visual inspection 
of the plots suggests that the variables are likely to be non-stationary.  
In addition to this subjective visual inspection of plots, the nonstationarity of 
variables is tested by means of Fisher-type unit root tests. In general, the findings 
from these tests, shown in Table A.2.2, suggest that the log of government shares 
in GDP (lnG), log of GDP per capita (lnGDP), log of age dependency ratio 
(lnDEP), log of general government employment share (lnGEMP), log of trade 
union density (lnUNION), log of financial openness (lnOPF) and log relative 
prices (lnRP) are nonstationary. The log of rate of unemployment (lnUNEMP), 
                                                 
58
 Pesaran (2007) argues that simple de-meaning of the series could partly deal with the problem of 
cross-sectional dependence if countries are equally affected by common factors (i.e. aggregate 
disturbances common to all). However, he warns that cross-section de-meaning could not work 
where pair-wise cross-section covariances of the error terms differs across the individual series. A 
currently extensive area of research is modelling of cross-sectional dependence in large panels. In 
the last few years work has been done on the so-called second generation panel unit root tests that 
allow for cross-sectional dependence.  
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log of financial sector share (lnFINC) and log of trade openness (lnOPT) are 
nonstationary when the testing equation includes a time trend. The log of revenue 
decentralisation (lnDEC) is nonstationary according to Phillips-Perron tests. 
Finally, for the log of political orientation (lnPOL) most tests suggest that the null 
hypothesis of non-stationarity is rejected. When differenced, all variables turn out 
to be stationary (except for the age dependency ratio variable when tested via the 
Phillips-Perron test). 
Table A.2.2: Panel unit root tests for de-meaned variables in levels and first differences: 
Fisher-type tests 
Variable 
Augmented Dickey-
Fuller 
(constant, no trend) 
Augmented 
Dickey-Fuller 
(constant, trend) 
Phillips-Perron 
(constant, no trend) 
Phillips-Perron 
(constant, trend) 
Levels     
lnG 0.023** 0.311 0.186 0.297 
lnGDP 0.657 0.978 0.305 0.866 
lnDEP 0.396 0.062* 0.922 0.990 
lnFINC 0.006*** 0.737 0.002*** 0.379 
lnOPT 0.009*** 0.131 0.049*** 0.557 
lnOPF 0.429 0.310 0.592 0.996 
lnRP 0.533 0.887 0.038** 0.229 
lnUNEMP 0.000*** 0.183 0.050*** 0.313 
lnGEMP 0.217 0.997 0.017** 0.999 
lnDEC 0.001*** 0.000*** 0.178 0.279 
lnUNION 0.916 0.568 0.579 0.829 
lnPOL 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.211 
First differences     
dlnG 0.000***  0.000***  
dlnY 0.000***  0.000***  
dlnDEP 0.000***  0.105  
dlnFINC 0.000***  0.000***  
dlnOPNT 0.000***  0.000***  
dlnOPNF 0.000***  0.000***  
dlnRP 0.000***  0.000***  
dlnUNEM 0.000***  0.000***  
dlnGEMP 0.000***  0.000***  
dlnDEC 0.000***  0.000***  
dlnUNION 0.000***  0.000***  
dlnPOL 0.000***  0.000***  
Note: Numbers in the table are p-values, while ***, ** and * denote the 1, 5 and 10 percent level of 
significance, respectively. Both ADF and PP test the null hypothesis of the existence of a unit root. 
Levels of the variables are modelled with a constant and no time trend, and with a constant and time 
trend, whereas the specifications for first differences of the variables include a constant only. The lag 
length was suggested by the Akaike information criterion (AIC), subject to a maximum of 4 lags. The 
Fisher-type tests were performed in Eviews 7 and Stata 11. 
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APPENDIX 2.3: DATA PLOTS 
Figure A.2.1: The share of government expenditures in GDP (G) plots 
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Figure A.2.2: The log of GDP per capita (lnGDP) plots 
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Figure A.2.3: The log of financial sector share (lnFINC) plots 
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Figure A.2.4: The log of age dependency ratio (lnDEP) plots 
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Figure A.2.5: The log of trade openness (lnOPT) plots 
3.2
3.4
3.6
3.8
4.0
1970 1980 1990 2000
Australia
4.0
4.2
4.4
4.6
4.8
1970 1980 1990 2000
Austria
4.4
4.6
4.8
5.0
5.2
1970 1980 1990 2000
Belgium
3.6
3.8
4.0
4.2
4.4
4.6
1970 1980 1990 2000
Canada
4.4
4.6
4.8
5.0
5.2
1970 1980 1990 2000
Czech Republic
4.0
4.2
4.4
4.6
4.8
1970 1980 1990 2000
Denmark
3.6
3.8
4.0
4.2
4.4
4.6
1970 1980 1990 2000
Finland
3.4
3.6
3.8
4.0
4.2
1970 1980 1990 2000
France
3.2
3.6
4.0
4.4
4.8
1970 1980 1990 2000
Germany
3.0
3.2
3.4
3.6
3.8
4.0
4.2
1970 1980 1990 2000
Greece
4.1
4.2
4.3
4.4
4.5
1970 1980 1990 2000
Iceland
4.0
4.4
4.8
5.2
5.6
1970 1980 1990 2000
Ireland
3.4
3.6
3.8
4.0
4.2
1970 1980 1990 2000
Italy
2.6
2.8
3.0
3.2
3.4
3.6
1970 1980 1990 2000
Japan
5.0
5.2
5.4
5.6
5.8
1970 1980 1990 2000
Luxembourg
4.4
4.6
4.8
5.0
1970 1980 1990 2000
Netherlands
4.15
4.20
4.25
4.30
4.35
4.40
4.45
1970 1980 1990 2000
Norway
3.6
3.8
4.0
4.2
4.4
4.6
1970 1980 1990 2000
Poland
3.6
3.8
4.0
4.2
4.4
1970 1980 1990 2000
Portugal
4.0
4.4
4.8
5.2
1970 1980 1990 2000
Slovak Republic
3.2
3.4
3.6
3.8
4.0
4.2
1970 1980 1990 2000
Spain
3.8
4.0
4.2
4.4
4.6
1970 1980 1990 2000
Sweden
4.0
4.2
4.4
4.6
4.8
1970 1980 1990 2000
Switzerland
3.7
3.8
3.9
4.0
4.1
4.2
1970 1980 1990 2000
United Kingdom
2.4
2.6
2.8
3.0
3.2
3.4
1970 1980 1990 2000
United States
LNOPNT
 
    
 
2
4
2
 
Figure A.2.6: The log of financial openness (lnOPF) plots 
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Figure A.2.7: The log of relative prices (lnRP) plots 
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Figure A.2.8: The log of unemployment rate (lnUNEMP) plots 
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Figure A.2.9: The log of trade union density (lnUNION) plots 
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Figure A.2.10: The log of general government employment share (lnGEMP) plots 
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Figure A.2.11: The log of fiscal decentralisation (lnDEC) plots 
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Figure A.2.12: The log of political orientation of governments (lnPOL) plots 
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APPENDIX 2.4: ADDITIONAL ESTIMATION RESULTS  
Table A.2.3:  PMG estimation results - all variables included, first-order ARDL specification 
(dependent variable ΔlnG) 
Variable PMG 
Long-run coefficients 
lnGDP 0.111            (0.135) 
lnDEP -0.693***    (0.000) 
lnFINC 0.327***      (0.000) 
lnOPT 0.053**        (0.096) 
lnOPF - 0.158***    (0.000)  
lnRP -0.391***    (0.000) 
lnUNEMP 0.050 ***   (0.002) 
lnGEMP 0.834***   (0.000) 
lnDEC -0.0234   (0.103) 
lnUNION - 0.072*   (0.100) 
lnPOL 0.009   (0.136) 
DCR 0.203***   (0.000) 
Short-run coefficients 
ΔlnGDP -0.632***   (0.000) 
ΔlnDEP -0.371   (0.628) 
ΔlnFINC 0.006    (0.960)      
ΔlnOPT -0.033   (0.525) 
ΔlnOPF 0.061**   (0.029) 
ΔlnRP 0.240   (0.388) 
ΔlnUNEMP 0.002   (0.933) 
ΔlnGEMP 0.453 ***   (0.000) 
ΔlnDEC 0.013   (0.766) 
ΔlnUNION -0.134   (0.442) 
ΔlnPOL -0.003   (0.721) 
ΔDCR -0.002   (0.389) 
Error-correction coefficient -0.318***  (0.000) 
Constant 0.646***  (0.000) 
Notes: A country-specific constant term is included. Numbers reported in parentheses are p-values.  
*, ** and *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent, respectively. LnGDP is the logarithm 
of GDP per capita; lnDEP is the logarithm of the age dependency ratio; lnFINC is the logarithm of 
value added in banks, insurance, real estate and other business services as a share of  total value 
added; lnOPT is the logarithm of trade openness; lnOPF is the logarithm of de facto financial 
openness; lnRP is the logarithm of relative prices;  lnUNEMP is the logarithm of unemployment 
rates; lnGEMP is the logarithm of general government employment shares in total employment; 
lnDEC is the logarithm of revenue decentralisation; lnUNION is the logarithm of trade union 
density; lnPOL is the logarithm of the political character of government; and DCR is a dummy 
variable for financial crisis. 
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Table A.2.4:  Robustness checks of the preferred PMG results - different lag lengths for the potentially endogenous variables 
 
Variable A B C 
D 
 
L
o
n
g
-r
u
n
 c
o
ef
fi
ci
en
ts
 
lnGDP -0.167 (0.200) -0.570*** (0.000) -0.243*** (0.000) -0.745*** (0.000) 
lnFINC 0.534*** (0.000) 0.452*** (0.000) 1.167*** (0.000) 0.823*** (0.000) 
lnOPT 0.031 (0.594) 0.119*** (0.000) 0.567*** (0.000) 0.178*** (0.000) 
lnOPF -0.168*** (0.000) -0.079*** (0.000) -0.285*** (0.000) -0.104*** (0.000) 
lnRP 0.652*** (0.000) 0.746*** (0.000) 0.855*** (0.000) 0.913*** (0.000) 
lnUNEMP -0.024 (0.383) 0.054*** (0.000) -0.058*** (0.000) -0.007 (0.711) 
lnUNION 0.238** (0.017) -0.109*** (0.000) 0.018 (0.704) 0.026 (0.258) 
lnGEMP 1.110*** (0.000) 0.461*** (0.000) 0.538*** (0.000) 0.971*** (0.000) 
lnDEC -0.010 (0.349) 0.025*** (0.002) 0.093*** (0.000) 0.036*** (0.000) 
lnPOL -0.012 (0.246) 0.018*** (0.000) 0.006*** (0.002) 0.025*** (0.000) 
DCR 0.354*** (0.008) -0.081*** (0.000) -0.008* (0.099) -0.045* (0.077) 
S
h
o
rt
-r
u
n
 c
o
ef
fi
ci
en
ts
 
ΔlnGDP -0.725*** (0.000) -0.462*** (0.010) -0.396*** (0.008) -0.520*** (0.003) 
ΔlnGDP (-1)   -0.572 (0.391) 0.061 (0.866) -0.019 (0.963) 
ΔlnGDP (-2)   0.313 (0.239)   0.228 (0.104) 
ΔlnFINC -0.014 (0.894) -0.018 (0.900) -0.057 (0.694) 0.030 (0.832) 
ΔlnOPT -0.076 (0.222) -0.072 (0.181) -0.119** (0.042) -0.042 (0.449) 
ΔlnOPF 0.054* (0.089) -0.011 (0.814) 0.057** (0.025) 0.009 (0.754) 
ΔlnRP 0.071 (0.767) -0.202 (0.490) -0.197 (0.608) -0.150 (0.663) 
ΔlnUNEMP -0.032 (0.313) 0.037 (0.474) 0.062 (0.270) 0.039 (0.532) 
ΔlnUNION -0.141 (0.335) -0.496 (0.298) -0.278 (0.326) -0.379 (0.149) 
ΔlnUNION (-1)   -0.161 (0.175) -0.068 (0.528)   
ΔlnGEMP 0.507*** (0.000) 0.629** (0.012) 0.767*** (0.000) 0.468** (0.025) 
ΔlnGEMP (-1)   -0.187 (0.346)     
ΔlnDEC 0.008 (0.851) 0.036 (0.544) 0.008 (0.875) 0.005 (0.938) 
ΔlnPOL 0.004 (0.548) 0.002 (0.861) -0.012 (0.142) 0.000 (0.992) 
ΔDCR 0.001 (0.309) 0.001 (0.699) -0.001 (0.400) -0.000 (0.943) 
 Constant -0.029 (0.388) 2.011*** (0.003) -0.236** (0.015) 1.307*** (0.004) 
 EC coefficient -0.175** (0.018) -0.308***  (0.003) -0.19** (0.015) -0.264*** (0.004) 
 No of obs 446 426 435 428 
Notes: All equations include a country-specific constant term. Numbers reported in parentheses are p-values. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent, 
respectively. Δ denotes first differences, (-1) and (-2) denote the first and second lag, respectively.
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Table A.2.5:  Robustness checks of the preferred PMG results - testing down procedure 
 Variable A B 
L
o
n
g
-r
u
n
 c
o
ef
fi
ci
en
ts
 
lnGDP -0.419*** (0.000) -0.438*** (0.000) 
lnDEP -0.513*** (0.000)  -0.564*** (0.000) 
lnFINC 0.594*** (0.000) 0.630*** (0.000) 
lnOPT 0.147*** (0.000) 0.140*** (0.000) 
lnOPF -0.170*** (0.000) -0.170*** (0.000) 
lnRP 0.732*** (0.000) 0.701*** (0.000) 
lnUNEMP -0.083*** (0.000) -0.091*** (0.000) 
lnUNION - - - - 
lnGEMP 0.686*** (0.000) 0.669*** (0.000) 
lnDEC -0.037*** (0.000) -0.034*** (0.000) 
lnPOL -0.005 (0.502) -0.005 (0.497) 
DCR -0.022 (0.223) - - 
S
h
o
rt
-r
u
n
 c
o
ef
fi
ci
en
ts
 
ΔlnGDP -0.484*** (0.002) -0.531*** (0.000) 
ΔlnGDP (-1) -0.337 (0.194) -0.374 (0.160) 
ΔlnDEP 0.481 (0.395) 0.314 (0.569) 
ΔlnFINC -0.080 (0.430) -0.057 (0.561) 
ΔlnOPT -0.088 (0.156) -0.083 (0.182) 
ΔlnOPF 0.057** (0.011) 0.056** (0.012) 
ΔlnRP -0.140 (0.560) -0.113 (0.646) 
ΔlnUNEMP 0.027 (0.661) 0.018 (0.771) 
ΔlnUNION - - - - 
ΔlnUNION (-1) - - - - 
ΔlnGEMP 0.125 (0.316) 0.125 (0.344) 
ΔlnGEMP (-1) -0.094 (0.389) -0.085 (0.422) 
ΔlnDEC 0.031 (0.520) 0.030 (0.544) 
ΔlnPOL -0.003 (0.721) -0.003 (0.684) 
ΔDCR -0.001 (0.847) - - 
 Constant 2..223*** (0.000) 2..331*** (0.000) 
 EC coefficient - 0.367*** (0.000) - 0.363*** (0.000) 
 No of obs 441 441 
Notes: All equations include a country-specific constant term. Numbers reported in parentheses 
are p-values. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent, respectively. Δ denotes 
first differences and (-1) denotes the first lag. LnGDP is the logarithm of GDP per capita; lnDEP is 
the logarithm of the age dependency ratio; lnFINC is the logarithm of value added in banks, 
insurance, real estate and other business services as a share of  total value added; lnOPT is the 
logarithm of trade openness; lnOPF is the logarithm of de facto financial openness; lnRP is the 
logarithm of relative prices;  lnUNEMP is the logarithm of unemployment rates; lnGEMP is the 
logarithm of general government employment shares in total employment; lnDEC is the logarithm 
of revenue decentralisation; lnUNION is the logarithm of trade union density; lnPOL is the 
logarithm of the political character of government; and DCR is a dummy variable for financial 
crisis. 
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 Table A.2.6.:  Robustness checks of the preferred results - different sample size (DFE 
estimates)  
 Variable A B 
L
o
n
g
-r
u
n
 c
o
ef
fi
ci
en
ts
 
lnGDP -0.433*** (0.002) -0.428*** (0.002) 
lnFINC 0.175 (0.175) 0.088 (0.511) 
lnOPT -0.067 (0.462) 0.016 (0.863) 
lnOPF -0.043 (0.297) -0.052 (0.227) 
lnRP 0.522*** (0.002) 0.547*** (0.002) 
lnUNEMP 0.079** (0.014) 0.082** (0.014) 
lnUNION -0.019 (0.756) -0.069 (0.310) 
lnGEMP - - - - 
lnDEC - - - - 
lnPOL 0.006 (0.726) -0.002 (0.907) 
DCR -0.010 (0.852) 0.027 (0.619) 
S
h
o
rt
-r
u
n
 c
o
ef
fi
ci
en
ts
 
ΔlnGDP -1.137*** (0.000) -1.136*** (0.000) 
ΔlnGDP (-1) 0.006 (0.955) 0.062 (0.527) 
ΔlnFINC 0.037 (0.454) 0.110** (0.034) 
ΔlnOPT -0.049 (0.100) -0.045 (0.107) 
ΔlnOPF 0.055*** (0.002) 0.044*** (0.009) 
ΔlnRP 0.387*** (0.000) 0.300*** (0.000) 
ΔlnUNEMP -0.007 (0.621) -0.004 (0.757) 
ΔlnUNION 0.059 (0.351) 0.046 (0.491) 
ΔlnUNION (-1) -0.083 (0.165) -0.013 (0.833) 
ΔlnGEMP - - - - 
ΔlnGEMP (-1) - - - - 
ΔlnDEC - - - - 
ΔlnPOL -0.004 (0.383) -0.002 (0.695) 
ΔDCR -0.017 (0.383) 0.021 (0.298) 
 Constant 1.467*** (0.000) 1.362*** (0.000) 
 EC coefficient -0.185*** (0.000) -0.17*** (0.000) 
 No of obs 674 639 
Notes: All equations include a country-specific constant term. Numbers reported in parentheses 
are p-values. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent, respectively. Δ denotes 
first differences and (-1) denotes the first lag. . LnGDP is the logarithm of GDP per capita; lnFINC 
is the logarithm of value added in banks, insurance, real estate and other business services as a 
share of  total value added; lnOPT is the logarithm of trade openness; lnOPF is the logarithm of de 
facto financial openness; lnRP is the logarithm of relative prices;  lnUNEMP is the logarithm of 
unemployment rates; lnGEMP is the logarithm of general government employment shares in total 
employment; lnDEC is the logarithm of revenue decentralisation; lnUNION is the logarithm of 
trade union density; lnPOL is the logarithm of the political character of government; and DCR is a 
dummy variable for financial crisis. 
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